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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF 
ISRAEL’S TECHNLOGY TRANSFERS AS TOOLS OF DIPLOMACY 
by 
David Tooch 
Florida International University, 2017 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Shlomi Dinar, Major Professor 
Since its inception, Israel has wrestled with attempts by adversaries to keep her politically 
isolated in the international arena. To garner more friends and expand diplomatic reach, 
Israeli leaders initiated a strategy of sharing specialized knowledge with other nations. 
The technologies and knowledge shared were based on the experience gained from 
Israel’s distinctive security and developmental struggles. The transfer of technology 
developed into a foreign policy instrument in Israel’s overall international relations. 
Technical cooperation became part of a broader foreign relations drive that sought to 
deliver greater diplomatic recognition for Israel. This strategy, which continues to present 
times, was born mostly out of two major necessities for the young struggling state. The 
first, to boost Israel’s political stature in international forums. The second, to 
counterbalance efforts by Israel’s rivals to keep the Jewish State isolated in the Middle 
East and the rest of the world. In the early years of the initiative, the technology transfers 
were mostly confined in fields related to agriculture and the military. In more recent 
years, the rise of Israel’s hi-tech industry has attracted worldwide attention creating new 
opportunities for Israeli foreign policymakers to widen the scope of technologies to be 
 vii 
offered as part of international partnerships. The dissertation examines the interplay of 
technology/knowledge transfers as a source of soft power for Israel in efforts to advance 
relationships even with seemingly unlikely partner nations. It explores the usefulness of 
know-how sharing in the making, growing and maintaining Israel’s relationships with 
two influential Asian countries. The study considers the multiple factors including the 
convergence of interests as drivers of Israel’s ties to India and China in both secretive and 
open relationships. Over the span of five decades, the Jewish State’s international 
cooperation efforts have grown in scope of expertise in areas like agriculture, defense, 
anti-terrorist training, and disaster relief. The study explores the weight of Israel’s 
technology transfers as tools of diplomacy in terms of propping up trade ties, gaining 
more favorable policies towards Israel in the context of the conflict with Palestinians and 
boosting bilateral exchanges in the form of official visits and treaties.   
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
An old story offers poignant insights about why a small struggling nation chooses 
knowledge transfers as a vehicle in its foreign policy strategy. The tale goes like this: a 
visitor to Israel asked his host why with all its challenges and problems the Jewish State 
finds the means to engage in international projects. The host responded with the parable 
of two (Galilee and Dead) seas. The waters of the Jordan River feed the two seas. The 
Sea of Galilee gives and receives; supporting life while the Dead Sea only takes and is 
void of life. The message, which emerges from the parable, is powerful. To support life 
one must not only receive but also give.  However, if one only receives it guarantees 
death.  The story echoes in part the ethos behind Israel’s technical cooperation strategy in 
foreign relations. 
Even in the early years of its fledgling statehood, Israel made the “export of 
knowledge” a pillar of her foreign policy. This strategy, which continues to present times, 
was born mostly out of two major necessities for the young struggling state. The first, to 
boost Israel’s stature in international forums. The second, to negate the efforts by Israel’s 
opponents to keep the Jewish State isolated in the Middle East and the rest of the world. 
Technical cooperation became part of a broader foreign relations drive that sought to 
deliver greater diplomatic recognition for Israel. Early technical cooperation programs 
drew on know-how from Israel’s own development struggles like how to overcome water 
scarcity to produce ample crop yields and foodstuffs.  
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The transfer of technology developed into hallmark foreign policy instruments 
in Israel’s overall international relations strategy especially in developing countries in 
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the former Soviet Republics. Over the span of five 
decades, the Jewish State’s international cooperation efforts have grown in scope of 
expertise in areas like agriculture, defense, anti-terrorist training, and disaster relief. 
Despite its relatively brief existence, Israel has managed to accrue a sizable inventory of 
groundbreaking and influential technological achievements to its credit. Israel’s leaders 
relentlessly espouse opportunities to showcase Israel’s technical accomplishments. 
Homegrown innovations are an immense source of national pride and have become tools 
in diplomacy meant to portray Israel as an accomplished country which has much to 
contribute in tackling global issues. In 2014, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
headlined Israel’s achievements before an influential audience of business leaders at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The Israeli leader asserted his country’s 
inventiveness was a product of a distinct duel set of circumstances. Most notably Israel’s 
demanding defense needs and the country’s collective sense of “no choice” mindset to 
self-devise given the country’s unique set of challenges and circumstances. Like other 
Israeli leaders before him, Mr. Netanyahu, touted technological achievements, making a 
case for Israel as an appealing success story. Success, in science and technologies which 
he said Israel has shared with others.  
Israel’s use of technology as tools of public diplomacy is underscored by an 
exhibition at the country’s main gateway -- Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport. In a hallway 
leading to departure gates a large wall features a pictorial history of Israeli technologies, 
which have influenced the world.  Interestingly, the exhibits are positioned to specifically 
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target the attention of passengers just about to leave the country. The exhibit projects 
Israel as a formidable player in science and technology advances. The display is perhaps 
representing a microcosm of Israel’s technology in diplomacy strategy.      
Historically, much of Israel’s international technology transfers have been 
channeled (often covertly) through state sponsored foreign outreach campaigns. Usually 
these projects would happen under the auspices of the international cooperation arm of 
Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within a broad examination of 
technology/knowledge transfers, the study that follows considers technology transfers as 
viable tools of Israeli diplomacy in an incessant struggle to broaden bilateral ties for 
Israel as Israeli policymakers silently hope to gain greater support for the Jewish State in 
principal international arenas.  
In the last few decades, state sanctioned technical collaborations in Israel’s 
foreign affairs have continued, but they have also diminished, falling victim to domestic 
politics in the form of budget cuts and reduced public support (Inbal and Zahavei, 2009). 
Nevertheless, smaller yet more pointed programs have maintained a measure of strategic 
significance. Ongoing programs continue to operate as mechanisms for initiating, 
maintaining, and developing broader diplomatic opportunities for Israel. Israel's success 
in specialized fields like agriculture and security offers much in way of selling talking 
points for Israeli diplomats, leaders and NGO pro-Israel advocacy groups. 
Israel is perceived as a small, but an advanced technological state (Aras, 1998). 
Surprisingly, reinforcement of this seemingly positive view of Israel does not come from 
Israel advocates.  It is a reaction voiced in a paper published by the Doha Institute, a 
think tank based in the Arab Kingdom of Qatar. The study suggests Israel’s technology 
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assets were points of departure in bilateral discussions with Russian President Putin on 
his historic 2011 trip to Israel. The Doha Institute (2012) asserts that Israel managed to 
garner leverage in dealing with Russia because of its pronounced interest in specialized 
Israeli nanotechnology and military drones. The Doha think tank alludes to a link 
between Russia’s unsuccessful attempt to reverse-engineer Israeli drones and Moscow’s 
proposal for a joint venture with Israel. The Doha Institute paper also notes a noticeable 
decline of criticism of Israeli policies towards the Palestinians on the part of the Russians. 
The notion of a direct association between technology cooperation and diplomatic gains 
is precisely at the heart of the investigation in this dissertation.   
Though there have been past examples where countries have used knowledge 
transfers as tools of diplomacy, the Israeli case is important because it offers instances of 
how even tiny states undertaking small scale project initiatives can yield valuable 
contacts and by extension secure economic and perhaps political benefits. As such, the 
dissertation goes beyond the study of Israel and the Middle East by considering overall 
concepts in the study of International Relations.  
  
ISRAEL’S TECHNOLOGY/KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERS 
 
 
Israel’s technology/knowledge transfers in foreign affairs launched less than a 
decade after independence in 1948. This happened at a time the country’s leaders 
grappled with a collection of mounting existential threats, most notably in the form 
political and military pressures imposed by a protracted state of war between Israel and 
its Arab neighbors. Israel’s arid and semi-arid conditions too presented existential 
questions in the form of water scarcities and with it limited capacity to develop a viable 
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agricultural sector able to produce adequate food production outputs. The Israeli 
experience in overcoming such challenges lured the interest of others.  
 Israeli technology transfers on an international scale started through the 
operations of a relatively little known department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also 
known by its Hebrew acronym, “MASHAV” Israel’s International Development 
Cooperation Agency played a significant role in offering practical knowledge to partner 
countries accrued from Israel’s own development experiences. Jacob (1971) contends 
that one of MASHAV’s principle roles was to foster favorable diplomatic relations for 
Israel.  
MASHAV was instrumental in setting up training centers and propping up 
projects, aiming to showcase the helpfulness of Israeli technologies in areas like farming 
and water management. Such technologies were introduced in dozens of countries as part 
of international partnerships. Collaborations typically involved MASHAV personnel in 
managing joint ventures like demonstration farms and/or learning centers. The 
technologies and techniques on display were designed to be learned and adopted in other 
venues in partner countries. In some instances, MASHAV worked in cooperation with 
third party development agencies of other countries. For example, in the former Soviet 
Republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, MASHAV has teamed up with the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in agriculture and medical 
projects (Bishku, 2012). 
While Israel’s international technology/knowledge transfers have been in 
existence for over five decades, they remain relatively under-explored in the field of 
International Relations and as a subfield of Israeli foreign policy. Bialer (2002) points out 
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that Israeli foreign policy is a relatively new field of study. As such, the study of Israel’s 
international affairs suffers from a lack of sizable research. The lacuna in Israel studies 
research is primarily attributed to unyielding declassification laws which have prevented 
access to state documents of recent decades. Not until the late eighties was it possible to 
access government papers about the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  
A growing volume of scholarly works explores forms of technology cooperation 
as vehicles of political persuasion between states (Neumayer, 2003). However, only a 
relatively small portion of literature considers small states like Israel. The case of Israel 
offers a unique scenario of a small state with two noteworthy attributes; it has technical 
knowledge, but a lack of financial resources in comparison to large states. A great deal of 
the literature on technology transfers in foreign affairs is centered on the undertakings of 
large countries and entities like the United States, European Union, Japan, and China. 
Unlike Israel, big players like the US tend to be as much involved in bankrolling projects 
as in advancing knowledge transfers. Such was the case in East Timor where Western 
donor countries reportedly contributed billions of dollars to finance development projects 
(Deutsch, 2009). The point being made here is that technical engagement by small states 
like Israel rests predominantly on skills and not on  political leverage which may be 
associated with big money donor countries.   
Although this dissertation’s primary focus is on state sanctioned programs, it is 
important to be mindful of the rising role of non-state actors in Israel’s 
technology/knowledge diplomacy. Non-state actors like business people and NGOs 
increasingly play a role in exporting knowledge, becoming informal ambassadors of 
Israel. Senor and Singer (2012) point to the case of Netafim, the Israeli company that 
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developed drip irrigation, a technology which is designed to maximize crop outputs with 
minimum water usage. The company’s extensive network of contacts and operations was 
a factor in opening new otherwise non-existent channels of communications for Israel 
with countries with which it had no formal relations. Senor and Singer’s research 
underscores the phenomena of Israel’s business ambassadors who promote themselves 
and their companies, but also, the entire economy of Israel. In doing so, they are public 
diplomacy bridgeheads. Leonard (2002) denotes public diplomacy as a way to encourage 
lasting relationships with influential persons. 
Given Israel’s traditional foreign relations limitations due to attempts to isolate it, 
the practice of technology transfers in international engagement offers possible pathways 
to expand diplomatic networks. It is difficult to measure the weight of technology 
transfers as tools of persuasion in foreign policy, but as Bozeman (2000) suggests, one 
must recognize that the transport of knowledge produces political, economic and social 
impacts. In turn, changes in these spheres may have bearing in changing a country’s 
behavior in foreign relations.  
 
TECHNOLOGY/KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERS AND SOFT POWER 
 
  It can be argued that Israel’s use of technology/knowledge transfers is a form of 
soft power. The concept of soft power, developed by Nye (2004), proposes a non-military 
means of changing the behavior of others by way of attraction. Soft power is realized 
through the use of institutions, culture, political values, and innovation so as to foster 
admiration and support. Since the inception of the concept, it has gained sway as a tool of 
analysis in the study of foreign affairs especially in the subfield of international 
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cooperation.  Nevertheless, Nye’s concept is broad making it difficult to gauge. Soft 
power can be depicted in relative terms (Fan, 2008). One form of power may be 
perceived as “soft” relative to another form of power, and yet, “hard” in relation to 
another. For example, economic power may be considered “soft” vs. military power, yet 
might be considered “hard” in relation to cultural power. Holyk (2011) offers a 
breakdown of soft power by considering separate categories: economic soft power, 
human capital soft power, cultural soft power, diplomatic soft power and political soft 
power. These soft power modules will be fully described in forthcoming chapters. 
Considering such soft power nuances can be helpful in identifying more specific accounts 
of the concept at work in the case of Israel’s foreign relations. 
Israel is a small state in terms of territory and size of economy. Therefore, the 
dissertation domain of research explores the significance of small states, and considers 
why they have gained importance in the international system since the fall of the Soviet 
Union.  
As the title of the dissertation implies, diplomacy and technology transfers are the 
principal concepts in the study. As such, the dissertation considers what actually 
constitutes diplomacy, and explores what it might be expected to achieve. It also 
discusses the merits of technology in fostering international cooperation. Similarly, the 
study reviews unique aspects of technology transfer frameworks which play a part in 
promoting dialogues and advancing international cooperation among partner countries. 
Technological transfers as Larson (1998) suggests are driven by the prospects of 
achieving maximum mutual benefits for the technology receiver and sender. Interactions 
to achieve this goal could offer opportunities for face-to-face talks. 
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The study considers “soft power” features in Israel’s technical international 
engagements. It examines a possible linkage between Israel’s technical ties in the 
international arena and diplomatic gains in its favor broadly defined. (in terms of trade, 
bilateral exchanges and Middle East policy) as detailed in upcoming chapters. Gains may 
be direct like political support at the UN or indirect and tacit in the form of quiet joint 
collaborations. Callick (2012) notes Israel has gained ground in gradually building 
relationships with Asian countries, even as a trend of hostile votes against it in 
international arenas persist. Largely, Israel has struggled to prevent hostile anti-Israel 
declarations at the UN but continues to experience noteworthy achievements in terms of 
increased trade and recognition. Israel has succeeded in partaking in international 
collaborations and attaining membership status in exclusive influential international 
organizations [for example, admission to the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
(CERN)]. The inclusion of Israel in these organizations perhaps demonstrates how the 
Jewish State’s technical skills and experience may at times be viable factors in outplaying 
Middle East political dynamics, which have historically constrained Israeli diplomatic 
reach.  
The dissertation considers the role of Israel’s technical offerings in advancing 
informal and formal ties with China and India. China and India were selected as cases 
studies because they share a number of distinct attributes. First, both have experienced 
periods with and without full diplomatic relations with Israel. Second, China and India 
are both countries which are outside the spheres of Israel’s traditional western allies. 
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Third, both Asian giants are influential players in international arenas. Fourth, both have 
demonstrated long standing pro-Arab positions in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Finally, technology ties played major roles establishing formal relations with 
Israel. Hence, Israel’s relations with China and India offer strong examples of the 
usefulness of technology/ knowledge transfers in Israel’s sometimes fragile foreign 
dealings. The study focuses mostly on the export of knowledge in the fields of 
military/security and agriculture. In areas of security/military it reviews the likes of 
armament transfers, intelligence sharing and joint technology ventures. In the area of 
agriculture, it will cover joint farming projects. Military/security and agriculture are two 
sectors in which Israel is widely recognized as technology leader. What follows is a 
chapter-by-chapter outline of the dissertation.  
 
OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
   
 The chapter reviews a broad spectrum of key concepts and theoretical 
assumptions in the literature, which are pertinent to the study of knowledge and 
technology transfers as tools of diplomacy. The terminologies and concepts surveyed 
include: diplomacy, soft power, technology transfers and international negotiations. Also 
reviewed: science and technology as a source of soft power, small state soft power, 
motives in technology transfers, challenges in technology transfers, technology transfers 
as forms of communications, and technology/knowledge transfers in Israeli foreign 
relations. It is noteworthy to mention a review of literature directly relating to Israel’s ties 
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with China and India are positioned in case country specific chapters 4 (China) and 5 
(India). 
 Chapter 2 also reviews the merits and benefits of formal and non-formal 
diplomacy. Within the realm of diplomacy, soft power is explored as a tacit tool of 
statecraft, particularly in the case of small states like Israel. It also considers the evolving 
significance of small states in the international system in the last 50 years. Furthermore, 
the section will look at the implications of technology transfers in international relations 
and how this type of interaction can be associated with soft power.  
 
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODS   
 
The examination of the utility of technology transfers in Israel’s bilateral 
undertakings draws on a host of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources in the 
form of conversations with journalists, diplomats, government officials, and scholars. 
Secondary sources being, scholarly literature, archival materials, and news media. 
Materials were reviewed in either English and Hebrew without the need for translation. 
Field research in Israel and elsewhere has affirmed the relevance of the dissertation topic 
to the study of IR. It also revealed instances of difficulty in accessing Israeli state archival 
materials due to regulations placing limitations on the release of state documents 
associated with national security including foreign relations issues. Much of Israel’s 
international dealings remain guarded knowledge. 
  The chapter outlines the overall research design, specifying methods used to 
gather, organize, analyze and interpret data. The section, introduces the hypothesis and 
the independent variable (technology transfers), dependent variables (robustness of 
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relations with Israel) and intervening variables (politics & conflict). To be clear, the study 
does not intend to suggest that any correlations which may be observed between the 
variables necessarily infer causation. However, interview data demonstrates there is a 
relationship between Israel’s technology transfers and the improving nature of relations 
with China and India. Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the dissertation topic, the 
study employs a mix of quantitative and qualitative research approaches, making use of 
primary and secondary sources (detailed earlier). The chapter also specifies the utility of 
sourcing data trends and computer assisted content analysis (NVivo) in the investigation. 
Furthermore, it provides an overall account of research limitations and the introduction of 
a broad-minded analysis strategy, which does not conform to a specific paradigm. The 
chapter describes the benefits behind the use of particular research approaches and 
explains in greater detail why China and India are appropriate country case studies.  
 
 CHAPTER 4 ISRAEL IN CHINA     
  
 The chapter examines the nature of Sino-Israeli cooperation in the last few 
decades mainly from the late 1980s to 2014. In doing so, it will illustrate specific 
timelines which highlight technology transfer milestones between Israel and China both 
before and after the establishment of diplomatic relations. In this time span, China and 
Israel have forged technical ties in specialized fields. The section explores the 
significance of relations between the two countries in terms of mutual benefits. It also 
considers the role of technology transfers in initiating, maintaining and broadening 
bilateral ties. Well before the formation of full diplomatic relations, the countries had 
mostly informal clandestine contacts. Much of the quiet dialogues centered around 
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technology cooperation stretching over several years.  Israel’s experience in the security 
and farming sectors drew special interest among Chinese decision makers as China 
looked to the world for new technologies in lieu of rapid economic growth and 
modernization ambitions starting in the late 1970s.  At the same time, Israeli leaders 
sought to expand Israel’s diplomatic network in Asia beyond traditional allies in the 
West. The combination of China’s technological interests and Israel’s diplomatic hopes 
to expand its international reach played a pivotal role in setting the stage for dialogue, 
cooperation and ultimately formal full diplomatic ties. After diplomatic relations became 
a reality, military and agriculture continued to be major vehicles of collaboration between 
the two countries. The chapter will demonstrate how state interests can supersede 
ideological sentiments as part of dual track foreign policies. While China generally 
follows a pro-Palestinian position, at least officially, it developed close ties with Israel. 
Despite China’s sometimes public and critical approach toward Israel, bilateral ties have 
flourished involving joint technology projects in a broad range of knowledge areas. 
Finally, the chapter offers case specific conclusions about the role of technical ties in 
advancing Sino-Israeli relations.  
 
CHAPTER 5 ISRAEL IN INDIA   
  
 The chapter examines the development and evolution of Israel-India relations in the 
last few decades. In doing so, it will also sketch a series of timelines which highlight 
technology transfer milestones in ties between Israel and India both before and after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. Israel’s ties with India like those with China have 
experienced tremendous overall growth and cooperation especially in areas of specialized 
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agricultural and military technologies. The section explores the significance of ties 
between the two countries in terms of mutual benefits and examines the role of 
technology transfers in starting, and expanding India-Israel relations.  As was the case in 
Sino-Israeli relations, full Indian-Israeli relations ties only became a reality after a string 
of guarded stop and go encounters occurring over the span of several years. In the early 
years of the India-Israel relationship, encounters between Israeli and Indian officials were 
primarily informal but touched on technical issues.  
With the end of the Cold War, India lost its primary source of military and 
diplomatic support from the Soviet Union. This new situation pushed Indian leaders to 
forge new partnerships to fill the void. India’s decision to formalize ties with Israel was 
part of a wider strategy intended to broaden New Delhi’s inventory of strategic ties. 
Relations with Israel provided  access to advanced weapon technologies and by extension 
to influential contacts in the US. Since the start of full diplomatic ties in 1992, 
cooperation between Israel and India has significantly increased.  
For India, one of the dominant determinants in the warming of relations with 
Israel was national security. Israel’s military know-how was viewed as beneficial to India 
in the face of past conflicts with China and lingering tensions with Pakistan. Israel 
assisted India during the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict and the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 
and 1971.Israel’s particular experience in manufacturing and deploying arms was also of 
interest to India.  As bilateral ties moved forward and matured, Israel and India sought 
partnerships in co-producing specialized military equipment. New Delhi’s eagerness for 
advanced military technologies combined with Israel’s desire to expand its scope of 
 15 
diplomacy and arms exports contributed in the push to full formal relations (Inbar, 2004). 
Consequently, Israel became India’s second largest arms provider. 
Not to be outdone by rival China’s closer ties with Israel, India also moved closer 
to the Jewish State. Interestingly, echoing Chinese policy, Indian decision makers started 
to de-link moving towards expanded ties with Israel and issues related to the conflict with 
the Palestinians. This meant the conflict was no longer a factor in hindering tighter ties 
with the Jewish State.  Over time, Singh (2012) suggests that growing Israeli technology 
collaborations played a role in the subsequent decline in vocal opposition to ties with 
Israel, which were a mainstay source of heated debates in Indian politics.   
The India-Israel connection has never been a secret, but its significance has never 
been so expansive as it has become in recent years.  Israeli and Indian media regularly 
underscore how India has become one of Israel's largest global trading partners in Asia, 
overtaking China and Japan. Hafeez (2009) asserts that since ties between the two were 
formalized, scores of joint agricultural projects have been established. The two countries 
have also signed mutual agreements encouraging development in areas other than 
agriculture like telecommunications, trade and economic cooperation. In conclusion, the 
chapter offers case specific assessments about possible linkage between the proliferation 
of technical ties and diplomatic gains for Israel in India-Israel relations.  
 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter illustrates an overview on how the export of knowledge has 
benefited Israel in its relations with China and India. It will consider commonalities and 
differences in Sino-Israeli and Indian-Israeli relationships. The section will offer 
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conclusions about the validity and implications of utilizing technology and knowledge as 
tools of diplomacy. Finally, it will suggest what other countries, in particular small states, 
can learn from the Israeli experience. 
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CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
INTRODUCTION  
   
 The dissertation examines the diffusion of knowledge and technology transfers as 
tools of diplomacy. As the topic suggests, the study explores variant approaches in the 
practice of diplomacy. It does this by drawing on a myriad of key traditional and non-
traditional concepts from inside and outside the field of International Relations. The 
investigation aims to contribute in shaping a sub-discipline, which underscores the 
significance of technology transfers in the realm of foreign relations.  
 This study seeks to evaluate the efficiency of knowledge and technology as 
currencies of attraction between states and thus possible sources of leverage in 
international engagement. This dissertation topic does not appear to have accumulated a 
sizable inventory of scholarly literature. No definitive or significant volume of literature 
directly explores the implications of technology/knowledge transfers as tools of 
diplomacy especially in the case of small states like Israel. However, an ample volume of 
scholarly literature does cover individual topics, which make up core conceptual 
components of the overall dissertation topic. A review of these concepts will help to 
better understand the underpinnings of the primary research question of this study and the 
theoretical foundations on which it rests. What follows is a review of literature covering 
principle terms which are relevant in the examination of knowledge and technology 
transfers as tools of diplomacy. The terms explored below are: diplomacy, soft power, 
small state soft power, science and technology as a source of soft power, technology 
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transfers, technology transfers motives, technology transfers challenges, technology 
transfers and communication theory, technology/knowledge transfers in Israeli foreign 
relations, and international negotiations. It is important to note that literature (reviews) 
directly related to each of the two case study countries (India and China) under 
examination are not covered in this section but will be positioned in respective country 
specific chapters. 
 
DIPLOMACY   
 
Diplomacy (dependent variable) is a function of foreign policy (independent 
variable). Kleiner (2008) describes diplomacy as a tool expected to help states peacefully 
deal with and solve problems with other states. More specifically, the primary purpose of 
diplomatic activity is to fulfill a country’s foreign policy goals. It is important to note that 
diplomatic goals vary from country to country as policymakers respond to fluctuating 
foreign relations challenges. Diplomatic dealings constitute dialogue encompassing 
several forms of communication or channels of engagement between states. In general, 
diplomats on the ground work to operationalize or advance their government’s interests 
in a host country. They do this by drawing on a bank of contacts and resources. In the last 
few decades, the way diplomacy is practiced has changed with the increased inclusion of 
non-traditional or non-governmental players to help boost international outreach on 
behalf of governments. Pigman and Demos (2008) and Lee (2004) point to examples of 
non-professional pools of diplomats which can include business executives and others 
who, in the course of their business activities, also help to foster relations between their 
home and host country. Public-private partnerships have also helped to expand the scope 
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of international exchanges thorough increased trade, development projects, joint ventures, 
and other forms of state-to-state collaboration. Kraft (2002) denotes the activism of 
multinational non-government organizations (NGOs) as promoters of international 
debate, which in turn can open non-traditional platforms for diplomatic exchanges.  
India’s international outreach efforts of recent years exemplify the veering away 
from conventional protocols and signify the utility of uncustomary diplomatic practices 
in pursuit of enhancing relations with other nations. Kumaraswamy (2010) illustrates how 
India’s external affairs dealings do not necessarily happen through the work of traditional 
channels like foreign affairs-specific governmental offices or professional diplomats. 
Instead, a growing contingent of non-external affairs ministry personnel are enlisted to 
promote and carryout foreign relations undertakings. India’s Ministry of External Affairs 
for example, often draws on specialists from other government departments to help 
advance diplomatic business. The practice is not unique to India but clearly reflects an 
overall trend in the efforts that some countries undertake to promote their foreign affairs 
goals. Kelly (2010) contends the professional diplomat’s role started to change with the 
end of the Cold War, when a rethinking in international relations began, opening new 
pathways for informal diplomacy. More recently the advent of the Worldwide Web has 
also contributed to further broadening the scope of possibilities of non-conventional 
country-to-country exchanges. India’s case also brings to light another interesting and 
emerging inclination in international relations, which is, the practice of paradiplomacy. 
The concept denotes sub-national states like provinces and states engaging in their own 
brand of external affairs. Santos (2010) contends that paradiplomacy is becoming a more 
common practice in recent years. Its origins can be traced back to the British Empire of 
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early 20th century, and was devised to enable dominions like Canada, South Africa, and 
Australia to directly take part in international trade agreements. Santos (2010) points out 
that Hong Kong was one of the early adapters of paradiplomacy, as Britain permitted the 
then colony to deal directly with other states, particularly on economic issues. Para-
diplomacy undertakings are pursued by sub-national states to address local specific 
interests in areas like trade, technology, and economic development, which perhaps are 
not adequately addressed by the central government. In doing so, sub-states turn to 
outside sources (states) in an effort to seek solutions to overcome both emerging and 
longstanding problems. They do this also in the hope that connecting in the international 
arena raises the prospects of improving their visibility and competitiveness in the global 
economy. India’s federal political system, which is composed of individual semi-
autonomous states and territories offers numerous paradiplomacy avenues for 
international cooperation in a wide spectrum of sectors. Kumaraswamy (2010) 
emphasizes an important point, suggesting Indian States have reached out to other 
countries to address local problems, but not necessarily to implement foreign policy or 
negate polices shaped by the national government in New Delhi. Nevertheless, such para 
diplomacy arrangements are of significance since they create wider opportunities for 
bilateral cooperation between sub states and other countries like Israel.   
As mentioned above, non-state players have also gained prominence in the field 
of diplomacy. This often happens as part of symbiotic-like private-public partnerships. 
Kleiner (2008) points out private sector corporations may seek their government’s 
support in gaining contacts to penetrate external markets. In some instances, professional 
diplomats are called upon to help companies based in their home country to launch 
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businesses in the host country where they are stationed. However, public-private 
relationships can also work in reverse, whereby business concerns manage to establish 
political contacts and initiate dealings, even in the absence of formal relations between 
their host and home country. In these circumstances, a role reversal is likely at work 
when a company’s brand gains popularity and manages to attract the interest of key 
political and economic players in the host nation. As a consequence, a commercial 
interest may succeed in establishing a presence ahead of full diplomatic ties. In such an 
instance, the private sector concern becomes by default a primary and perhaps the sole 
link between its host and home country. In turn, the home country governments seek to 
seize on the success of commercial penetration in a prospective target country by 
recruiting business leaders as ambassadors of goodwill or business ambassadors with the 
view to promote wider bilateral ties. Israel is a case in point. Senor and Singer (2011) 
describe Israel’s recent transformation in the business of exporting knowledge as the 
country evolved into a hotbed of technological innovation. Emerging as notable leaders 
in some areas of hardware and software technologies, Israeli entrepreneurs in the hi-tech 
sector have become a source of charm and indirectly a channel of “soft” power 
(explained below) for Israel’s policymakers to exploit. Israel’s Netafim, a pioneer of drip-
irrigation technology is a profound example of a company, which was highly successful 
in establishing ties in countries which had no formal relations with Israel.  Such ties 
eventually assisted opening otherwise closed foreign affairs channels for Israel.  
While Senor and Singer’s research is not primarily concerned with the foreign 
relations of Israel, it does underscore the phenomenon of Israel’s private or “business 
ambassadors”. The authors contend that Israeli technology entrepreneurs who travel the 
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world tend to not only promote themselves and their companies, but also the entire 
economy of Israel. Pigman and Deos (2007) point out that governments and private 
sectors can tend to collaborate in nation branding strategies. In recent years, government 
policymakers have pursued branding strategies to boost positive images of their country 
by cloning private sector multi-national corporation marketing techniques. Public 
relations professionals are recruited to generate positive images to help bump up trade 
and attract more foreign investment, and even bolster a county’s international clout (geo-
political influence). Essentially the idea is to link a country’s image to a particular 
positive feature.   
Van Ham (2001) asserts that companies can play a role in building a country’s 
brand. This can be accomplished by associating a company’s brand to the image of the 
country where it has headquarters. For example, BMW and Mercedes-Benz have created 
brands popularized as efficient and reliable, and these traits have also been touted to be 
products of German engineering. In other words, constructing a linkage between 
efficiency and reliability features not only to the automotive producers but also with other 
German products and, by association, with the entire German economy. Lee (2004) 
cautions that the growing number of non-traditional players in diplomatic business can 
make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between state and non-state actors. This 
concern is important to note especially looking forward as an increasingly number of 
affluent leaders in sectors like hi-tech join the growing pool of business ambassadors.  
Trans-boundary commerce and exchanges, whether through formal or informal 
means, can assist in prying open bilateral contacts, which would otherwise be 
unattainable or exist on a very limited basis. The exchange of ideas and technologies 
 27 
whether covert or done through openly public pathways can draw attention and perhaps 
attraction to a technology’s country of origin. States possessing sought-after problem 
solving technologies can likely be in a position to attract new contacts from other 
countries. Attraction between states in the realm of international relations is a form of 
soft power. The concept has developed as an important foreign affairs feature in the last 
few decades.    
 
SOFT POWER  
 
The terms “power and “soft power,” have long been staple concepts in the field of 
International Relations (IR). Barnett and Duval (2005) point out that IR theorists largely 
interpret hard or military based power as a concept exclusive to Realism. Realists view 
states as the key actors in the international system, which vie for self-preservation. 
Simply, states are seeking security to survive (Waltz 1979). To do so, they act in pursuit 
of national interests, and compete for power with other states. Realism is usually 
distinguished from Idealism or Liberalism, which tends to highlight international 
cooperation. Along these lines, Wilson (2008) contends that IR Neorealist thinkers in IR 
often stress the principles of hard power or mostly military might to influence other state 
actors’ behaviors, while the followers of Liberal Institutionalism view international 
organizations (soft power) as a tool of statecraft allowing states to exercise power 
through non-military means. Furthermore, Andrews (2010) points out prescribers of Neo-
Liberal institutionalism argue interdependences between states are born out of on mutual 
or shared interests.  
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In essence, Neo-Liberal Institutionalists view international institutions as boons 
for setting norms of behavior in the absence of a central authority (anarchy) in the 
international system and thus help to diminish distrust and fears between states reducing 
the need to turn to military force. International institutions thus create environments 
favorable to promoting cooperation, reciprocity, yielding compromises, and producing 
mutual benefits. Keohane (2012) points to international institutions as enablers of 
cooperation between states, helping to advance shared interests. However, Andrews 
(2010) cautions that mutual interests may not always result in mutual benefit because 
transnational organizations and most of what happens in the international system is 
commandeered by a small group of powerful states which tend to marginalize the status 
of other states. 
The concept of soft power gained wide acceptance and currency in the study of 
foreign relations and diplomacy in the last few decades through the theoretical work 
developed by Nye (2004). Nye (2010), suggests institutions can play a part in boosting a 
country’s soft power reach. He points to the examples of the United Kingdom and the 
United States, which advanced their values in the international arena by having a hand in 
shaping international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade 
Organization and the United Nations which, in effect mirror the American and British 
economic systems. Nye makes an interesting point, suggesting countries that are able to 
make their power be seen as legitimate by others, will likely encounter less disagreement 
with their viewpoints. Nye (2010) distinguishes between soft power and hard power, 
contending that soft power is realized through agents of attraction. Agents include: 
national institutions, culture, and political values as well as a host of other values, which 
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can be associated with the supposed soft power holder. Nye makes a point of dismissing 
loose interpretations of the concept (soft power) solely in terms of influence. Influence, 
he contends, should be viewed more broadly because it could also be a result of other 
variables like hard power policies. Instead, the mechanics of attracting others is the 
bedrock feature of soft power. That attraction could be key in achieving bilateral and 
multi-lateral understandings. It is important to note that soft power heavily rests on the 
consent of those affected by it. Cristo (2005) reinforces the view that actual utilization of 
soft power is contingent on how others, namely other states, recognize it. Furthermore, 
this form of power may take long periods of time to produce desired results, but any 
gains could also slip away relatively quickly. Such soft power vulnerabilities appear to 
have emerged in the case of Israel’s diplomatic legacy in Africa in the 1960s and 70s. 
Soft power’s sometimes fragile shelf life could help explain, at least in part, why some of 
Israel’s foreign relations campaigns fell short on long term goals. Despite a substantial 
period of technical cooperation engagement in Africa, Israel experienced a dramatic 
severing of diplomatic ties when all but two African countries dropped relations with 
Israel in the wake of the 1973 Middle East (or Yom Kippur) war. Attraction in the 
context of soft power should not be equated with the notion of control over others. Soft 
power is more about attraction than about influence. It’s important to underscore this 
distinction because this understanding of the concept can help better identify instances of 
Nye’s soft power. Soft power is a viable feature in the dynamics of the international 
system but it can be operationalized in various forms. Therefore, Nye rightly cautions 
that soft power should not be considered in broad terms, but should rather be viewed on a 
case-by-case basis.  
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The development of Nye’s soft power has triggered a scholarly debate about the 
usefulness of the concept and raised poignant questions about plausible theoretical 
shortcomings. Fan (2008) argues that simple distinctions between “hard” and “soft” 
power can often be confusing and even counterproductive. That is because power can be 
characterized in relative terms. One type of power may be perceived as “soft” in contrast 
to another form of power, and yet, “hard” when compared to another. For example, 
economic power may be seen as “soft” when contrasted with military power, but could 
also be depicted as “hard” when compared to cultural power. Furthermore, attempts to 
quantify soft power have proved difficult to demonstrate. Nye himself (2006) 
acknowledges lingering challenges in measuring soft power but contends that hard power 
too can be difficult to gauge, pointing to America’s Vietnam War experience as a 
formidable example. He asserts the US possessed more military capabilities (a 
measurable variable) than North Vietnam, and yet lost the war. Nye (2006) contends soft 
power features like cultural capital and communications may be measured and compared. 
He also points to gauges like public opinion polls as metric tools and indicators about a 
country’s levels of attractiveness in the eyes of other states. 
 Further insight on this point comes from Holyk (2011) who asserts positive steps 
have been taken to empirically investigate soft power. Measurement methods, he reasons, 
have started to gain ground in recent years, with more in-depth approaches to determine 
quantitative features.  Holyk (2011) proposes a more defined way of examining the 
concept through a model. The model excludes the possibility of viewing soft power as 
one size fits all, instead breaking down the makeup of the concept into smaller units of 
analysis. The model considers five primary categories of soft power: economic soft 
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power, human capital soft power, cultural soft power, diplomatic soft power and political 
soft power. Each of these are further unpacked into smaller parts. For example, economic 
soft power is broken down into: economic importance of soft power benefactor, 
economic benefits, product reputation and entrepreneurial reputation of soft power 
holder. Human capital soft power can be examined in terms of: state’s universities’ 
reputation (rankings) in comparison to other countries, education level of population (per-
capita university graduates), science technology achievements (measured by rates of 
technology patents generated). Cultural capital soft power can be considered through 
cultural spiritual heritage connections (common religious beliefs). Diplomatic soft power 
is diplomatic reputation (diplomatic influence). This is just a sampling of Holyk’s overall 
approach. A more detailed treatment of the model in terms of Israel’s soft power will be 
addressed in the next chapter, which outlines the research methodology.  
Israel’s record of disrupted ties in Africa (mentioned above) raises questions 
about the limitations of soft power and suggests the interplay of intervening variables like 
geo-political and interdependency issues between partners. On this point, Kroll (1993) 
rightly points out that states in bilateral relationships may be susceptible to lopsided 
levels of interdependence. In other words, one state may have greater leverage over the 
other state making it the less dependent. Ruggie (1975) asserts that asymmetrical 
relationships in which one state enjoys advantages over another can disrupt viability in 
international partnerships. Baldwin (1980) advocates considering interdependence in 
terms of cost factors. He suggests looking at the price partner countries would likely have 
to pay to end a relationship as an indicator of interdependency strength. In other words, 
the higher the price a country has to pay to end its ties with another state, the greater its 
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dependence on that state. In the case of mutual equal vulnerability, both parties will pay a 
similar price in the event the relationship ends. Baldwin offers a simple way to explore 
whether two states are genuinely interdependent: if the demise of a relationship has little 
or no effect on the parties it (the relationship) was never interdependent. Keohane and 
Nye (1977) describe interdependence as one of the underpinnings of international 
cooperation. They posit that out of self-preservation motives, states may be forced to 
advance their interests through direct country-to-country cooperation or through 
international organizations instead of embarking in unilateral actions. Interdependence 
fosters reciprocity and is a chief tool in helping states gain benefits unlikely achieved by 
any other means. Kutys (2009) maintains that the emergence of a global economic system 
is conducive to interdependency between states, and thus generates international 
cooperation opportunities to deal with problems. In turn, increased calls for cooperation 
can offer soft power opportunities especially for countries holding particularly useful 
capabilities. States of all sizes may be in a position to retrieve soft power rewards. 
However, the utility of Nye’s concept has gained a nuanced significance in the case of 
small states (like Israel) as more of them came into existence in the last few decades, 
especially with the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, Israel’s ties with China and India 
can be explained along the lines of functionalism as described by Mitrany (1971) as a 
mechanism set up to tackle overall problems. On this point, Mitrany’s notion of 
functionism echoes the theme of common interests as central drivers behind international 
collaborations to resolve problems. Technical collaborations or joint ventures like those 
between Israel and her partners tend to focus on commonalities rather than differences. 
Such endeavors promote the exchange of ideas and open new contact opportunities. Joint 
 33 
ventures in one sector can also help set the stage for discussions on wider spheres of 
bilateral cooperation. In this way, non-political collaborations could expand into 
collaborations on political levels.   
 
SMALL STATE SOFT POWER 
 
 Kutys (2009) lays out factors, which explain why small states have gained more 
significance in the international system after the Cold War. First, the emergence of 
breakaway republics from the Soviet Union gave rise to the formation of over a dozen 
new small states. Second, and more importantly, newly established small states like 
former eastern bloc countries gained the freedom to shape and advance their own 
independent foreign policies in the absence of Soviet constraints. This notable 
development bolstered the diplomatic standing of small states by forming a fresh 
contingent of political forces in the global system, which up to that point in history was 
mostly was dominated and driven by large states. The new diplomatic landscape meant a 
greater number of small states were seeking to advance their interests, and at times 
working in competition with their larger counterparts. Their stepped up activity and 
presence in international arenas has triggered fresh interest and thinking in scholarly 
circles about small state behaviors. This may have inspired some thinkers to move away 
from conventional understandings of how small states operate and propose novel 
approaches. Sutton (2011) for example, rejects the view that geographic or population 
limitations can be determinants of whether a state can be considered small or large. 
Physical features, he contends, cannot define state behavior. Therefore, he implies small 
states can act as large states while large states can act like small states. Sutton (2011) and 
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Hey (2003) suggest it is how people of small states perceive themselves that can 
determine attitudes towards their country.  
Chong (2010) points out a soft power feature unique to small states. He contends 
soft power is essentially one of the only ways small states can extend their presence and 
influence beyond their borders. In contrast, large states generally have extended resources 
beyond soft power to project themselves internationally. Large countries have the means 
to draw on a wider scope of assets, which may include a mixture of soft and hard power 
capabilities. Consequently, larger states may employ soft power strategies either in 
isolation or in combination with hard power in order to realize goals. Wilson (2008) 
refers to the mixed soft power-hard power approach as smart power. The absence of 
viable hard power opportunities for small states, suggests that soft power likely plays a 
prominent role in their diplomatic toolkit.  
Chong (2010) considers two robust examples of small states (Singapore and the 
Vatican) as models that have effectively extended their presence and influence 
internationally despite lacking hard power capabilities in the international arena. 
Singapore’s recognized economic success and the Vatican’s accomplished mediation 
reputation have drawn positive attention, likely acting as agents of attraction. The lure of 
these qualities could translate into diplomatic soft power. These examples support the 
view that small states whose achievements are recognized can be in a position to enjoy 
soft power opportunities. The case of Singapore is particularly important in the context of 
this study because it offers strong similarities to the case of Israel. Both countries possess 
small tracts of territory bordering larger and mostly un-friendly neighbors. The two 
countries have also historically suffered from limited diplomatic sway and lack natural 
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resources. Yet Singapore and Israel have both succeeded in translating domestic 
hardships into marketable experiences of use to other states.  
Ooi’s (2008) sketch of Singapore’s efforts to advance a more positive image of 
itself to the world in the last decade provides real world testimony about the possible 
value of soft power for a small state. Singapore’s public relations push touted itself as a 
center of innovation, creativity, and as a good place to do business. The promotion builds 
in part on Singapore’s reputation as an economic success story. Ooi’s description 
suggests that Singapore’s recognized business achievements may have played a role in 
muting other less positive perception, about the country. Put differently, economic 
reputation as a source of positive attraction may have been a factor in softening critical 
voices which disapprove of Singapore’s less likable restrictive social and political 
policies. Ooi points out that Singapore’s economic achievements appear to have 
overridden the negative perceptions; this is perhaps reaffirmed by Singapore’s 
consistently high ranking in the World Economic Forum’s Annual Global 
Competitiveness Reports published in recent years. However, economic achievement is 
but one of many sources of soft power as Holyk’s model above suggested. The model 
also implies a country’s knowledge and technology assets can also yield soft power 
opportunities.    
   Teece (1977) neatly hones in on the significance of technology transfers in 
international relations by pointing out that a country’s fiscal growth and success rest to 
some extent on its ability to procure know-how from external sources. Nevertheless, a 
technology transfer is a wide-ranging process, which can encompass numerous 
practices. In its simplest form, it is the movement of technology and/or know-how from 
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one place or entity (country) to another, from the sender to the end user recipient party. 
It is this overall understanding of the concept that is adopted in this study. Technology 
transfers can involve hardware, software, maintenance, and training components, and 
may also be part of international technical cooperation agreements. Transfers in the form 
of state-to-state technical cooperation, are generally a part of diplomatic initiatives.  
 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS A SOURCE OF SOFT POWER  
 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2007), a publication that primarily reports 
on technology and world security, posits that scientific cooperation can help abate 
tensions in the international community. This view backs the idea that scientific 
knowledge or technology can act as bridges of cooperation and offer valuable tools in 
advancing diplomatic undertakings. Collaboration in the technological sector, after all, 
commands an exchange of ideas, which can create a host of contact opportunities through 
joint ventures and partnerships, which tend to promote a focus on commonalities rather 
than differences between stakeholders. Joint ventures in one sector can also help set the 
stage for discussions on wider spheres of multilateral and bilateral cooperation. Such 
partnerships are born to advance mutual partner benefits and tackle problems. In this 
sense, the transfer of knowledge and technology sharing can be agents of state-to-state 
attraction and hence a form of soft power in the international arena. Yakushiji (2009) 
points out that global economic growth has created more ways for non-diplomatic 
personnel like technicians and scientists to represent their countries informally, in areas 
not covered by traditional diplomacy. These opportunities may also open technology  
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diplomacy for uses under different pretenses to advance a country’s foreign policy 
objectives.   
Since technology or know-how offer promises of resolving problems, they are 
viable sources of attraction. Technology collaboration, as will be explored later in this 
study, is plausible even between countries with major or long-standing policy 
disagreements. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (2007) asserts that even states opposed 
to US policies have expressed appreciation for American innovation. This understanding 
implies that a technology’s usefulness for the “greater good” can overshadow negative 
attitudes towards the technology’s country of origin. In others words, technology if 
deemed useful can possibly trump politics in international relations. The process of 
technology cooperation, in the form of transporting knowledge from one party to another 
can be a tricky undertaking, which may be up against a horde of unpredictable 
challenges, including economic and political constraints.  
 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS  
 
  It is important to note that technology transfer is a broad concept referred to in the 
literature through a variety of terms. Technology transfers may, for example, be 
characterized as forms of technical cooperation, development assistance, and/or science-
and-technology diplomacy and trade just to name a few. Bozeman (2000) points out that 
technology transfers could be used to describe a wide range of organizational and 
institutional interactions. This can include private sector government agencies and 
research centers, universities, nonprofit research organizations, and even entire nations. 
As movements of knowledge or technology from one setting to another, technology 
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transfers are time-based endeavors, which generally involve multiple actors and 
numerous stages. Project progressions require crucial decision-making steps, and may 
entail long stretches of time to implement. The transfer timeline can encompass: 
evaluating opportunities, making choices, procurement, preparation leading up to 
transfer, implementation, and post-transfer interactions like after market training and 
development.  
  Wahab, Rose, Wati and Suzana (2012) raise noteworthy questions, one should 
consider while examining international technology transfers. One question, for example, 
denotes the importance of preferences made in consigning one technology over another 
for transfer. The selection of a particular technology by a sender state is important 
because it could reveal specifics about the technology sender’s foreign policy priorities 
while also spotlighting problematic issues in the recipient nation. For example, the 
transfer of advanced weaponry from the US to Israel is testament to America’s efforts to 
maintain the Jewish state’s qualitative military edge while highlighting Israel’s existential 
security challenges. Other important factors in the transfer process include: composition 
of participants, method of transfer, and possible implications like economic growth 
(Millman, 2001). Intent or motives are also noteworthy aspects of technology transfers, 
especially in foreign affairs. 
 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS MOTIVES   
 
Technology transfers generally the results of two sets of motives, one, on the 
technology donor side and the other from the technology recipient side. Furuoka and 
Munir (2011) bring up an obvious yet paramount point relating to donor motives. The 
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notion of altruism does not necessarily paint a complete picture of the driving forces 
behind technology transfers like those in the form of seemingly generous technical 
assistance initiatives. Instead, motivations may be driven by the desire to achieve a broad 
range of political and strategic goals, which could include gaining advantages over rivals, 
boosting trade volumes, and enhancing diplomatic prestige. On the recipient side, the 
motivations stem from necessity or desire of securing fresh sources of knowledge. Ray 
(2012) points out technologies are generally acquired in one of two ways: either self-
developed or brought in from elsewhere in the form of a technology transfer. Technology 
transfers can act as catalysts, helping countries speed up developmental progress. Reddy 
and Zhao (1990) confirm the idea that states pursuing external knowledge is a fairly 
common practice. As mentioned above, international technology transfers draw on both 
public and private sources.  However, a combination of factors like new trade 
opportunities, business interests, informal diplomacy efforts, and increased ease of 
transporting know-how have given rise to state and non-state partnerships in international 
technology transfers. No matter the underlying motives, or the make up of players, 
transfers are intended by design to produce mutual benefits for technology senders and 
receivers. Benefits of these transactions may be realized in tacit or non-tacit forms. 
However, expected or ideal outcomes may not unfold as intended. There are several 
explanations why this could happen. Results may be time-delayed, null or even 
damaging, as occurred in the case of Sino-Israeli relations, which will be detailed in 
chapter four. 
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS CHALLENGES  
   
 Omar, Takim & Nawawi (2012) explore possible missteps and a checklist of 
fundamental tools and conditions they assert are essential to successfully carry out 
technology transfers. These include specialized equipment, operating instructions and 
skill sets. Failure to provide any of these operational components either in isolation or in 
combination could prevent or slow the transfer process. In addition, the technology 
sender must take steps to ensure intended or suitable use of transferred technology. In 
cases in which the transfer requires recipient state input in technology development, that 
involvement may inadvertently disclose otherwise guarded information about the 
technology senders’ strategic capabilities. This could unveil the scale of technological 
disparities between partner (sender and receiver) nations. Misunderstandings, language 
issues, differences in culture and attitudes could be factors in disrupting the transfer 
process. Mismatched or unsuitable technologies could also be culprits when shared 
technology cannot be applied adequately in the recipient country. Lack of trust and 
discrepancies in management styles as well as difficulties with technology upgrades, 
training and funding can all sabotage transfer projects. Any of these tricky issues can also 
translate into political problems in international partnerships. One main objective of 
technology transfers is to advance development by closing or reducing technology gaps 
in the destination country. However, Chan and Daim (2011) caution that the technology 
gap reduction may not be realized in the long term when transfers do not translate into 
innovation. This possibility will most likely unfold when the technology sender limits 
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transfers to low/medium-level technologies, as Wang and Zhou (1999) point out. Other 
major transfer constraints could include conflicting interests between domestic and 
international parties. Some knowledge stakeholders may be in danger of losing their 
technological advantage in transfers, but may conclude that the prospects of new market 
opportunities outweigh such risks. Knowledge originators may be forced to consider 
putting safeguards in place to offset theft of intellectual property or unauthorized 
technology sharing with third parties, a practice that is also known as technology 
forwarding.  
 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND COMMUNICATION THEORY  
 
 At its core, a technology transfer is a process in which knowledge is translated into 
practical use to solve a problem. As such, the practice instinctively comprises knowledge 
sharing through training and movement of technology between people and places. Hence, 
a technology transfer enterprise can be framed as a channel or medium through which 
skills and knowledge are transmitted.  As stated above, technology transfers can be a 
source of attraction (soft power) when the process entails the delivery of new ideas and 
methods which promise benefit to others (states). A knowledge transfer could also be an 
instrumental agent of change in the behaviors of others, by introduction of new working 
or operating techniques. Chong (2010) suggests newly introduced technology (soft power 
feature) can concurrently serve as a message (“we support you”) and creator of new 
opportunities (new industries and jobs), echoing Marshall McLuhan’s (“the Medium is 
the Message” 51–66, 70–71) in Understanding Media. Chong’s (2010) understanding of 
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soft power, applied to the technology transfer process, emphasizes the idea of a transfer 
that is both a message and shaper of content (or policy).   
Federman (2004) simplifies McLuhan’s theory by explaining change brought 
about by the introduction of a new idea is more significant than the new idea itself. In 
effect, this notion proposes that the secondary effects of a new technology are the most 
important issue to be aware of. Applied to a technology transfer (framed as a medium), a 
technology’s ability to sway a recipient’s behavior is of greater significance than the 
actual technology being transferred. Generally, technology can be a driver of change. 
McLuhan suggests avoiding focusing on the immediate effects of change, and instead 
suggesting being cognizant of the non-obvious outcomes triggered by something new. 
Federman asserts that McLuhan is saying the medium is a tool, which helps extend our 
presence and, in doing so, empowers us to do more than would otherwise be possible on 
our own. This belief mirrors the key premise of soft power (as discussed above) as a tool, 
which enables states to extend their presence beyond their borders.  
This dissertation examines Israel’s export of knowledge and technical cooperation 
in diplomacy. In doing so, the study looks at how technology transfers can translate into 
broader forms of cooperation helping to widen the scope of Israel’s foreign relations. 
Below are some examples.   
 
TECHNOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERS IN ISRAELI FOREIGN RELATIONS  
   
While this study focuses on instances of Israeli technical ties with Asian countries 
it is important to note the use of technology sharing as a diplomatic tool by Israel also 
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played a role in other regions, particularly in Africa. Knowledge sharing programs were 
launched with the aim of boosting Israel’s diplomatic relations on the continent (Oded, 
2009). Mogire (2008) contends Israeli technical activities in Africa served as vehicles to 
build and maintain relations with several countries. Israel’s initial outreach to the 
continent in the 1960s offered an attractive option for emerging nations. Oded (2011) 
suggests that Israeli offerings were inviting because they shared practical agricultural 
techniques to improve crop production. As noted earlier, carrying out technology 
transfers can be complex and fraught with problems.  Some of Israel’s technical 
cooperation efforts were indeed troubled by cultural issues, social dissimilarities and 
allegations of corruption, which reportedly harmed relations with some African countries. 
However, overall, Israel experienced noteworthy growth in its diplomatic reach in Africa 
in the mid to late 1960s. This success has been attributed in part to technical cooperation 
activities mostly in the agriculture and security sectors. Specialized training in farming 
facilitated by Israel’s International Development Agency (MASHAV) was of special 
interest to African leaders grappling with nation-building challenges. Israel’s outreach in 
Africa was also part of a wider foreign policy strategy known as the Periphery Doctrine. 
The doctrine was designed to develop alliances with non-Arab countries, like Kenya, 
which form a geographic ring around the Middle East (Alpher, 2013). Perhaps the 
importance of technology links in Israel’s diplomacy can be best appreciated in times 
marked by the absence of formal relations.  It is interesting to note that even after a string 
of African states dropped ties with Israel in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom 
Kippur War, technology links continued to play a role in Israel’s ties with various 
countries. The case of Kenya’s relationship with Israel is a good example. Albeit on a 
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smaller scale, ties were maintained with Kenya where Israeli technical personnel and 
entrepreneurs kept a quiet presence despite the absence of diplomatic relations (Chazan, 
2006). Military cooperation also continued as evidenced by Nairobi’s well-publicized 
logistical help in the 1976 rescue of hijacked airline passengers held hostage at Entebbe 
Airport, Uganda. The Israeli plane carrying the freed passengers was permitted to land 
for fuel in Nairobi on the return journey to Tel Aviv. The gesture was a crucial factor in 
accomplishing the successful completion of the mission given the round-trip distance 
from Israel to Uganda. 
Israel and Kenya eventually renewed diplomatic ties in 1988. Security 
cooperation has been historically demonstrated to be a key pillar in Israel-Kenya ties both 
in distant and recent times. Defense and security concerns have been at the center of the 
relationship between the two countries, especially following a series of major attacks in 
Kenya targeting US and Israeli interests. Examples include the 1998 bombing of the 
American Embassy in Nairobi, the 2002 attack on an Israeli owned resort hotel in 
Mombasa, and an attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner the same year. Bilateral 
security cooperation has proven to be a deeply entrenched fixture of the Kenyan-Israeli 
relationship since the 1960s when Israel was said to be instrumental in helping to set up 
branches of the Kenya’s security services. A testament to the ongoing security 
collaboration was demonstrated in the handling of the 2013 terror attack on Nairobi’s 
upscale Westgate Mall. A multitude of media sources underscored the positioning of 
Israeli security personnel on the ground to assist Kenyan forces to end the ensuing siege 
after the initial attack, which killed dozens. Since the restart of formal relations in 1998, 
ties have been robust with Kenya not inclining to automatically support every anti-Israeli 
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resolution at the UN.  Yet Kenya did join the majority of member states at the UN in 
2012 favoring upgrading the Palestinian delegation to non-member observer in the face 
of Israeli objections. This is a clear example of the role of technology transfers can 
promote bilateral considerations but also a testament to the fact that technology transfers 
do not offer fool proof tools in diplomacy.  
Over the last few decades, Israel has returned to Africa, re-establishing lost 
relations and even fostering new ones. Oded (2011) credits positive perceptions of past 
Israeli technical and military cooperation as one of the reasons for the Jewish State’s 
fruitful renewed presence on the continent. Oded’s assertion implies that Israel’s 
technical legacy in Africa may have been a factor in helping to re-start and expand 
bilateral opportunities. Israeli cooperation projects trickled back to parts of Africa, but 
with a few new distinctions in comparison to past decades. Israeli involvement returned 
on a much smaller scale, and not as stand-alone endeavors but instead in some instances 
as part of joint ventures with third party countries. Also, rarely does Israel deploy long-
term technical personnel in Africa as it did in the 1960s and 70s. One of MASHAV’s 
most notable operating changes after Israel’s return to Africa was the shift away from 
field operations, instead training foreign nationals in Israel itself. By doing so, Israel is 
endeavoring to make itself known as a center of learning in areas like agriculture, social 
development, and computing and energy conservation. Trainees participate in courses 
some of which are facilitated through partnerships with UN organizations like UNESCO, 
FAO, WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, and donor nations like the United States, 
Holland, Germany and Denmark.  In a media interview, MASHAV’s Director of Policy 
Planning acknowledges the small scale of the agency’s activities in Africa but also points 
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out Israel’s participation in high-impact programs like Grand Challenges Israel (GCI) and 
the Israeli-German Africa Initiative, which support projects in public health and food 
security in countries like Kenya. 
The initial rekindling of Israeli relations in Africa, which began in the 1980s, was 
marred by prolonged doubts in Israel about the usefulness of relations on the continent 
given a history of severed ties in the previous decade. Sentiments of betrayal in Israeli 
circles lingered since African leaders dropped relations during the 1973 Yom Kippur war. 
However, in recent years a change in Israel’s approach towards Africa has emerged. 
Chazan (2014) contends that Israeli policymakers have reevaluated the importance of 
Africa, especially in light of mounting international recognition of economic and strategic 
prospects in African countries. Recent discoveries of fossil fuels and forecasts of new 
business opportunities in emerging markets have recharged interest in Africa. A bevy of 
global powers like China, the United States, Russia and the European Union have 
allocated large sums of capital on development projects around the continent as they vie 
to reap political and commercial benefits. Pronounced interest in Africa has prompted 
government, private sector, and NGO voices within Israel to push the Jewish State to 
rethink the scale of its involvement in Africa, urging the launch of new technology based 
initiatives which they argue is not only good for business, but will also advance Israel’s 
standing as a noteworthy player in the overall international development aid arena. 
Israel’s rebooted but limited engagement in Africa through state sanctioned MASHAV, 
has created opportunities to involve more Israeli commercial companies, entrepreneurs, 
nonprofit organizations and NGOs in developmental work. The development of Israel’s 
relationships with most African states tended to follow identical timelines. That is, 
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initially establishing and maintaining formal (and technical) ties with Israel in the 1960s 
until severing relations mostly in 1973 (some countries retained quiet ties informally in 
the absence of diplomatic relations), and then restoring relations in the 1980s.The case of 
Cameroon’s relations with Israel also adhered to such a path. 
Formal relations between Israel and Cameroon restarted on the heels of Israeli 
involvement in recovery efforts after a major volcanic eruption disaster in the central 
African country. The warming of relations came as Cameroon’s leadership also sought 
new ways to wrestle with persistent developmental struggles. Press reports suggest 
renewed ties were initiated with the expectations of re-introducing Israeli technical 
cooperation (Broder, 1986). Cameroon's President, speaking to the press, hinted that his 
country’s past partnership experience with Israel in the form of technical cooperation was 
a factor in the decision to restore relations. On the 20th anniversary of the 1986 
reestablishment of formal ties, the Cameroonian ambassador to Israel emphasized 
technical cooperation as one of the underpinnings of his country’s relationship with the 
Jewish State. On the same occasion, an Israeli government minister went on public record 
acknowledging Cameroon’s support of Israel in the International arena. Similarly, the 
website of the Israeli embassy in Cameroon touts the transfer of technology as a central 
feature in bilateral relations. Israel has played a role in advancing Cameroon’s 
agriculture, which is a significant part of the country's economic development. Israel has 
done this by partnering with other countries like Brazil to boost Cameroon’s poultry 
industry as featured in on-line publications Cameroon Today (2011) and the Poultry site 
(2008). Media reports also imply military cooperation between Israel and Cameroon, but 
details about collaboration in this area are mostly murky and unverifiable (Brooke, 1987). 
 48 
The export of arms, and the sharing of counterinsurgency techniques was a major factor 
in reinstating relations with Zaire, Liberia and Cameroon. 
In 2010, the Israeli ambassador in Yaoundé, Cameroon’s capital, called 
Cameroon his country’s best friend in Africa, affirming it has diplomatically stood by 
Israel. Indeed, Cameroon’s UN voting records of recent years perhaps demonstrate 
distinct support for Israel. One can point to Cameroon’s positions at the United Nations 
(2012) Sixty-Seventh General Assembly plenary 44th & 45th meetings. In these sessions, 
Cameroon voted either to strike down resolutions unfavorable to Israel or simply 
abstained altogether. One of the resolutions covered the highly charged topic of 
Palestinian refugees. In that instance, the motion only drew two votes against (UN, 
2013). Besides the obvious objection from Israel, the only other vote against was cast by 
Cameroon. Even Israel’s staunchest allies like Canada and the United States, abstained in 
this instance. On the highly contested status of Jerusalem, Cameroon also abstained while 
most UN members voted against Israel (UN, 2013). The General Assembly 
overwhelmingly voted to accord Palestine Non-Member Observer Status in United 
Nation in 2012. Cameroon chose to abstain in this case as well, while other countries 
with close ties to Israel like Kenya and India voted in favor of the resolution (UN, 2012). 
Cameroon’s recent voting record on Middle East issues sharply contrasts with its policies 
in the period before the restart of formal bilateral relations with Israel. In 1980, when 
Cameroon held the chairmanship of the African Union it tended to support policies 
against Israel especially in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Conceivably this 
notable shift in policy towards Israel in recent years can be attributed to technology 
transfers which is a central feature of the relationship between the two countries.  
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In Asia, technology and knowledge sharing also played a notable role in creating 
relationships for Israel. Bainerman (1994) illustrates how an agricultural initiative 
spearheaded by MASHAV had assisted Israeli policymakers to broaden contacts in the 
Philippines.  Collaboration in agriculture reportedly helped lay the groundwork for 
additional cooperation in the military sector, which facilitated the sales of armaments, 
including big items like fighter jets. A report in a Philippines-based newspaper provides 
further testament how Israel's reputation in the field of agriculture may have also played a 
role in broadening bilateral ties. Aning, J (2012) documents a visit to Israel by the Vice 
President of the Philippines. On his tour, the senior politician stated his country could 
benefit by adopting Israeli food production techniques and expressed a willingness to 
tighten overall bilateral relations (Aning, 2012). In another instance, Gottlieb and Radler 
(2002) point to the Federated States of Micronesia’s (FSM) pro-Israel stance at the UN 
and possible linkage to technology transfers. Through MASHAV, Israel was said to be 
instrumental in developing an agricultural sector in the FSM. Bilateral cooperation in this 
area was noteworthy since the farming industry is one of the largest employers in the 
island chain nation. Gottlieb and Radler attribute tight ties between the countries to 
technical collaboration in agriculture. The example of Israel’s engagement in 
developmental projects, like those in Asia, the South Pacific, and other regions, perhaps 
further reinforces the utility of technology transfers in the business of diplomacy. The 
consistency of Micronesia’s solid political support for Israel has generally been on par 
with the level of backing usually extended to the Jewish State by Israel’s closest allies 
like the US, and only a handful of other nations. Given the extent of technical 
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cooperation with Israel in a sector crucial its economic well being, Micronesia’s firm 
diplomatic support for the Jewish state is not surprising.  
Overall, recognizing similar links between technology sharing and gains in the 
realm of Israel’s foreign relations may not be as apparent in other cases. The dissertation 
largely seeks to identify linkages between technology transfers and bilateral benefits for 
Israel in obvious and non-obvious form. Callick (2012) notes Israel's efforts to widen ties 
in Asia in recent years are helping to gradually build or strengthen relationships with 
countries which have historically maintained close ties to Arab nations. Technology 
cooperation to some degree appears to be a factor in driving advances in these bilateral 
dealings. While growing technical ties with countries like China, India and Vietnam, for 
example, rarely deliver outright diplomatic gains (defined narrowly) they do help widen 
overall bilateral links in important areas like trade.  
Ostrovsky (2012) touches on an interesting trend, which has emerged recently in 
Israel’s foreign relations dealings. Israel has in some instances expanded ties with other 
countries irrespective of their objections related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. While 
Israel has not been able to necessarily curb hostile motions at the UN, it has experienced 
a string of noteworthy accomplishments in the realm of trade and international 
recognition. This could mean Israel has managed to promote an environment in which its 
bilateral agreements are increasingly judged on merits, regardless of the conflict with the 
Palestinians. In other words, partners may consider what Israel can contribute in skills 
and experience despite differences about political issues. Two notable examples of 
Israel’s achievements in terms of international recognition include acceptance as a full 
member state in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
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and admittance as the first non-European member of The European Organization for 
Nuclear Research (CERN). On this very point, Ido Aharoni (2012) Consul General of 
Israel in New York, speaking to the Wharton School of Business, talked about country 
“positioning” in describing Israel’s efforts to utilize the county’s competitive edge in 
selected sectors to market itself. Aharoni asserts that people who ardently care about 
particular issues will set aside political differences to listen to offers in areas they are 
interested in. 
Technology transfers and cooperation exchanges, typically involve several 
stakeholders, each with their own set of interests and goals. As such, transfer 
arrangements require participants or partners to agree on conditions and rules of 
engagement. This is generally accomplished through negotiations. Interestingly, even 
countries which do not have diplomatic or warm political relations, will negotiate over 
certain issues if it is in their benefit. A strong example is the case of the Russia-NATO 
relationship in which both parties are generally at odds over arms control issues and yet 
work to collaborate in a handful of areas. These include dealing with maritime piracy, 
cyber security and radical Islamic groups. 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS   
 
Negotiations have become vital tools in the international system. The purpose of 
negotiation is to tackle complex and pivotal global issues like trade and international 
cooperation endeavors, many of which entail forms of technology transfers. Such state-
to-state interactions as Larson (1998) suggests are driven by the prospects of achieving 
mutual benefits or gains for all parties involved. To that end, face-to-face talks provide a 
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forum to iron out differences in demands. Fearon (1998) asserts that no matter what the 
talks are about, there are usually several ways to lock in an agreement, and those 
involved will likely have differing ideas on which direction to proceed. Larson (1998) 
contends that the possibility of a tug of war of positions and attempts to hold out for more 
favorable outcomes as parties propose offers and counter offers with the intention of 
maximizing gains for themselves. As each side works to advance their interests, they 
must deal with a bargaining partner’s competing interests, and at the same time figure out 
the minimum terms the other side would accept to reach an agreement. This means the 
consideration of concessions by both sides. Negotiation discussions can be put at risk of 
faltering and stalling if demands are excessive and/or the proposed agreement limitations 
are deemed unacceptable by any side. To better position themselves, negotiators will 
likely benefit by learning a bargaining partner’s strengths, weaknesses, customs, 
traditions, economic system, and expectations from an agreement. In any case, the parties 
must work to build mutual confidence and trust to enhance the probability to reaching an 
impartial agreement outcome.  
Pfetsch, Frank R, Landau, Alice (2000) detail factors, which could influence 
negotiation outcomes. These can be for example, power capability disparities between the 
parties and the presence of a third party mediator. Talks involving a mix of small and 
large state players could exemplify the challenge of power asymmetry. Conceivable 
power unevenness around the negotiating table puts into question the ability of small 
countries to effectively negotiate with larger countries and manage to avoid a skewed 
outcome in favor of the more powerful party. Zeitoun, Mirumachi, and Warner (2011) 
suggest that international negotiations can produce a one sided conclusion when one of 
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the parties has more soft power opportunities to advance an outcome in their favor. Page 
(2003) cites a number of issues that can undercut small state leverage in negotiations. 
These can be for example smaller budgets, fewer personnel and training resources in 
comparison to larger states. However, Page (2003) also asserts that small states are 
nevertheless able to yield gains in discussions because even a strong (larger) state’s 
bargaining power may be curtailed when it recognizes a necessity to seal a deal. The 
more powerful party may be forced to cut back on its demands and offer more 
concessions when it concludes its goals can be better accomplished through the 
cooperation of another less powerful (smaller) player. Fearon (1998), points out that once 
an agreement is reached, the deal must be implemented and observed for compliance. 
Agreements may be open to self-monitored arrangements. Negotiating parties may also 
insert opt out clauses, which allow signatories to shy away from select portions the deal 
terms. Urpelainen (2010) emphasizes that agreements are not likely to be discontinued as 
long as incentives exist. The notion of agreement incentives can be helpful in explaining 
ties between otherwise seemingly unlikely partnerships like those between Israel and 
states with which it has maintained technical ties even in the absence of formal relations.  
In other words, it is possible perhaps regardless of political differences for two parties to 
cooperate as long as mutual benefits continue be delivered. 
 
SUMMARY   
 
 Drawing on a broad range of literature, this chapter reviewed a myriad of overall 
concepts and issues of relevance in support of the overview topic of the dissertation.  
Major theoretical assumptions and critical terms like diplomacy, soft power, the 
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significance of small states, technology transfers, and international negotiations in 
managing common interests/benefits have been explored. It is important to note literature 
directly related to the study case countries (India and China) not included above will be 
reviewed in country specific chapters 4 and 5. 
This chapter also considered the role of formal (diplomatic) and non-formal 
channels in the international arena. Within the realm of diplomacy, soft power was 
examined as a tool having special significance, particularly the case of small states. 
Namely, soft power’s utility was assessed as a key way for smaller states to extend their 
presence and influence internationally despite their physical size. Furthermore, this 
chapter explored why small states have gained more importance in the international 
system after the end of the Cold war. Examined, too, was the relevance of technology 
transfers in the realm of international relations and the reasons this form of engagement 
can function as a source of soft power and hence tools of diplomacy. Also, it was 
proposed to look at technology transfers as modes of communications, which involve 
actions and can impact the behaviors of other parties and in that sense may constitute a 
form of soft power. Diplomacy through supplementary means like technology transfers is 
of special significance in the case of Israel in efforts to counter attempts to isolate it 
politically and economically.  
On that point the dissertation explores the usefulness of technology transfers as 
tools of diplomacy through the investigation of case studies, showcasing Israel’s bilateral 
exchanges with China and India. Naturally, this raises questions about what constitutes 
diplomatic success and how it could be measured. No prevailing definition of diplomatic 
success appears to have taken hold among foreign policy practitioners and IR theorists.  
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Joe Johnson, a veteran of the US State Department (2006), points out there is no 
agreement about what public diplomacy can be expected to deliver. Leonard (2002) 
characterizes public diplomacy as developing lasting relationships with important and/or 
influential persons through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences and 
the media. Technology transfers are forms of public diplomacy since they primarily 
involve such undertakings. Johnson surmises the absence of a definitive diplomatic 
success metric is problematic, but contends the most important token of achievement 
comes in the form of anecdotes. Anecdotes can help identify significant changes in the 
host government or society made possible through public diplomacy. The US State 
department for example records anecdotal victories in a database called RESULTS. 
However, the research design of this project goes beyond the scope of anecdotal 
parameters by drawing on a broad range of data sources to gauge robustness of Israel’s 
bilateral relations.   
To be clear, this study is not suggesting that knowledge transfers promise 
diplomatic sway for the technology sender. Instead, the dissertation argues the 
technology originator is likely to achieve diplomatic or other gains when certain variables 
are present during transfers. The dissertation hypothesizes that under certain 
circumstances technology transfers are more likely to produce favorable outcomes in the 
foreign relations of Israel (technology sender).  
The next chapter, chapter 3, Methods, will delve deeper into these factors and 
suggest a hypothesis that will then be tested through the case studies using both anecdotal 
information as well as other forms of data. Furthermore, what follows in the next chapter 
is a detailed account of research considerations, limitations, techniques and the use of 
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content analysis tools (software). 
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CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODS  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The primary goal of the dissertation is to evaluate the use and usefulness of 
technology transfers as tools of diplomacy in the case Israel’s foreign relations. The 
research topic comprises a wide range of issues inside and outside the field of 
international relations (IR). As such, the nature of this study is multi-disciplinary. The 
investigation draws its theoretical grounding from an assortment of sources including IR 
themes such as soft power, diplomacy and additional fields like geography, history, and 
others. This chapter describes why particular research approaches were adopted and how 
primary and secondary data sources were identified and accessed. The dissertation 
considers interviews done face to face, by phone, and/or through electronic 
correspondence as primary sources. Archival, media, literature, and internet retrieved 
data are regarded as secondary sources. The chapter will also layout the merits of 
introducing and utilizing a particular content analysis software package. In doing so, it 
will detail measures taken to identify to classify, examine, and display data. Furthermore, 
the chapter will explain why particular countries were selected and deemed appropriate 
case study objects. The hypothesis will also be introduced here. What follows is a layout 
of the research design, sketching the challenges, constraints, and considerations in 
gathering, organizing, analyzing and interpreting acquired data. 
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BACKGROUND  
 
As argued and illustrated in chapter 2, the “export of knowledge” has played a 
role in Israel’s overall foreign relations operations. The strategy was conceived with the 
view to broaden international recognition of Israel. Jacob (1971) emphasizes that one of 
the underlying purposes of the (knowledge transfer) practice was to foster positive 
relationships for Israel in the international community. Since the start of the strategy in 
the early years of Israel’s statehood, the use of technology transfers in Israeli foreign 
policy has experienced shifts in terms of scope of execution. In past decades, the bulk of 
Israel’s knowledge transfers were almost exclusively channeled through the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Technology transfers were operationalized mostly in the form of 
development cooperation through Israel’s international development agency known by its 
Hebrew acronym MASHAV, short for “Center for International Cooperation”.  
Interestingly, the abbreviation (MASHAV) also spells out the Hebrew word (mashav), 
which means resource.  In more recent decades, state sanctioned technology transfers 
(through MASHAV) have diminished. Inbal and Zahavi (2009) attribute public doubts 
about the usefulness of technical cooperation in foreign affairs and changes in domestic 
politics for the shrinking of MASHAV’s operations. Nevertheless, the agency’s smaller 
scale facilitation of know-how transfers has maintained a measure of significance, 
operating as tools for opening, maintaining and expanding Israel’s diplomatic reach, 
especially with major regional and international players like India and China. However, 
as state involvement in technical engagement abroad dwindled, private sector interests 
have increasingly played a role in facilitating the export of knowledge, and doing so 
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contributed formally and informally to Israel’s efforts to step up its diplomatic reach and 
make more friends. Senor and Singer (2010) contend that Israeli entrepreneurs in the hi-
tech sector have become a source of charm, and indirectly, a channel of soft power for 
Israel’s foreign policymakers by boosting international recognition of the Jewish state as 
a notable producer and player in novel technology driven sectors. Some Israeli 
entrepreneurs and executives have taken on self-appointed diplomatic missions, 
becoming de-facto ambassadors on behalf of the state. Thus, private sector activism, 
coupled with success in research and development efforts of techniques and technologies 
have created diplomatic opportunities similar to knowledge transfer programs in the early 
stages of Israel’s statehood, laying foundations for joint ventures and partnerships with 
other countries.  
Though there have been past examples of states using knowledge sharing as a part 
of diplomacy, Israel’s example is important because it demonstrates how even small 
states in competition with larger counterparts, may achieve some gains in foreign 
relations through relatively small scale initiatives. Israel’s case offers a unique scenario 
of a tiny country with two noteworthy attributes. First, it possesses sought-after technical 
knowledge. Second, it lacks large financial resources comparable to that of a larger state 
or major world power. Israel’s reputation as possessor of specialized knowledge draws on 
its successful experience in overcoming many of its own development struggles. Given 
Israel’s history of diplomatic isolation, coupled with its unending existential challenges, 
knowledge transfers stand out as one of few viable instruments in advancing the Jewish 
state’s international engagement endeavors.  
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As noted in the previous chapter, the successful exploitation of soft power is 
conditional on how it is recognized by others. Along those lines, Israel’s know-how 
transfers could be a source of soft power (attraction) when others identify value or benefit 
in what Israel has to offer. Within a broad examination of technology or knowledge 
transfers as tools of diplomacy, this study explores Israel’s relationships with a pair of 
partner nations: China, and India.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
  
 The dissertation seeks to answer: 
 Are technology transfers a source of soft power for Israel?  
 In what ways have technology transfers created gains for Israel?   
 What, if anything can be learned from Israel’s experience in utilizing technology 
transfers in foreign policy  
 
 
HYPOTHESIS  
 
 
The study is not suggesting technology transfers guarantee gains for Israel in her 
foreign relations dealings. Instead, the dissertation hypothesizes that knowledge transfers 
are more likely to play a role in advancing Israel’s relations with other (partner) states, 
when one or more of the following conditions exist:   
 
1. Technology/knowledge transfer shows promise of addressing critical issues in a 
partner nation. For example, increasing crop yields even in challenging conditions 
like arid and semi-arid environments as in the case of India and China.   
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2. Israel and partner nation share similar concerns. For example, military and 
national security threats. Israel, China and India all face the risk of military 
confrontations with neighboring and surrounding states.  
3. The prospect of expanded commercial ties between Israel and partner nation 
through state or non-state actors. Israel has experienced exponential growth in 
trade with China and India.  
 
These circumstances may be contributing factors in advancing Israel’s foreign 
relations individually or as part of an interplay between one or more of these conditions. 
The study will also consider intervening issues, like geo-political policy shifts which 
could negatively or positively impact the operationalization of knowledge transfers in 
diplomacy. For example, a negative impact on Israeli diplomacy was experienced when a 
group of African countries made policy changes in response to growing and tighter ties to 
the Arab World, mostly in the late 60s and early 70s. It is believed the warming of 
relations between African and Arab states contributed to the en-masse abandonment of 
formal relations with the Jewish State despite Israel’s well-seated technical engagement 
in Africa. However, in contrast, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of decades old 
alliances are believed to have helped open new pathways for technical and overall 
relationships with Israel.  
 Nye’s notion (2004) of soft power broadly defined is the ability to attract rather 
than strong-arm as a means of persuasion (as discussed in the previous chapter). The 
eclectic perimeter of the concept raises doubts about whether the concept is too broad to 
be useful. Recognizing this issue as a theoretical limitation, the dissertation looks at ways 
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to more narrowly identify and evaluate variant soft power factors. Holyk (2011) proposes 
a model, which considers the concept in more specified themes. The dissertation features 
Holyk’s model as a guide because it breaks the concept down into smaller units of 
analysis, and in doing so, mitigates the view of soft power as one size fits all or catch-all 
concept. The model illustrates distinct theme-nuanced soft power categories. These are: 
economic soft power, human capital soft power, cultural soft power, diplomatic soft 
power and political soft power. Modules are further broken down into smaller feature 
components illustrated in Holyk’s Model in the Figure 1 below. 
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Source: Holyk (2011)  
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 While Holyk’s approach contributes to overall efforts meant to improve ways of 
isolating soft power attributes, not all of the model’s modules and subcategories are 
relevant in the case of Israel foreign relations. For example, one of the subcategories, 
which is a component of Human Capital soft power, features the “necessity of main 
language” referring to the helpfulness or advantages associated with knowing the 
language of the supposed soft power holder. In the case of the US or the UK, English is a 
source of attraction because it is of value to non-native speakers as a language which can 
be a bridge in international trade, business and cooperation. However, knowledge of 
Hebrew, Israel’s most spoken language unlike English is of no benefit and therefore not a 
source of interest (attraction) from the perspective of other nations. Therefore, the 
dissertation utilizes the model in a modified form, which filters out irrelevant soft power 
sub categories to better investigate the intricacies of Israel’s case. Qualities listed in the 
modified model may be contributing factors to Israel’s overall soft power (attractiveness) 
potential in foreign relations. The modified model encompasses the following 
components: Economic Soft Power, Human Capitol Soft Power and Diplomatic Soft 
Power. 
 
Economic Soft Power  
 
• Economic importance: Israeli free trade status with other states, most notably the 
United States, may be viewed by some other countries as a bridge to US markets  
• Economic benefit to local populace: Israeli initiatives in partner country which 
could be associated with local business opportunities     
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• Product reputation: Israel is a highly regarded innovator in a number of sectors 
like security, military, agriculture and hi-tech goods 
• Entrepreneurial reputation: Israel is recognized in achieving a high per capita rate 
of successful startup ventures    
 
Human Capital Soft Power 
 
• University reputation: principal universities in Israel have achieved noteworthy 
ranking positions among the world’s leading institutions of higher learning. 
• Educational level of population: per-capita university level graduates is high in 
Israel  
• Science/technology capabilities: high numbers of technology patents secured by 
Israeli companies  
 
Diplomatic Soft Power  
 
• Diplomatic reputation: access to Israeli ties with other states most notably to 
policy makers in the United States   
• Humanitarian assistance: Israel regularly takes part in disaster rescue and relief 
efforts around the world in places like Nepal, Haiti, and the Philippines 
 
LEVELS OF MEASUREMENT   
 
 
Typically, phenomena can be measured using one or more of the following four 
levels of measurements: nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio.  On the nominal level, the 
lowest level, data are distinguished solely by name. Ordinal level attributes can be rank-
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ordered, but no differences between the data can be collected. On the interval level, 
distances between data values can be determined. At the ratio level, the highest-level, 
sums and differences can be detected. At this level, values can also be divided to yield a 
meaningful number. Of these, only nominal and ordinal levels of measurement are 
applicable in this study because the data on which the dissertation rests can at best be 
labeled (nominal level) and ranked (ordinal level). As suggested by Fan (2008) in the 
previous chapter, concepts like power can be characterized in relative terms. This view 
supports the possibility of ranking one type of power as “soft” in contrast to another form 
of power, and yet, “hard” when compared to a third form of power. For example, 
economic power may be seen as “softer” when contrasted with military power, but could 
also be depicted as “harder” when compared to cultural power. Nye (2006) acknowledges 
limitations associated with attempts to more precisely measure soft power but also points 
out that some features like cultural capital and communications may be rated and 
compared. Metric tools in the form of public opinion polls too can point to indicators 
about the scale of a country’s level of attractiveness in the eyes of people in other nations. 
Such measurements can at the very least be best expressed at ordinal levels.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION  
 
 
This dissertation considers Israel’s dealings with China and India as strong and 
wide-ranging examples of technology transfers at play in Israeli foreign relations. China 
and India have experienced long, drawn out periods in the absence of full diplomatic 
relations with Israel before advancing to closer formal ties. These histories feature 
relationship transitions from non-formal (quiet) to formal (open) ties. The Sino-Israeli 
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and Indian-Israeli narratives offer valuable “before” and “after” scenarios from which to 
consider the contributions of technology transfers in starting and broadening bilateral ties.   
 
COUNTRY CASE SELECTION   
 
The dissertation explores the export of knowledge from Israel to case study 
partner countries in various fields of technology. For the purpose of this study, transfers 
are any form of movement or transportation of know-how. This can be articulated in the 
form of advisors and technicians on the ground and/or in the transferring of hardware or 
software technologies. Israel’s technological transfers cover a number of specified areas, 
but the bulk are agri-tech and security/military related. These are the fields of knowledge 
for which Israel has gained a noted reputation of expertise and which are recognized to be 
of value to others. Hence technology transfers in agriculture and security/military sectors 
may likely be sources of soft power for Israel.  
Technology transfers are forms of collaboration (as pointed out in chapter 2). 
Such undertakings involve the exchange of ideas, which can create a host of contact 
opportunities. Most importantly, in the realm of international relations, technical 
cooperation exchanges tend to promote an emphasis on commonalities between partner 
countries which are stakeholders in joint ventures. Multi-national partnerships are born to 
address common concerns and produce mutual benefits. Israel and some partner nations 
tend to share comparable military/security threats and risks, which can produce platforms 
for distinct bilateral discussions. The same can be said about challenges in agriculture, 
which is another major area of state to state cooperation. However, common areas of 
cooperation (security/agriculture) should not be viewed in isolation, unchanging or 
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confined terms. Bilateral contacts in one sector can be points of departure for discussions 
to broaden collaboration in other technology areas as well.  
  
SIGNIFICANCE OF ASIA IN ISRAEL’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
 
Setbacks in Israeli diplomacy in Africa in the 1960s and 70s prompted 
policymakers in Jerusalem to rethink the Jewish State’s overall outreach tactics in the 
international arena. Seeking to offset an agonizing major loss of relations in Africa, 
Israel’s foreign policy strategists looked to broaden ties in other regions of the world. 
Chazan (2006) asserts that Israeli policymakers redirected their attention elsewhere after 
the African diplomatic watershed and the 1975 United Nations resolution equating 
Zionism with racism, (a resolution which was later overturned). These events pushed 
Israeli leaders to turn eastward to Asia to initiate new relationships and expand existing 
ones. Israel’s renewed efforts to find friends took it beyond the comfort zone of ties with 
traditionally friendly states in the West. Asia is the continent where much of Israel’s 
international cooperation efforts have been directed in the last few decades. Israel’s 
military and developmental experiences strongly speak to the needs of some Asian 
countries, which seek to alleviate a myriad of daunting challenges including but not 
limited to areas of security and agriculture. The Israeli presence in Asia offers Israel an 
array of strategic/partnership opportunities in the company of influential regional and 
global players like India and China. It also provides Israel with large new lucrative 
markets for its services and products.  
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WHY CHINA? 
 
China is the world’s most populous country. It also holds a territory, which 
contains large swaths of arid and semi-arid land making mass crop cultivation endeavors 
increasingly challenging. It is no surprise, therefore, that the efficiency of food 
production would be a growing cause of concern in Chinese policymaking circles. 
Troublesome foodstuff output issues came at a time dominated by major social and 
economic transformation (Zhang, 2000). China’s rapid development pressed decision-
makers to seek new ways to meet the demands of a fast growing population. Leaders in 
Beijing also had an interest in modernizing China’s large military given the ideological 
rift with Russia in the 1960s (which contributed to border tensions between the two 
countries). Technology transfers offered China an accelerated path to reduce 
technological gaps in both the military and civilian sectors which would help the country 
become more competitive as it is strove to be more engaged in the global marketplace. 
 China’s growth, developmental issues, and move towards more openness to the 
outside world, coupled with Israel’s desire to broaden its diplomatic reach created a 
“perfect storm” of opportunities with which to drive technical contacts (initially quietly) 
between the two countries. Israel’s experiences in overcoming developmental and 
security difficulties, while on a small scale in Chinese terms, nevertheless attracted 
noteworthy attention in Beijing.  Chapter 4 explores the intricacies of Sino-Israeli 
relations - a relationship frustrated by highs, lows, and diplomatic drama, at times raising 
eye brows in Washington and rattling US-Israeli relations. 
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WHY INDIA?   
 
India is the world’s second most populous country and its largest democracy. Like 
neighboring rival China, it has faced a host of challenges both internally and externally. 
India’s protracted territorial dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir and other looming 
national security threats in the region has given rise to the need for a military enlargement 
and an advanced defense sector. During the Cold War, India maintained tight strategic 
and military ties with the Soviet Union, which was its major arms supplier. After the 
collapse of the USSR, India looked to boost relations in the Western world including 
finding new sources of military supplies and technologies. 
Also, a significant portion of India’s economy is agrarian making the farming 
industry a major source of livelihood for many of its citizens. Despite struggles with 
overpopulation, environmental issues, and poverty, India has emerged as a formidable 
regional power and global economic force. India’s quest to deal with national security 
and alleviate developmental vulnerabilities made Israel’s experience a practical and 
attractive source for technical collaboration. India’s sizeable and rapidly growing market 
also offers significant economic opportunities for Israel.  Against this backdrop, the 
Indian-Israeli relationship has blossomed. Chapter 5 examines technical cooperation 
factors, which have brought about significant bilateral partnerships in critical areas, 
making India one of Israel’s closest allies. In doing so the Indo-Israeli ties shifted from a 
foe-like demeanor to a multi-layered friendship over the past two decades.  
 
 
 
 77 
CASE PARTNER COUNTRY TREATMENTS (CHINA AND INDIA) 
 
Each of the partner country case (China & India) chapters will include the following 
treatment components: 
 
• Partner country profile:  this section is an introduction which reviews a 
country’s history, key institutions, political and economic circumstances, and 
overall involvement in international affairs  
• History of relations with Israel: this section will consider milestones in bilateral 
relations, surveying what has been written or said about the development of 
Israel’s ties with case study countries by scholars and media sources which 
includes a country specific literature review and interview comments  
• Partner country challenges: this section will highlight central vulnerabilities and 
issues of national concern (i.e. conflict, national security and food 
production/agriculture) in the case study country 
• Mutual interests and commonalties with Israel: this section will review 
benefits and perhaps tradeoffs in bilateral relations 
• Areas of cooperation: this sections looks at the sectors which have opened up 
partnership opportunities  
• Content analysis: this section will describe and display (graphical 
representations) results of bilateral relations-specific content analysis, which 
seeks to explore and identify possible interconnections between Israel’s 
technology transfers and robustness (strength) of relations with a partner country. 
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This will be accomplished using NVivo, a software package which can help 
facilitate transforming qualitative data to quantitative data (additional information 
on NVivo is detailed below)  
• Summary and conclusion of relationship with Israel: this section will offer 
conclusions about the nature of Israel’s relations with a specific partner nation 
while accounting for the hypotheses as stated earlier  
 
DATA SOURCES   
  
The study draws on primary and secondary data. It utilizes a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative data types. Data sets were compiled from a variety of sources like field 
and phone interviews, electronic correspondence, government documents, development 
agency materials, press reports, scholarly literature, and international organizations. 
Interviews were conducted with an assortment public officials, diplomats, scholars, 
journalists, business people and others. Interviewees were based in the US, Israel, India, 
China, and Singapore. International trade data in the form of statistics and background 
information were principally sourced from organizations like the United Nations, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI). Political statements about the Middle East conflict used for 
content analysis were drawn from the United Nations Information System on the 
Question of Palestine (UNISPAL). The UNISPAL database, which contains UN material 
specific to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, from which a large assortment of textual data 
was analyzed. Data was accessed directly (interviews), from online archives or through 
third party database gateways like LexisNexis, ProQuest, NewsBank, Academic Search 
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Complete, and other available databanks. Such data and information portals provide a 
way to explore and pull a vast range of content from newspapers, magazines, news wire 
reports, academic journals, peer-reviewed journals, and multimedia assets.  
Research efforts also involved substantial fieldwork in Israel over the course of 
multiple visits. This research enterprise included Israel based interviews, and was 
accompanied with searches for and examination of helpful Israel government materials, 
which are unclassified and available for public viewing. Hundreds of Israel Foreign 
Ministry documents were reviewed on site at the Israel State Archives, which is a 
division in the Prime Minister’s Office. It is the government’s central document 
depository located in Jerusalem. Researchers do not have direct physical access to 
materials. This is so, because archival assets are stored in isolation offsite, outside the 
public viewing room. Most documents at the State Archives may only be examined in 
person, which means they cannot be seen prior to the research visit. To access documents 
of interest, one must make a request to pull materials in advance of a visit to the archives 
viewing room.  Once approved, documents are delivered to the archive’s reading room 
where they are held for the requester. In accordance with this procedure, items of interest 
were selected and pre-ordered prior to arriving at the reading room. Document searches 
and selection was accomplished by entering keywords in the archive’s limited on-line 
search engine. Searches used Hebrew and English keywords to maximize search results. 
Most, if not all, original documents were composed originally either in English or 
Hebrew, but rarely if at all simultaneously in both languages. The search engine’s scope 
of retrieval is limited because queries do not reach the archive’s entire inventory of 
materials. Some documents have not yet been declassified and thus are off-limits for 
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public viewing. However, a separate set of materials, which are unclassified are also not 
searchable on-line, but may be searched in Hebrew only on an internal computer located 
in the public reading room. Both internal and external searches were utilized. I am a 
native speaker of Hebrew, so the review of materials did not necessitate the use of a 
translator. It is unclear why some unclassified materials were not searchable on-line; 
whether because of cyber-security, technical, organizational, or budgeting issues. Time 
spent onsite at the state archives was dedicated to practicing a triage-like filtering of 
retrieved materials to determine which documents are of relevance. Materials deemed 
relevant were scanned and stored on a portable device for closer examination offsite at a 
later time. Israel State Archives permits the photographing/photocopying/scanning of 
materials once they are cleared for viewing in the public reading room.  
 A great deal of time, funds and overall effort were expended in searching, 
collecting and reviewing the documents from Israel State Archives. Yet the information 
contained in these materials led to blind alleys failing to reveal extensive in-depth 
insights about Israel’s diplomatic dealings. However, these documents did provide some 
suggestion of Israeli international technical engagements in distant decades beyond the 
overall time span of the dissertation. Hints of technical activity were found mainly in the 
form of diplomatic correspondence between Israeli overseas missions and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. A large portion of the documents pertained to the 
operations of MASHAV. It is important to note that sizeable volumes of official (Israeli) 
government documents about Israel’s diplomatic history have not yet been declassified or 
made public. Materials in Israel State Archives are subject to the Archives Law of 1955. 
According to the Archives Law records are to be available for research purposes 
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generally after 30 years.  However, some documents may be subject to more stringent 
protocols. For example, personal (Prime Ministers, Ministers and Military Leaders) and 
national security records may be sealed for 70 years and 50 years, respectively. Bialer 
(2002) suggests that some of Israel’s important initiatives have retained a measure of 
secrecy in part due to access restrictions. Furthermore, various materials and the 
information they contain may remain closed (classified) indefinitely if they are associated 
with national security matters. Given the historical prominence of defense issues in Israel 
it is not unusual for security and civilian sector undertakings to be intertwined, thus 
offering the possibility of categorizing even civilian driven dealings (government 
ministries, agencies) as classified beyond the standard 30 year time period. 
Overall, access restrictions of historical government documents explain in part 
past limited academic treatment of milestones in Israel’s overall history and foreign 
affairs enterprises. It was not until the late 1980s that it was possible to begin to access 
documents about Israel’s 1948 War of Independence. Besides declassification issues, 
Israel State Archives has experienced difficulties in procuring documents from various 
ministries and government bodies as explained in a talk by its chief archivist. On this 
point, Dr. Yaacov Lozowick who heads Israel State Archives candidly answered 
questions at a graduate research workshop at the 2014 annual Association for Israel 
Studies (AIS) meeting at Ben Gurion University in Israel. Dr. Lozowick revealed that 
some government records were not appropriately preserved or were altogether misplaced. 
He attributed inadequacies in archiving materials to a combination of poor record 
keeping, and, in some cases, outright neglect. As a consequence, he acknowledged some 
documents might never be salvaged thus creating gaps in time and material coverage of 
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some types of government documentation. He also publicized mounting efforts to 
advance a new multi-year digitization plan aiming to put significant volumes of state 
archives documents online, especially in response to the growing interest in Israel as a 
field of study.  
In addition to archival inquiries and interviews, field research also included other 
arenas like major academic conferences such as the annual meetings of the International 
Studies Association (ISA) and the Association for Israel Studies (AIS) in the US and 
Israel. Participation at these gatherings offered the opportunity to present papers on the 
dissertation topic and draw feedback in panel discussions. Conference participation also 
enabled face-to-face meetings with scholars who were otherwise not easily accessible in 
person. Prior to attending conferences, contact (via email) was made with scholars and 
contemporaries who were identified as having similar or related research interests. The 
aim of the correspondence was to make others aware of my interests, request an informal 
meeting, and to further build a bank of research contacts.  
The study primarily focuses on Israel’s foreign relations in the years between 
1989 and 2014. This span of time encompasses notable periods in Israel’s ties with case 
study partner countries. For example, lead up times to the establishment, and 
development of formal ties. Inclusion of these time markers facilitates opportunities to 
better survey the beginning and advancement of Israeli diplomacy in Asia. Nevertheless, 
this period is largely subject to the general 30-year rule mentioned above. For this reason, 
the research of the dissertation mostly rests on datasets drawn from a wide range of 
sources other than official Israel government state archive sources. The sources will be 
detailed in the sections below. What follows is the overall research approach.  
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MIXED METHODS APPROACH  
 
Owing to the multi-disciplinary nature of the research topic, the dissertation 
comprises a mixed-methods research approach. Trochim (2006), for example, argues for 
the usefulness of combining both qualitative and quantitative methods. A mixed methods 
design provides the largest number of ways to probe the primary research question, 
especially given data access and collection limitations associated with the dissertation 
topic which draws on a vast assortment of dataset types (descriptive and numeric), and an 
expansive scope of theoretical concepts.  At the same time, a combined approach can 
help maximize analysis and integration opportunities. Blending qualitative and 
quantitative methods when possible also allows the study an advantage of drawing on the 
strengths of each.  
 
BROAD THEORETICAL APPROACH  
 
 The wide scope facets of the topics covered in the dissertation coupled with data 
retrieval availability restrictions (described above) necessitate the use of liberal research 
and analysis strategies. On this point, Sil and Katzenstein (2010) offer a theoretical 
approach they call Analytical Eclecticism, which does not conform to a specific 
paradigm. This non-conforming approach offers the researcher investigative 
maneuverability. The open approach is especially useful in the case of the dissertation, 
which does not follow a particular theoretical tradition in International Relations. 
Analytical Eclecticism as Sil and Katzenstein (2010) point out, can fill capability gaps, 
which are not available in traditional research approaches and may furthermore be useful 
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in identifying interactions between unique mechanisms, which are usually considered 
separately. The significance of this feature opens the possibility of exploring a wide range 
of research spheres.  The approach supports the exploration of odd or non-traditional 
topics, which cannot adequately be examined within the theoretical boundaries of a 
particular discipline. Overall, this means opening up to diverse ways of investigating 
research interests.  Analytic eclecticism offers two non-unique yet valuable and suitable 
attributes:  
 
1. Practical approach  
2. Tackles broad range issues (i.e. diplomacy, technology transfers)   
 
These features can help facilitate an across-the-board look at technology transfers in the 
context of international relations, and specifically, as tools of diplomacy.  
 
CONTENT ANALYSIS    
 
       The purpose of data analysis is to test the strength of the hypothesis. Data analysis 
seeks to validate or contest the hypothesis. At the very least data analysis can help 
determine if the hypothesis represents a measure of possibility and if so, under which 
conditions. The investigation herein utilizes both quantitative and qualitative datasets. In 
doing so, the dissertation maximizes the number of pathways to data interpretation that 
might otherwise go unutilized. Notably, however, the overwhelming majority of data 
utilized in this dissertation is in text form while a smaller portion in numeric (mostly 
economic figures). Therefore, the bulk of analysis is the treatment of qualitative data. To 
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make data more meaningful or usable for analysis purposes, coding techniques have been 
devised. Trochim (2006) points out that the coding of quantitative data enables forms of 
analyses, which would otherwise not be possible, and in doing so could help to uncover 
important information. All qualitative data can be quantitatively coded. The 
quantification of qualitative data is also possible. This is accomplished by assigning 
meaningful numerical values (coding) to qualitative data. In turn these values can be 
operated to examine the validity of specific hypotheses with the aim to achieve a grander 
understanding of data and recognize its significance. A principle research technique used 
in this dissertation is quantitative content analysis. Devi (2009) describes quantitative 
content analysis as a process that seeks to quantify the occurrences, significance, 
positioning, and interplay of words or concepts, to infer meanings. Qualitative content 
analysis also involves a particular (subjective) interpretation of text data through 
classification methods or coding to identify themes or patterns. Salenda (2009) describes 
coding as a subjective act, which involves the use of words or short phrases to represent 
an idea. A code profile may include labeling data sources, a description of the code, its 
function, and applications of the method used. Coding organizes large quantities of text 
into fewer and more manageable groups (Weber, 1990). It is a conversion of data into 
noteworthy clusters or categories. Coding is principally a middle step between data 
collection and analysis. It links the data to the main research theme. Weber (1990) points 
out that qualitative content analysis goes beyond simple word counts, and enables the 
researcher to identify themes. Put another way, content analysis opens opportunities to 
explore relationships between categories. It is important to note that coding schemes are 
often revised and/or refined as the analysis process advances. The determination of 
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whether coding was necessary and which coding methods to practice in this study was the 
product of trial and error as the project progressed. Along these, lines of data collection, 
and overall the dissertation, did not advance in a linear fashion. Once data was obtained it 
was either placed in applicable dissertation chapters or stored for future consideration and 
positioning. This process shaped a workflow in which portions of the dissertation were 
not necessarily pieced together and positioned in the document in the order in which data 
was acquired. Content analysis is a primary part of the research design toolkit and as such 
it is imperative to carefully consider various content analysis categories.  
 
CONTENT ANALYSIS TYPES  
 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) highlight three principal categories: conventional, 
directed, or summative. The content analysis types can be distinguished by the way codes 
are formulated. Conventional content analysis involves creating code categories 
stemming directly from the text. The directed approach rests on theoretical or research 
findings from which to identify which codes to use. The summative method deals with 
counting and comparisons of keywords or content, which provides context interpretation 
opportunities. A summative approach to qualitative content analysis starts with 
identifying and counting certain words or content to determine circumstantial use of the 
words or content. Word frequency counts are computed, and sources are identified. Next, 
text search results are examined for initial assessment to create codes. In the summative 
approach, keywords or codes are classified before and during data analysis. The 
keywords used are driven by the investigator’s interest or review of literature content. 
Besides word counts, the approach seeks to identify and interpret hidden content. The 
 87 
summative approach text can be analyzed as single words or in relation to particular 
content. Patterns uncovered could help interpret the contextual meaning of terms or 
content. For these reasons the summative approach best suited the purpose of the 
dissertation. 
 
STUDY VARIABLES   
  
 The dissertation seeks to evaluate the efficiency of technology transfers as tools of 
diplomacy in the case of Israel. Diplomacy, broadly defined for the purpose of this 
dissertation, is the robustness of bilateral relations, between Israel and case study partner 
nations (China and India). To assist in the exploration of possible links between 
technology transfers and aspects of bilateral relations, the study considers three categories 
of variables: a dependent variable, an independent variable, and an intervening variable.   
Independent Variable (Technology Transfer)    
 
Technology transfer is considered the independent variable. It is important to note 
that technology transfers are expressed through variant descriptions or framed in different 
ways like: developmental cooperation, technical assistance, technology collaboration, 
joint ventures, intelligence sharing, and other means of knowledge transmission.  
Therefore, any of these and a host of other possible similar terms would be considered 
independent variables for the purpose of this study.  
 
Dependent Variable (Robustness of Bi-lateral Relations with case study partners [China 
and India])   
 
Robustness, infers a demonstration of strength and vigor of ties.  
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For the purposes of the dissertation, the robustness of relations will be based on 
trends/volumes in three categories. Each of these is considered a dependent variable as 
follows: 
  
1. Trade/Economic indicators such as import/export numbers      
Data Sources: International trade monitoring organization UN Comtrade, official 
Israel, China and India government published announcements  
2. Political/Cultural Exchanges such as visiting delegations and treaties     
Data Sources: official Israel, China and India government published announcements  
3. Policies towards Israel/ Middle East based on statements like speeches   
Data Sources: United Nations  
Intervening Variable  
 
The following factors may be considered intervening variables:   
 
1. Technology/knowledge transfer addresses critical issues in partner/recipient nation. 
For example, crop growing techniques, which can raise the level of food security and 
human security.    
2. Mutual national security concerns such as similar military challenges and/or terror 
threats.  
3. Efforts to gain access to the US through Israeli channels.  
  
4. Potential for viable commercial ties for Israel through state or non-state actors 
providing new markets for Israeli based technologies. However, in the opposite 
direction, Israel’s tiny economy is too small to offer much export growth for large 
partner nations like China and India.  
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5. Geopolitical shifts like, change of leaders, domestic politics, change of global and 
regional alliances (end of Cold War), Middle East politics (Arab Spring), Middle East 
conflict flare-ups (Gaza conflict) 
 
RESEARCH TOOL 
 
 
The analysis mostly involves the examination of text data. After considerable 
consultation with faculty and informal conversations with fellow graduate researchers, it 
was determined that computer-assisted content analysis would be the most useful method 
of advancing some the dissertation’s research objectives. Several qualitative data analysis 
software packages are available. All are designed to handle vast volumes of files. The 
most notable software packages include ATLAS.ti, NVivo and MAXQDA.  Of these 
NVivo was selected.  
NVivo was chosen after considering scores of research tools, which could 
accommodate particular research constraints like data, collection limitations, quantity of 
data and scope of data types. Based on these conversations with NVivo users and a test 
use of the software, it was determined that NVivo was an appropriate research tool 
because it can assist in the following: 
 
1. Storing, organizing, querying, interpreting data, and displaying findings   
2. Qualitative and mixed methods research  
3. Numeric and non-numeric data analysis 
4. Detect possible subtle links in datasets.   
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5. Accommodate large data sets   
6.       Data visualization with charts, graphs and matrices 
 
NVivo helped to facilitate the query of non-numeric data like press reports, 
literature, documents, and web content. NVivo also features visualization functions, 
which can convert data into forms of meaningful information, like matrices showing 
numerical frequencies by characteristics/codes and graphical representations like charts. 
These display vehicles can show patterns while demonstrating the extent and nature of 
links in datasets.  
 
DATA GATHERING 
   
 
Data was gathered in two phases. The first phase included a series of field, email 
and phone research interviews with a mix of public officials, diplomats, scholars, 
journalists, business people and others. Dozens of interview subjects were approached. 
Most agreed to take part. They were sought for interviews or general information because 
their areas of expertise covered both theoretical and/or geopolitical themes of direct and 
indirect relevance to the overall dissertation theme. Interviewees (as mentioned) were 
based in India, China, Israel, Singapore and the United States. Interview subjects were 
identified through a multitude of resources such as scholarly publications, media 
appearances, news reports, conference panels, and colleague contacts. They did not 
represent any one specific group or entity, and spoke only on behalf of themselves. 
Interviewees were approached to take part in the study through email correspondence 
using two distinct steps. The initial step included outreach correspondence, which served 
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multiple primary purposes: first, as a letter of introduction about the researcher, second, 
to provide the interviewee background information about the overall dissertation theme, 
third, to state the purpose of the study, and to finally request participation in answering a 
series of research related questions. Once consent to take part in the study was secured 
from the prospective interviewee, follow up contact was initiated in the form of email 
correspondence or phone conversation depending on respondent’s preference.  
Correspondence proposed interview times, dates and venues. Whenever possible, 
interviews in person were preferred, but otherwise subjects were asked to indicate if they 
could participate via phone, Skype, email, or social media messaging. In some instances, 
interviews with particular subjects were completed in more than one sitting, and may 
have involved a combination of email, phone conversations and/or face-to-face meetings.  
  Field interviews were conducted in a variety of formal and informal settings like 
offices, private residences, conference venues, and public areas like cafes. Some of these 
included noteworthy venues like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Israel (two 
visits). The setups of MFA meetings were multi-faceted processes involving prolonged 
correspondence with relevant officials, the setting of conditions to proceed and bound by 
advanced security checks about the researcher. Public officials, while willing to 
contribute, were generally bound by Israel government regulations with regard to whom 
they could speak and what they can say. This was not the case with non-government 
interviewees. Most interviews were audio recorded with permission, and later transcribed 
for analysis purposes. On one occasion, recording of the conversation was not permitted 
at the request of the interviewee but notes were allowed. Interviews generally lasted 
anywhere between 30 and 90 minutes per sitting. All interactions were in English. 
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Conversations were informational and at times informal allowing a free exchange of 
ideas within the realm of the research theme. Topics discussed were drawn from a pool of 
prepared and (IRB) pre-approved research questions (See Appendix 2). However, since 
the roster of questions covered a broad range of issues, not all of these queries were of 
relevance to the areas of expertise of each and every interviewee. As such, a refined 
selection of questions was made from the original overall questionnaire inventory to 
ensure a match of query topics, which conform to the knowledge area of the interviewees. 
Some interview subjects went beyond merely responding to questions, and directed the 
researcher to additional data sources outside of interviews. These sources include video 
materials, media appearances, or literature of which interviewees directly or indirectly 
played a part in creating. This phase of research (interviews) provides a background for 
the second phase of data collection. As was stated and detailed earlier, public archives of 
the period under examination were not available due to Israeli state archive laws and 
regulation constraints. Therefore, the study adopted an information-mining model often 
utilized by Israeli media to report on issues of which no official domestic sources are 
publically accessible on the grounds of national security or other security classification 
matters. Israeli public and commercial media typically pursue and report on classified 
issues by turning to foreign sources to side step being at risk of violating 
publication/broadcast regulations. Israeli media treatment of Israel’s nuclear capabilities 
serves as an outstanding example of this practice. Israel’s nuclear capabilities have been 
an open secret for decades and yet local media shy away from directly (as a primary 
source) reporting even on the very existence of the Jewish State’s atomic program. News 
organizations in Israel nevertheless report on this secretive issue by attributing stories 
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about Israel’s nuclear reactor to foreign press reports and sources outside of Israel to tell 
the story. This approach of utilizing external sources is especially of utility to the 
dissertation because the primary research focus is Israel in the world at large. For this 
reason, an inventory of some Israeli but mostly non-Israeli foreign media were used as 
sources of textual data on Israel’s international technical ties.   
 The second phase of data gathering involved the retrieval of textual data like 
newspaper stories, news agency reports, online publications as well as transcriptions of 
news broadcasts. These includes an array of prominent Israeli and international news 
outlets like Jerusalem Post, Ha’aretz, New York Times, BBC, The Associated Press and 
many others. Relevant materials were identified and retrieved through search platforms 
like ProQuest, LexisNexis Academic and News Bank. In this way, a data bank containing 
tens of thousands of news pieces was compiled. Also, data on trade and political/bilateral 
exchanges was retrieved electronically directly from official Israeli, Indian and Chinese 
government and UN on-line sources.  
The search criterion used to capture data from the above mentioned sources was 
designed to cast the widest possible net in order to maximize the gathering of data 
objects. For example, in seeking material about technology transfers in the case of Sino-
Israeli relations, a sweeping search was used. “Israel” and “China” were used as the 
search terms instead of just pursuing a narrower search field using a longer string of 
keywords like “Israel”, “China”, “Technology Transfers” and “Diplomacy”. The broad 
search strategy is helpful because it can help prevent the possibility of missing useful 
data. As detailed in the previous section, the concept of technology transfer is broad, 
covering multiple activities. It may be described in different forms like technical 
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cooperation, developmental assistance, agricultural, security or military collaboration just 
to name a few.  Using technology transfer, as a search criterion would likely fail to 
capture pertinent information. This strategy was applied in both case country searches. 
The wide-sweeping search tactic only pertains to the initial searches. It was put into 
practice after consultation with faculty, and rested on the premise that greater data 
capture in preliminary searches would enable a wider range of targeted secondary 
searches. On the other hand, a narrow initial search would inhibit research catchment 
efforts. The initial search results are stored in NVivo for more targeted secondary text 
searches, data management and analysis operations in order to seek and detect possible 
significant relationships between terms. Secondary data was sought within the initial 
search results by utilizing a list of pre-complied keywords (see appendix 1). These words 
represent commonly used terms to describe the various aspects of subject matter in the 
dissertation. Data processing was achieved through specified search criteria and coding 
filters like: keywords (terms), range of dates, and country names. All materials under 
examination were in English or were official translations into English in the case of some 
U. N. speeches/statements. However, (as previously described above) some archival 
material was read in the original Hebrew by the researcher without the need of a 
translator.  The Hebrew documentation turned out to be of only general informational 
background value, and was not part of the data management and analysis phases of the 
study.  
SUMMARY  
   The dissertation explores notable milestones in Israel’s overall international 
affairs and examines Israeli technology transfers as part of its foreign relations primarily 
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in Asia from 1989 to 2014. During this time span, the Jewish State experienced 
noteworthy growth in relations with a number of Asian countries. The period was 
selected for analysis because it covers stretches of time in which Israel and case study 
partner nations (China and India) shifted from seemingly low level engagements to the 
formation of full formal or upgraded relations. As such, this timeline offers adequate 
opportunities to follow the start, maintenance, and growth of Israel’s bilateral relations 
with some of Asia’s most powerful players.  
The research question and the hypothesis were introduced along with descriptions 
of data types and sources. In addition, the dependent, independent and intervening 
variables were defined and outlined. Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the 
dissertation, a case was made for a mixed-qualitative and quantitative methods research 
approach. Atypical facets of dissertation topics coupled with data availability limitations 
(described above) have prompted the adoption of a flexible analysis strategy called 
analytical eclecticism, which does not conform to a specific paradigm. Analytical 
Eclecticism can be useful in identifying interactions between mechanisms, which are 
usually considered separately. 
Data treatment was assisted using a software package called NVivo. NVivo was 
selected as a primary tool of inquiry because of its extensive content analysis capabilities 
especially in the case of text-rich non-structured data. NVivo’s data handling 
functionalities enable a summative content analysis which seeks to identify and interpret 
hidden content.  
The research design also includes case country profiles and how key issues in 
those countries are of relevance in relations with Israel. Chapter 4 considers China’s 
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challenges in agriculture and security/military sectors against a backdrop of diplomatic 
ups and downs in Sino-Israeli ties. Chapter 5 looks at how aspects of India’s geography, 
national security, economic and political factors play a part in Indo-Israeli technology 
relations which began as low-key cooperation but eventually transformed into open 
collaboration in specialized areas.  
Finally, the Conclusion chapter 6, will provide an overview of how the export of 
knowledge may have benefited Israel’s efforts to expand its diplomatic network. The 
chapter will sum up the philosophical foundations and pragmatic underpinnings of 
Israel’s diffusion of knowledge as part of its foreign policy strategy, Finally, it will offer 
overall conclusions about the effectiveness of technology transfers as forms of soft power 
tools of diplomacy. 
The purpose of the investigation is to identify a plausible interplay between the 
independent variable (technology transfer) and dependent variables (aspects of bilateral 
relations) between Israel and partner nations. However, the dissertation does not make 
any definitive claims about the implications of technology transfers in Israel’s foreign 
affairs. Though, it does postulate that the movement of technology does play a role in 
Israeli foreign relations and seeks to investigate its efficiency as a tool of diplomacy 
under certain circumstances (detailed above). The rest of the dissertation includes country 
case study chapters. What follows next is chapter 4 on Sino-Israeli relations and the first 
of 2 chapters, which examine the significance of Israel’s technology transfers in relations 
with partner states. 
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APPENDIX 1 SEARCH KEYS WORDS 
 
Cooperation 
Development  
Technical Assistance  
Collaboration   
Technology  
Innovation 
Military  
Security  
Terror   
Diplomacy  
Israeli  
Prime Minister 
Foreign Minster  
Defense Minister 
MASHAV  
Israel  
China  
India  
 
ISRAELI LEADERS  
1973- Present  
 
Golda Meir   
Yitzhak Rabin  
Menachem Begin  
Yitzhak Shamir  
Shimon Peres  
Benjamin Netanyahu  
Ehud Barak  
Ariel Sharon  
Ehud Olmert  
Israeli delegation  
 
CHINESE LEADERS 
1987 – present  
 
Li Peng,  
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Wen Jiabao,  
Li Keqiang,  
Jiang Zemin,  
Hu Jintao,  
Xi Jinping,   
 
INDIA LEADERS  
1984-present  
 
Narendra Modi  
Manmohan Singh  
Atal Bihari Vajpayee  
IK Gujral  
HD Deve Gowda  
AB Vajpayee  
PV Narasimha Rao  
Chandra Shekhar  
VP Singh  
Rajiv Gandhi  
 
APPENDIX 2 
QUESTIONS INVENTORY  
 
1. It has been often argued in the past that Israel did not really have an overall 
formal foreign policy but instead a collection of ad hoc international initiatives Is 
the argument a valid? 
2. Media reports indicate Israel regularly maintained informal quiet relations with 
other countries in the absence of diplomatic relations. How did Israel benefit from 
this arrangement?  
3. Was technical cooperation in the form of technology/knowledge transfers a main 
driver of informal relations between Israel and other states?  
4. Typically, what kind of conditions for cooperation were stipulated by Israel and 
partner states.  
5. After years of Israeli technical assistance programs in Africa almost all African 
states severed relations with Israel at the start of the Yom Kippur War.  
      What lesson did Israeli policymakers learn from the African experience? 
6. How have domestic perceptions of Israeli overseas technical cooperation 
programs evolved over the last 6 decades? 
7. What if anything is applied from diplomatic setbacks in Africa today?     
8. Does Israeli involvement in technical cooperation programs translate to soft 
power? 
9. What’s unique about Israeli Soft Power?  
10. What kind of initiatives can be considered tools of diplomacy? 
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11. What kind of feedback are you getting from those impacted by Israeli technology 
transfers?  
12. How have technology transfers helped Israel establish, expand and maintain 
relations with other states? 
13. What area of technology is most in demand for Israel transfers – military, 
agriculture, medical?  
14. What is the feedback from those negatively affected by transfers i.e. rivals or 
recipients?  
15. What are general unintended consequences as a result of technology transfers? 
16. How are Israeli technology transfers different from those of large states like the 
United States, Japan and EU countries?  
17. Is what Israel is doing or did with technology transfers unique for a state of its 
size?  
18. Would you say the Israel’s technology transfers is a pivotal part of diplomatic 
gains?  
19. What are the negative and positive aspects of technology transfers on recipients 
and transferring party? 
20. What are common challenges in the before during after stages of technology 
transfers? 
21. Are technology transfers as a source of Soft Power in the case of Israel.  
22. What role is the private sector playing in Israeli international technology transfers  
23. Who can be considered a business ambassador? 
24. How do state and and non-state actors collaborate in carrying out technology 
transfers? 
25. Who would you say are Israel’s most business ambassadors? 
26. Is the Israeli hi-Tech industry a growing source of Israeli Soft Power? 
27. Has the military/trade cooperation softened ( county name ) policies towards 
Israel and approach over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -  
28. Are Israel’s military and other connections with China a source of influence with 
China and others or perhaps putting Israel at risk vulnerability  
29. What safeguards are in place to prevent technology transfer forwarding to others 
like Iran a country which has a close ties to China  (recently it was alluded to that 
Iranian have a similar to those made in Israel  
30. I’ve been to Israel State Archives in Jerusalem but not much material released 
there about military cooperation - just basically a few diplomatic cables about 
various contacts  
31. Most of these are summarized by Zeev Sufott in his book a china diary book  
32. Is Israel tech offering so unique in way that China can not get similar knowledge 
else where  
33. What’s unique about the relationship for China for Israel? 
34. Where else can I search archival materials?  
35. How does this form cooperation spillover into other forms of cooperation? 
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CHAPTER IV ISRAEL IN CHINA  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
With rapidly growing economies, massive markets, huge population centers and 
large deposits of natural resources East Asia understandably draws interest from the rest 
of the world. China, also known by its full name, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
stands out in the region as a major economic and security player among other powers like 
Russia, India and Japan. Generally, China and overall the East Asia region, have been of 
interest to the West for several reasons--with economic considerations being one of the 
most noteworthy. China can offer much in the form of strategic, economic and diplomatic 
partnerships. Such opportunities are of pronounced significance in the case of Israel 
considering the Jewish State’s campaigns to widen its contacts, especially with pivotal 
regional and global powers. Yet despite early efforts, Israel’s push to forge formal ties or 
diplomatic recognition in Asia came at a somewhat sluggish pace, hindered mainly by the 
complexities of Middle East conflicts and Cold War constraints. Nevertheless, for the 
past two decades Israel has made diplomatic gains, and now enjoys robust relations with 
most Asian states and the continent’s key players: China, Russia, India and Japan. Israel’s 
outreach to the PRC is an ongoing process, coming after decades of diplomatic setbacks 
and the forging of formal relations. This chapter traces the significance of knowledge and 
technology sharing as factors in bringing China and Israel closer together against a 
background of adversary efforts to isolate the Jewish state.  
Israel’s initial technical engagement in East Asia happened shortly after Israeli 
independence, but in that instance did not include contacts with the newly established 
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PRC. Instead, Burma (now Myanmar) was the first country to interact with Israel in the 
realm of military and agricultural know-how, which drew on distinctive Israeli 
experiences in those sectors. Ties between the two countries eventually withered as 
Burma experienced political transformation and a change of government. The demise of 
Israeli relations in the region in the distant past contrasts with more recent times in which 
Israel established and maintained official ties with numerous East Asian states. Israel’s 
relations in Asia are widespread, but the levels of interactions can vary in intensity from 
country to country. Countries like China have extensive trade with Israel valued in the 
billions, while ties with smaller partners like Vietnam, are only in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars. By far, of all Israel’s relationships in Asia, ties with the PRC are 
noteworthy in terms of trade volumes and Beijing’s diplomatic affluence.  
China is enormous and diverse, experiencing an array of domestic struggles.  
Some of the most persistent problems within a vast inventory of challenges have been: 
food production, national security matters, and a collection of other developmental 
concerns. As the PRC experienced growing pains, its policymakers sought to boost food 
output capabilities to meet the demands of swelling population levels. The modernization 
of China’s aging mammoth military was also on Beijing’s list of national priorities. The 
import of knowledge offered the PRC an accelerated track with which to address these 
and other outstanding developmental issues. The reduction of technology gaps also 
served as a boon to push China into a more competitive position in an emerging global 
economy. As will be detailed below, eventual policy changes in China created 
possibilities to introduce foreign technologies to deal with persistent domestic problems. 
The demands created by China’s growth coupled with Israel’s zeal to broaden diplomatic 
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reach, produced opportunities (supply and demand principles) with which to initiate and 
drive bilateral dialogues (initially quietly). Israel’s record of overcoming some of the 
same issues of pronounced concern to Chinese leaders put the Jewish State on the radar 
screen in a positive light (attraction) among Beijing’s policy makers.  
The sections below consider the efficiency of technology transfers as tools of 
diplomacy in Sino-Israeli relations. To facilitate the probe of possible associations 
between technology transfers and aspects of bilateral relations, the study considers 
independent, dependent and intervening variables.  
The independent variable represents technology transfers or technical cooperation 
with the PRC. The dependent variable represents the degree of diplomatic relations. 
Diplomatic relations are broadly defined here as the robustness of bilateral relations 
between Israel and China. Robustness is based on three categories. Each of which are 
dependent variables as follows: 
 
1. Trade volumes  
2. Sino-Israeli exchanges such as visiting delegations and treaties   
3. China’s policies towards Israel/ Middle East based on statements such as speeches 
(at UN) 
 
Intervening variables represent overriding factors, which may promote or impede 
causality between independent and dependent variables like: 
 
• Technology addresses priorities in China. For example, crop growing techniques, 
which can raise the level of food security and human security.    
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• Common security concerns like military capabilities and/or terror threats.  
• Efforts to gain better access to the US through Israeli channels.  
• Geopolitical shifts like, leadership changes, shifts in alliances (end of Cold War), 
Middle East politics (Arab Spring), and Middle East conflict flare-ups.   
It is important to re-emphasize that technology transfers may be framed in 
different ways like developmental cooperation, technical assistance, technology 
collaboration, joint ventures, intelligence sharing and other means of knowledge 
transmission. Any of these, and a collection of other similar terms, could be considered as 
the independent variable.  
To best explore the particulars of Israel’s relationship to China past, present and 
the future, the study considers the following: China’s country profile, challenges faced by 
China, shared interests/areas of cooperation, and history of relations. Furthermore, the 
probe will perform content analysis with the assistance of software NVivo, (as specified 
below) and finally provide a summation and conclusions about the nature of Israel-China 
ties. The country profile reviews China’s geography, recent history, political and 
economic systems and foreign policy of relevance to Sino-Israeli ties. The section 
considering China’s challenges reviews national vulnerabilities/issues (i.e. conflict, 
national security and food production /agriculture). The history of Sino-Israeli relations 
section features a sketch of watershed periods, based on interviews, literature and media 
sources. The shared interests /areas of cooperation segment consider sectors, which have 
offered Sino-Israeli partnership opportunities. The content analysis section examines the 
validity of the hypothesis or causality between independent, dependent and intervening 
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variables (detailed earlier). Here, mostly qualitative analysis methods are used with the 
help of NVivo software. As illustrated in the previous chapter, this chapter draws on a 
diverse inventory of primary and secondary sources like interviews, media reports, 
scholarly literature, government, and NGO documentation. The final portion of this 
chapter offers conclusions about the role of technology and knowledge transfers in Sino-
Israeli relations.  
The transfer of knowledge and/or technology in the context of this dissertation is 
not meant to infer in any way that Israel is overall more sophisticated or advanced than 
China. Both parties have much to learn from each other. However, the study underscores 
the value of Israeli specialized know-how as a source of attraction (soft power) for Israel 
in Sino-Israeli relations.  
 
CHINA COUNTRY PROFILE (OVERVIEW) 
 
The PRC has long held the distinction of the world’s most populous country and 
the first to pass the billion people benchmark. Misika (2015) contends that despite 
impressive leaps forward, China may also be viewed as the largest developing nation. In 
terms of territory, China is the largest country in Asia and by most sources the third 
largest in the world after Russia and Canada. However, the CIA World FactBook 
describes the PRC as somewhat smaller than the US. In this case, China would drop a 
notch in ranking to only the fourth largest country in the world in terms of area. 
Regardless of how it is measured, China holds immense territories and shares borders 
with over a dozen neighbors, some with which it has experienced disputes, most notably, 
rivals like Russia and India.  
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Much of the PRC has a rugged physical geography featuring expansive mountain 
ranges, hills, plateaus and sizable stretches of arid and semi-arid areas. The high elevation 
territories are in the west of the country, while lower lands and plains are in the eastern 
regions. These inhospitable topographical settings impose constraints on agriculture and, 
by extension, limitations in the critical business of food production. The vastness of the 
country also makes China susceptible to regional variances in terms of economic 
development. Strong growth is mostly experienced in eastern coastal regions where large 
cities and economic zones exist. In contrast, rural areas in the interior towards the west 
have witnessed much less progress and development. 
Since the late 1970s, China has experienced significant socio-economic changes 
as it transitioned to a new economic system known as a socialist market or mixed market 
economy as labeled in the literature. The mixed market system denotes paradoxical 
features, namely the integration of seemingly opposing economic and political principles, 
one in which state and non-state enterprises operate side by side under communist rule. 
Besides creating possibilities for the inclusion of private business players, the new 
systemic arrangement also enabled greater operational autonomy for state run enterprises. 
China’s move to a mixed model started after Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping and other 
leaders shied away from deeply trenched planned/centralized economic ideals. The wave 
of changes targeted four distinct areas for modernization: industry, agriculture, 
science/technology, and defense. The transformations brought about impressive growth 
and also gave cause for the country’s leaders to explore more engagement with other 
countries (Zhang, 2000). Brisk development produced a hunger to pursue new 
technologies and know-how from the outside.  
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As featured in chapter two, one of the main motivations behind initiating 
technology transfers is the desire by the technology seeker to boost the pace of 
development, which would otherwise not likely materialize organically. The technology 
transfer can offset growth impeding technology gaps. Leong Chan and Tugrul U. Daim 
(2011) call technology transfers “short cut” pathways for countries like China to fast-
forward their technological development capabilities. Generally, technology transfers 
also stimulate a “two to tango” mechanism, which in turn opens opportunities to advance 
bilateralism. Transfers are in themselves forms of partnerships thus creating foundations 
on which to build broader relationships, with the aim of achieving optimal benefits for all 
parties. In the case of Sino-Israeli relations, technology transfers have also produced 
unintended detrimental consequences, which will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
 With economic reforms, the ruling communist party also abandoned the 
agricultural commune system creating new realities in the country’s gigantic agrarian 
sector. These changes, like those mentioned above, opened investment opportunities for 
foreign interests. Xu (2015) points out the PRC’s fast economic growth made it an 
influential player in the global economy. China has evolved into the world’s largest 
exporter. Its economy went from being one of the poorest to one of the largest economies 
in the world.  
 The PRC is a one party state, the largest of its kind and one of the few remaining 
communist ruled countries. The Communist Party is China’s principal policy making 
organ. The legislative branch or National People's Congress (NPC) is influential in 
shaping national economic strategy and looks to elect officials, which conform to party 
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decrees. The executive branch includes the positions of President and Premier. The 
President is appointed by the NPC, and is the head of state. The Premier leads the 
government, and is nominated by the President and confirmed by the NPC.  
China is administered through provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities 
yet despite the power of the Communist party, the central government's jurisdictions at 
provincial and local government levels are limited. Local administrators are able to act 
with relative latitude in many areas. The country is governed through what Xu (2015) 
calls “regionally decentralized authoritarianism” (RDA). In essence, this means the 
decentralization of rule on the regional level when it comes to administrative execution 
and economic resource distribution, but centralized in terms of political power of which 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plays a principal role. In other words, the central 
government controls the personnel through the party, but sub-state governments manage 
most of the economy with the clout to introduce, discuss, realize and oppose policies, 
rules and laws. The PRC has been fashioned by this type of administration.  
Provincial and local administration leeway to make decisions on its own independent of 
the CCP enable the exercise of paradiplomacy. As mentioned in chapter 2, paradiplomacy 
is a practice in which sub-states like provinces/states develop and sustain direct 
relationships with other countries to advance their interests generally in non-political 
issues like trade and joint developmental projects. Paradiplomacy is of significance in the 
case of Israel’s direct technical relations with individual Chinese provinces. Chen (2014) 
underscores the importance of sub-state level relations in Sino-Israeli ties and asserts the 
trend will grow and add new dimensions to bilateral ties. Chinese scholar Pingan (2014), 
who was personally involved in recommending Israeli solar power and agricultural 
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technologies to Henan Province, asserts that some Chinese provinces have welcomed 
opportunities for collaboration with Israel especially in areas like desert and water-saving 
management. 
McGregor, (2011) cautions that for all of China’s economic liberalization, the 
state has retained tight reigns over personnel, information, and the military, the latter 
known as the People's Liberation Army (PLA).  He points out the primary mission of the 
PLA is to protect the Communist Party and not necessarily the country. Hence, leaders in 
Beijing place importance on party control of the military. McGregor’s assertion confirms 
a widely held understanding by China observers that the survival of the Party is a 
paramount priority. To maintain its survival, the Party looks to upholding political power 
but also to create a measure of societal content by raising living standards. On this point 
one could consider why the import of knowledge (technology transfer) can help advance 
Communist Party goals. 
Over the last few decades (from the 70s to the present), the PRC has become a 
more prominent actor in the global community. China has become a pivotal player in 
forums and organizations like the UN Security Council, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). China’s amplified involvement 
on the world stage meant more conversations with other countries about cooperation in 
the form of joint ventures and increased technical ties.  
The section above considered aspects of China’s geography, economic and 
political systems that are pertinent in the context of China’s technical driven ties with 
Israel.   
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CHINA’S CHALLENGES    
   
 
Elizabeth Economy (2005) echoes a telling account of China’s changed behaviors 
in recent times. Economy reasons the PRC’s move away in recent decades from 
concentrating mostly on domestic concerns to more external engagement reflects an 
important evolution. The point is that focusing mostly on internal issues reflects a 
behavior typical of developing countries (Economy 2005). However, a move in policies 
towards international outreach is more suggestive of a regional and global player. Put 
another way, these changes are perhaps a testament to China’s transformation from a 
mostly developing country to a more global player. In any case, world player tendencies 
and development country realities both play into Sino-Israeli dynamics in the context of 
specialized knowledge and technology transfers as will be explored below.  
International technology transfers can reveal possible associations between a 
given country’s domestic concerns and its external engagements. In other words, attempts 
by leaders to solve internal problems may entail international outreach involving 
technical cooperation agreements with other nations. To consider such a proposition in 
the case of the PRC, it is helpful to review some underlying challenges faced by China, 
which prompted a need to seek fresh problem solving approaches from domestic and 
foreign sources. This context promotes a supply and demand setting, opening soft power 
opportunities for states able and willing to cooperate in sharing problem-solving skills. 
This notion is valid in the case of large states like the United States and small ones like 
Israel. Most important is that the technology-sender nation is perceived or recognized to 
be capable of delivering durable ways to confront longstanding and growing problems. 
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So what are China’s challenges which may be associated with the import of helpful 
technologies?   
        As specified earlier, China’s vast geography comprises terrain containing large 
swaths of rugged, arid and semi-arid landscapes. These physical realities debilitate 
China’s ability to produce meaningful quantities of foodstuffs. Achieving ideal crop 
output levels are further frustrated by population growth. It is no surprise therefore, that 
the efficiency of food production was and continues to be a growing cause of concern in 
Chinese policymaking circles. Worries about crop yields grew as the PRC experienced 
major social and economic transformations in the 1970s and beyond (Zhang, 2000). 
China’s hurried development pressed Beijing decision-makers to seek-out proven 
techniques to keep up with the demands of progress. Veeck (2007) and Jin and Young 
(2001) point out crucial issues in the PRC’s agriculture sector are not confined to just 
food supply concerns, but also touch on socio-economic afflictions like income 
stagnation (especially in grain-dependent areas). Dry land conditions are but one in a set 
of problematic dynamics facing large numbers of subsistence farmers who endeavor to 
produce desirable fruits, vegetables, meat, poultry, and grain. Other impeding factors 
include management issues. Thus, more effective management coupled with new 
technologies could assist in boosting farmer revenues and by extension alleviate poverty 
and advance overall rural development. Veeck (2007) stresses that recent advances in 
farming techniques in the PRC have improved the agriculture sector, which in turn raised 
overall living conditions in less developed countryside regions. This illustration is 
testament to the great significance of agriculture in the economic well-being of millions 
of Chinese citizens. Misika (2015) also underscores the importance of improving 
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agriculture as a way to elevate standards of living in rural areas and suggests a role for 
foreign sources in that endeavor.  Of course, it is important to note that challenges in 
Chinese farming differ from region to region and are contingent on features such as the 
type of crop cultivated, and ownership and management styles in place.  
Overcoming water scarcity was an essential part of efforts to increase food 
production potential in China. Olli Varis, Pertti Vakkilainen (2001) attribute the 
country’s water woes to a combination of causes like: environmental issues, population 
density, rapid urbanization and structural (institutional) flaws. Jiang (2009) concurs with 
these assessments about the causes of water scarcity but argues that water management 
(technology) is the most realistic way to minimize shortage problems because the other 
issues cannot be modified. Arid climatic conditions in large parts of China highlight the 
critical utility of water management (irrigation) technologies to improve water use 
efficiency in agriculture. Jin and Young (2001) contend that proper irrigation is a vital 
component in securing adequate food output levels noting grain yields are heavily 
dependent on the availability of irrigated land.  
Further testament of inadequate food production concerns in the PRC can be 
sketched from China’s recent foreign land for farming acquisitions. Stone (2013) 
contends the PRC’s procurement of agricultural land outside China is part of a wider 
trend in which farmland changes hands from local to international interests. While the 
land acquisition tendency has no direct bearing on Sino-Israeli dynamics it does provide 
an indication about the urgency to increase agricultural production, which is a key 
component in Sino-Israeli cooperation in past and present times. National security is the 
other major dynamic driving bilateral relations with Israel.  
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 National security worries are not in themselves unusual for decision makers of 
most countries. In the case of China, one could argue that military affairs are of primary 
significance when considering a multitude of regional disputes involving the PRC. A 
history of quarrels stretches along a timeline, which covers decades from earlier periods 
in modern day China to present times. A political rift emerged between Beijing and 
Moscow in the 1960s spurring border tensions. Besides frictions on the Soviet frontier, 
China is party to a collection of territorial spats some of which have not been resolved. 
Some of these disputes have created opportunities for Sino-Israeli military contacts. 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) asserts a wide-ranging roster of regional 
issues involving the PRC. These include political differences with neighboring nuclear 
rival India over territory in the Himalayas and nuclear proliferation issues. Also, China’s 
southwestern Yunnan province has experienced smuggling border breaches from 
Myanmar stemming from drug trafficking activities. China has laid claims to islands in 
the South China Sea, but these claims have been challenged by Taiwan, Vietnam and 
Japan. There are also territorial disagreements between China and North Korea over 
border rivers such as the Yalu and Tumen. Furthermore, Beijing contends with domestic 
unrest mostly in western regions of the country. 
Teufel-Dreyer (2005) points out China’s susceptibility to minority separatism in 
autonomous regions like Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. After the September 11 
attacks, groups associated with radical Islam became the center of anti-terror security 
attention mostly in Xinjiang, where millions of ethnic Moslem Uyghurs reside. Sun 
(2010) suggests groups with ties to international jihadist organizations have challenged 
the legitimacy of Beijing’s authority in Xinjiang, and thus are seen as posing security 
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threats in Western China. Smith (2009) asserts the 9/11 attacks drew the US and China 
closer to cooperate on common counter-terrorism interests. Nevertheless, China’s 
cooperation in combating terrorism also extends to other international partners, who in 
the eyes of Beijing can deliver helpful combat knowledge and experiences. On that point, 
Pingan (2014) notes China’s efforts to fight extremist groups go beyond security itself, 
and extend to collaboration (international) in technology, intelligence and training 
techniques. 
The above passages have reviewed primarily areas of concern to the PRC’s 
leadership (security and agriculture) and which appear to be factors in the initiation and 
growth of ties between Israel and China. Agriculture and security associated technology 
transfers offered Beijing extra ways to approach national priorities. 
 
HISTORY OF SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS    
    
 
Trade, diplomatic and military sector interactions between China and Israel in the 
last two decades suggest remarkable growth in bilateral ties. However, the path to formal 
Sino-Israeli relations did not unfold swiftly or straightforwardly, but instead turned out to 
be a very lengthy experience. The eventual formation of diplomatic relations between 
Israel and China in 1992 came after a series of, on again, off again, clandestine behind 
the scenes dynamics starting in the 1950s and lasting for dozens of years. Even as quiet 
exchanges between the two countries took place, Chinese officials and state media 
routinely continued to reference the Jewish State and its policies through tough, critical 
language.  
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The genesis of Sino-Israeli relations can be traced back numerous years prior to 
the eventual opening of embassies in Tel Aviv and Beijing in 1992. The Chinese 
Embassy is located in Tel Aviv because the PRC does not formally recognize Jerusalem 
as Israel’s capital. The policy is not unusual, and mirrors those practiced by other 
countries, which maintain diplomatic missions in Israel. Nevertheless, the policy is of a 
symbolic nature as visiting Chinese officials conduct business in Jerusalem, the seat of 
the Israeli government.  
Many years of sporadic contacts between Israel and China proved 
inconsequential. However, starting in the 1970s the PRC’s new leadership dropped 
longstanding communist doctrines opening itself more to contacts with the outside world. 
Increased openness in foreign policy meant more opportunities to seek external resources 
with which to tackle some of the PRC’s most pressing issues. Chinese policymakers 
looked to other countries in pursuit of specialized knowledge. Against this backdrop, 
China and Israel began to renew contacts, which were previously dormant for many 
years. Unlike past distant periods, the exchanges of the late 70s, while also covert, proved 
to provide seeds for more productive interactions. The scale of Israel’s security and 
developmental experiences are small in Chinese terms. Nevertheless, know-how in those 
areas attracted notable attention among decision makers in Beijing. Sino-Israeli ties, has 
generally flourished, but have also been plagued by contentious interactions. The 
solidification of security ties between Beijing and Jerusalem in particular had at times 
drawn critical scrutiny from Washington, producing awkward and hot-tempered moments 
between the US and Israel, which still resonates in the present. Sino-Israeli relations 
suffered setbacks, but as a whole were not permanently damaged because of any one 
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specific issue. The section below considers milestones in bilateral relations. surveying 
what has been written or said about the development of Israel’s ties with China. It draws 
on information sourced from the literature, interviews, and media. Overall Sino-Israeli 
relations can be chronologically noted by the following periods (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 Timeline Overall Sino-Israeli Relations 
   
 
  
1949 – 1972 (BIRTH OF THE PRC TO CHINA OPENS UP)  
 
 
  
In terms of size of territory, economic dimensions and population Israel and 
China are situated at opposite ends.  Yet despite such striking differences, the two nations 
also exhibit some notable similarities and attributes. Israel and China share features in 
terms of historical legacy and modern day challenges.  
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China and Israel were established just one year apart. Israel was created in 1948 
and the PRC in 1949. The two countries both emerged after prolonged armed struggles. 
China endured a civil war, while pre-state Israel experienced internal strife in the lead up 
to statehood, and subsequent full-scale war with its neighbors upon declaration of 
independence. Both China and Israel were established with the aims of fulfilling deeply 
rooted doctrines, which were intertwined with their overall nationalistic ambitions.  The 
PRC was founded on the philosophies of Marxism-Leninism, while Israel was established 
on Zionist principles. The primary goal of Zionism included the yearning to re-establish 
Jewish sovereignty on land believed to be part of biblical ancient Israel. The goals of the 
1949 Chinese revolution included the introduction of radical social and economic 
reforms. In essence, the two movements worked to shape new societies. Early statehood 
Israel had an economy mostly dominated by state owned enterprises. Hence, at one time 
Israel’s economy featured socialist mechanisms before moving to a free market economy 
as it is today. Adelman (2014) suggests that Israel’s socialist past was an advantage in 
dealing with a mixed market communist country, which China became after reforms in 
the 1970s. Furthermore, both Israel and China have deeply seated beliefs in which they 
see themselves as ancient nations. The two nations also strive to maintain meaningful ties 
with diaspora communities. China placed importance on relations with ethnic Chinese 
communities worldwide as an aspect of its foreign affairs. Israel built an extensive 
infrastructure dedicated to maintaining and expanding bonds with diaspora Jewish 
communities. When future formal ties with Israel developed, the Chinese government 
expressed interest in the Israeli model of outreach to the diaspora to as a way to connect 
with Chinese communities around the world (Adelman, 2015). 
 119 
The two countries have had farming communes, albeit the Chinese model was 
discontinued with the advent of sweeping land reforms in 1970s, while the Israeli model 
(the Kibbutz) transformed into a more capitalist version of itself. Levin (2013) notes the 
two countries both assert rights over territories on historical grounds. Israel cites ancient 
Jewish heritage claims to the disputed West Bank. China, too, claims sovereignty over 
Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and parts of the South China Sea based on historical ties. In 
seeking to expand its diplomatic network, Israel sought to highlight commonalities with 
China wherever possible, and built on shared strategic interests. 
Sino-Israeli interactions first took place only a year after the 1949 establishment 
of the PRC. In 1950, Israel became the first Middle East country, and one of the few non-
Communist states, to recognize post revolution China. In the same year, initial secret 
exchanges between the two countries occurred. In the decades that followed, China and 
Israel fell in and out of contact with years passing between encounters. Zev Sufott, 
Israel’s first Ambassador in Beijing neatly unpacks the milestones in Sino-Israeli 
relations. Sufott (2000) and others trace a string of bilateral exchanges, which resemble 
back and forth ping-pong like dynamics; one in which intentions to normalize relations 
often changed directions falling prey to policy reversals, timing issues, missed 
opportunities, Middle East conflict, and intervening diplomatic constraints. Ambassador 
Sufott asserts various factors and historical episodes, hindered or stopped altogether any 
movement toward full diplomatic relations.   
Israel's foreign policies, like those of other countries, do not operate in isolation. 
Put another way, the Jewish State’s approach toward China was also subject to competing 
priorities, political pressures and interests in other regions. This was especially true 
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during the Cold War in association with the 1950-1953 Korean conflict. China was allied 
with North Korea while the US sided with the South Korea. Sobin (1991) contends that 
the warming of Israeli relations with China, during the Korean War would have been in 
direct opposition to US interests. Efforts to purse formal Sino-Israeli ties stalled after 
Israel was inclined to join western condemnations of China’s Korea policy. Nonetheless, 
shortly after the Korean War, a small Israeli trade delegation secretly traveled to Beijing, 
but the visit did not advance relations as hoped. China had its own interests and priorities 
in the Middle East, and consistently demonstrated unwavering support in favor of Israel’s 
key adversaries. This was exemplified by China’s pro-Arab position in1955 during the 
African-Asian Bandung conference, which adopted an anti-Israel resolution. Beijing’s 
policy at the contentious conference again lowered expectations of advancing Sino-Israeli 
ties (Shichor, 2014). Shortly afterward, in 1956, another obstruction in the way of 
moving towards formal relations occurred when Israel, joined forces with Britain and 
France to confront Egypt after it nationalized the Suez Canal. The nationalization of this 
highly strategic waterway threatened British and French interests. During the crisis, 
China again sided with the overall Arab World position further eliminating any prospects 
for renewed Sino-Israeli exchanges. After the conflict, decades passed before hints of 
progress towards bilateral contacts emerged again in the 1970s. 
 
1972 (CHINA OPENS UP) – 1980S  
 
The warming of relations between Beijing and Washington in the early1970s 
somewhat offered to ease constraints on Israeli policy limitations towards communist 
 121 
China. In prior periods, American governments discouraged allies from diplomatically 
engaging the Chinese. The opening of China to the world in the wake of President 
Nixon’s historic 1972 visit set the stage for the US and other countries in the West to tap 
into the massive Chinese market. In this context, Israel sought contacts with China, but 
Beijing did not respond right away, taking years to trickle into meaningful bilateral 
exchanges.  
During this period (1970s) the PRC interacted with numerous other countries as it 
pursued major modernization objectives. As new era Chinese polices solidified, so did 
opportunities to re-start once forgotten Sino-Israeli dialogues. Western engagement in 
China placed priority on selling finished goods and equipment. Western companies 
seeking to enter the PRC generally resisted transferring core technologies, but some were 
more comfortable helping with medium to low-tech knowledge (Wang and Zhou, 1999). 
In contrast to western players, Israel’s interaction in China (while of a very small scale) 
offered a platform from which Chinese decision makers could work toward, the goal of 
building self-reliance in crucial sectors like agriculture, and some military-related 
technology areas (Melman and Sinai, 1987). Put another way, the West tended to 
primarily focus on the sale of a particular product, while the Israeli approach appeared to 
emphasize sustainability, know-how, and training that could, in the longer term, be 
learned and then adopted in China. This type of approach was an attractive alternative 
and deemed helpful in advancing China’s technological capabilities (Chan and Daim, 
2011). Over time, China increased interest in learning more about Israel’s developmental 
and security experiences. In 1975, a Chinese delegation visited the Israeli Pavilion, at the 
Paris Airshow (featuring mostly military hardware). The visit set the stage for further but 
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quiet contacts later in the decade. Melman and Sinai (1987) reveal that an Israeli arms 
industry delegation traveled to China in 1979.  
Sino-Israeli meetings ultimately became more frequent but that did not happen 
until the 1980s. Eventually the medley of unofficial meetings, which ensued, transitioned 
into full formal ties (Chen, 2012).  
 
1980S – 1992 (LEAD UP TO FORMAL TIES)  
 
 In the 1980s, agricultural cooperation started indirectly, but later transitioned to 
direct contacts in the mid and late years of the decade. The increased Sino-Israeli 
cooperation, while mostly private, came at a time showing hints of Chinese policy 
modifications towards Israel. Sufott (2000) asserts the addition of the words 'since 1967' 
to Beijing’s demand that Israel withdraw from territories it captured in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war as a condition for formal relations suggests a subtle policy shift which was 
softer in tone towards the Jewish State. In essence, Chinese policymakers carefully 
managed a foreign relations balancing act. On the one hand, mindful of China’s deeply 
rooted Middle East interests in the Arab World while, on the other hand, conducting 
secret talks with Israel as it sought to advance technical cooperation. Sobin (1991) points 
out that discreet commercial links began in 1979, but ministerial level meetings only 
became a reality in the mid-1980s. The first high-level ministerial level contact between 
the two countries occurred when the Chinese and Israeli Ministers of Science met at a 
1985 conference in the US. Israel’s distinctive experience and achievements in 
agriculture technology, particularly in irrigation systems, were of special interest in the 
PRC. Chinese decision makers looked for ways to better cope with arid conditions 
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limiting food production thus giving cause for contacts with countries like Israel, 
regardless of politics or even the absence of formal relations. Israel’s experience and 
skillsets were suitable to help deal with deep developmental issues in China. Several 
years before the start of diplomatic relations, a Chinese delegation reportedly secretly 
traveled to Israel in 1985 to work out a deal on joint farming projects and other 
cooperation opportunities in solar energy, robotics, and arms manufacturing (Sobin, 
1991; Sufott, 1997). The sharing of agricultural technology served as a prime vehicle of 
cooperation at a time when China faced the struggles of feeding a 1/4 of the world’s 
population while possessing only 1/7 of the earth’s arable land (Sufott, 1997). It is also 
important to note as Bruins and Bu (2006) point out, China has the largest agricultural 
economy in the world, being both the largest food producer and food consumer. China’s 
food needs are unmatched by any other country, including neighboring India.  
On military ties, Harris (1999) posits that Beijing’s rift with Moscow created a 
need for China to seek combat-tested experience against Soviet-made arms. Israel’s 
combat record against Soviet-armed adversaries in the Arab-Israeli wars (1967, 1973 and 
1982) was a source of attraction to Israel from policymakers in the PRC. Shichor (2014) 
explains even in pre-diplomatic relations days China closely followed Israeli military 
achievements. He points out every kind of clash Israel had with Syria and Lebanon was 
recorded. Some of these were noted in Chinese publications covering military matters. 
Shichor suggests that because the Middle East is like a huge laboratory for use of state-
of-the-art military technologies this played a part in driving informal discrete ties with 
Israel (in the 1980s) which offered valued knowledge in warfare, and was in turn 
incorporated into China’s military modernization processes. Ultimately, the military 
 124 
relationship, like contacts in the agriculture sector, also played a role in inching Israel and 
China closer together. In effect, China’s contacts with Israel at the time negated Beijing’s 
long-standing close ties in the Arab World. Chunshan (2014) characterizes Sino-Israeli 
military exchanges as a product of pragmatism. Later in 1980s the foreign ministers of 
Israel and China met at the UN with a view to open opportunities for more exchanges. 
Besides the prospects of technical ties, geo-political factors also drew China closer to 
Israel. As a rising international player, China sought to play a notable role in Israel-
Palestinian peace efforts. Closer relations with all parties in the conflict including Israel 
would grant China more clout as a player in the peace process. China was also sensitive 
to the thawing of Soviet-Israeli relations, which could compete with and aggravate 
Beijing’s diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. A further tightening of Sino-Israeli ties 
came when the Israeli Minister of Defense traveled to Beijing in 1991. The visit marked a 
dramatic contrast to pervious distant periods dominated by discord and antagonism 
between the two countries.  Sobin (1991) sums up the transition in Sino-Israeli relations 
eloquently, contending that Israel slowly went from being seen by Chinese leaders as an 
inconsequential country to a potential partner and source of benefit, which could be 
helpful in dealing advancing some of the PRC’s national troubles.  
A tangible turning point in China-Israel pre-formal relations came with the mutual 
opening of non-diplomatic missions in 1990: The Israel Academy of Sciences and 
Humanities in Beijing and the Chinese tourist office in Tel Aviv. Over the history of 
exchanges, technical cooperation emerged as a central theme in bilateral engagement 
both before and after the opening of embassies in Tel-Aviv and Beijing. Technology 
transfers were significant features in the buildup to formal Israel-China ties as the PRC 
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grew into one of the world’s largest technology importers. At the same time, China’s rise 
as a global economic power made it an attractive and sought after prospective partner for 
many countries including Israel. In his memoir, former Israeli diplomat Sufott (1997) 
describes the launch of Israel’s quiet, semi-official, pre-diplomatic presence in Mainland 
China. His accounts reinforce the notion that technology and knowledge conversations 
served as channels of dialogue on the path to forge future formal ties. Ambassador Sufott 
asserts the opening of Israel’s scientific exchange office in Beijing was a distinct 
precursor in the lead-up to open relations. Adelman (2014) concurs that steps to formal 
ties revolved around scientific exchanges. Officially, the Israeli office was tasked with 
mostly facilitating scientific and agricultural cooperation, but it was also doubling as a 
venue for Sino-Israeli political contacts. The work of the office is notable because it 
offers some verification of how non-political technical exchanges may positively impact 
political processes, serving as way stations to wider bilateral cooperation and overall to 
the normalization of relations. Sufott (1997) confirms Chinese policymakers took note of 
Israel’s track record especially in military and development issues. Adelman (2014) notes 
that the rise of Deng Xiaoping and the launch of China’s modernization efforts set into 
motion policies which made once forbidden military contacts with Israel okay. In other 
words, the necessity to modernize in China, overrode any policies which would typically 
bar Chinese officials from talking and collaborating with Israel. The seemingly radical 
shift in policy is reminiscent of a Chinese proverb associated with Deng Xiaoping 
himself: “It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.” Sobin 
(1991) also notes ties with Israel offered appealing arms options namely in the form of 
relatively low-cost yet battle proven weaponry.  
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1992 -2014 (FORMAL TIES AND BEYOND)  
 
On 24 January 1992 Israel and China inaugurated full diplomatic relations.   
The initial years of formal ties were marked by a visible exchange of dignitary visits and 
the finalization of agreements covering science, technology and trade. Amplified open 
Sino-Israeli exchanges endowed Beijing in a number of ways: to be a more significant 
player in forthcoming Middle East peace efforts, to counter-balance Moscow’s power in 
the region, and to have better relations with the West where it also sought technologies.   
Israel-China formal relations grew to encase an array of cooperative and mutual interest 
dimensions in areas of trade, technology, and strategic benefits. Cooperation in counter-
terrorism is a key example of strategic interests. Peng (2007) points out that when 
China’s leadership stopped looking outward solely in terms of political polarity, it turned 
instead to an emphasis on broader international cooperation. Mutual Sino-Israeli 
objectives void of dogmatic political dynamics nudged Israel and China closer through 
technology collaboration. Peng (2007) points out that China’s relationship with some of 
America’s allies like South Korea, and Australia, made Washington nervous. The same 
may be said of tighter ties between Israel and China. The closer Sino-Israeli relations 
were not always seen with a favorable eye in Washington, where officials asserted that 
some Israeli military technology transfers to the PRC included American made 
components, which Israel was not authorized to re-export to third parties. To be clear, it 
is not suggested in this dissertation that it is unreasonable for the US to express 
objections to Israeli arms transfers to China. Some of Israel’s military technology 
transfers were believed to include American made components. Unauthorized transfers 
 127 
by Israel of American technologies as part of finished military products would be in 
violation of US export control regulations.      
Adelman (2014) notes Israel’s uniqueness in technical ties with China. He  
points out that Israelis were generally more willing to go to out of the way areas of 
mainland China while most westerners working in similar sectors tended to operate in 
more established major centers like Shanghai and other urban centers. As mentioned 
above, huge areas of China are dry (deserts) or too cold (high elevation) for food 
production. To cope with these challenges, China embarked on multiple collaborations 
with Israel in agriculture. Examples include a series of joint ventures officially called 
Sino-Israeli demonstration farms. The farms, which were designed to stimulate 
sustainability were co-established and managed by MASHAV, Israel’s international 
development agency. Each farm features different types of livestock or crops. Generally, 
such joint ventures are venues where specialized Israeli agricultural methods are 
implemented locally. In 1993, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Agriculture of China introduced the China-Israel Agricultural Training Center. A joint 
Sino-Israeli dairy farm was setup near Beijing in 2001. It introduced techniques in milk 
production, and featured new computer-assisted herd feeding, health and fertility 
management. An annual report by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012) describes 
the facility as a center where thousands of Chinese farmers train. These demonstration 
farms have also drawn interest from neighboring East Asian countries. MASHAV 
maintains that farmers from Thailand, Vietnam, and Korea visited the facility to 
experience how the farm works, what it can produce, and to explore the possibility of 
applying some of the same agricultural techniques in their home countries.  
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  Another notable joint agro-project was the 2002 Sino-Israeli Demonstration and 
Training Center for Agriculture, in the dry Xinjiang Uygur region of northwest China. 
The center’s mission focused on overcoming farming struggles in arid areas. The project 
involved the introduction of irrigation water-saving management methods. The system 
aimed to maximize crop output with minimal water use. The overall purpose of the 
project was to create a flagship model for China's dry lands agriculture and the 
development of industrial crops. Industrial crops are non-food plants, which are raw 
materials like cotton from which to produce finished products. In turn, increased 
industrial crop output can help China reduce imports of similar products. While such 
model farms have been established to help advance agriculture and foster government-to-
government cooperation, they also create public diplomacy opportunities. An Israeli 
agricultural specialist stationed in China on behalf of MASHAV contends that local 
farmers who associate their own success stories with Israeli techniques tend to become 
goodwill ambassadors for Israel. It should be noted that MASHAV operates alumni clubs 
in China (and other countries) known as Shalom clubs. Members are invited to attend 
lectures, exchange ideas, and organize technical cooperation. These forums provide 
MASHAV a platform to maintain personal ties with former trainees and organize 
professional activities. As noted, over the years since the start of diplomatic ties in 1992, 
Sino-Israeli cooperation in various sectors has helped move Israel and China towards 
tighter ties.  
On the political front, China’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has 
somewhat changed from mostly one-sided condemnations of Israel to a more neutral 
positions, thus softening its tone towards the Jewish State. Several sources suggest that 
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during the 1990s and early 2000s, Israeli military exports to China swelled, making Israel 
a major arms supplier in the Chinese market.  However, cooperation in the military sector 
was not maintained as Jerusalem faced intense opposition from Washington. Israel was 
obliged to renege upon and terminate arms deals. There were two major examples of 
disruptions in military cooperation between Israel and China.  First, a blow to the flow of 
military equipment came with the cancellation of the sale of Israeli Phalcon (Aircraft) 
Airborne Early Warning systems in 2000. Another striking example of the halt of Israeli 
arms to China happened when America requested that Israel stop the upgrade of (IAI) 
Harpy Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or drones. Harpy is an all-weather self-directed 
weapon system that can counter hostile SAM (surface-to-air-missile) and radar sites. This 
particular incident was especially embarrassing to Israel and created a setback in Sino-
Israeli relations. China had bought the drones from Israel some years before (1990s) but 
sent them to Israel for upgrades. Typically, this happens as part of an after sales 
maintenance program. Under strong US pressure, Israel backed out and did not upgrade 
the drones. Such vehement American objections to the stream of Israeli arms to China 
presents an interesting reversal of a previous US policy. Sobin (1991) points out that 
during the Cold War, Washington pushed in the opposite direction, encouraging Israel to 
supply advanced military equipment to the PRC believing the move would force the 
Soviets to transfer some of its most advanced weapons away from the European front to 
their eastern border with China and thus diminish threats to the US and its NATO allies.   
Both the Phalcon Airborne Early Warning systems and the Harpy UAV system 
were considered critical warfare tools. The cancellations produced furious reactions in 
Beijing, and created a credibility problem for Israel. It has raised doubts about whether 
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Israel could honor military technology transfer commitments without America’s 
approval. Opposition to Sino-Israeli military deals stem from US regulations aimed at 
curbing technology transfers of American made components as parts of finished goods. 
Shichor (2014) points out that the political turmoil following the failed deal forced Israel 
to limit and then eliminate altogether military transfers to China in the early and mid 
2000s. Adelman (2014) contends that the US forced Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to 
stop the transfer of weapons to China. Such restraints on Israeli military exports to the 
PRC remain in place today. Shichor (2014) and Adelman (2014) suggest the real reasons 
for Washington’s directive had to do more with concerns Israel could undercut America’s 
armament share in other lucrative markets like Latin America by offering equally 
effective yet lower cost military products. 
Adelman (2014) adds the Phalcon cancellation issue was a very big deal because 
it cut a lot of business for Israel. Furthermore, he asserts the arms trade gave Israel access 
to high-ranking people in China, which was subsequently lost. Tiezzi (2014) suggests 
there have been calls in Israel to restart the arms trade with the PRC, but US pressure 
continues to block that possibility. However, Israel’s trade relations with China gradually 
recovered and improved, but it was not an easy transition. Evron (2014) who traces 
technology transfers between the two countries says Israeli-Chinese ties have moved 
away from the military sector to instead focusing solely on civilian sectors. He notes the 
wounds of the Phalcon and Harpy fiascos have had long lasting negative implications on 
the nature of some Israeli exports to China. He points out that some Israeli companies, 
fearful of retribution from the US, tend to self-regulate their dealings with China 
especially if their products comprise of dual use civilian/military technologies. Dual use 
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technologies are generally civilian technologies, which may also lend themselves to 
military applications. Evron contends that some (Israeli) technology producers and 
suppliers tend to take an over cautious track and stop selling their products to China 
altogether. In retrospect, Chen (2014) acknowledges that while at one-point military 
technologies used to be more important in the relationship, other technologies have 
gained significance in the growth of bilateral ties. Tiezzi (2014) asserts China has grown 
to become second only to the US as a source of joint hi-tech projects with Israel, and has 
surpassed Europe as the leading source of hi-tech capital. 
On this point there has been a continued and growing interest in China in various 
specialized technologies from Israel like water desalination and ways to combat 
desertification, but also overall in hi-tech fields. This notion is confirmed by the words of 
former Chinese diplomats who were stationed in Israel. Former Ambassador Yonglong 
(2006) depicts Sino-Israeli ties as a partnership of many opportunities in technology 
fields. More recently, Ambassador Yanping (2012) in a telling opinion piece in a 
prominent Israeli newspaper entitled “China’s Road to Prosperity” asserts her country’s 
cooperation with Israel has been mutually beneficial on multiple levels and urged a step 
up in scientific and technical ties. A convincing instance of intensified Sino-Israeli 
technical relations in recent years came in the form of a 2012 agreement to set up 
technology parks in Dangguan, a city in the southern Guangdong province. The projects 
aimed to advance water treatment as well as electric car and biomedicine technologies. 
Chen (2014) believes tech ties between the two countries are a “win-win”, arguing that 
China benefits by accessing technologies it seeks, and by extension, the relationship with 
Israel also provides Chinese interests a pathway to connect with the American Jewish 
 132 
Community. Israel mostly benefits from the relationship with China through market 
access and sources of funding. Pingan (2014) expects specialized tech cooperation 
growth to stay on track, and even suggests the convergence of Israeli patents (technology) 
and Chinese resources could have the potential to produce future iconic business brands. 
This assertion gains significance, when considering the PRC is the world’s largest 
exporting country. 
However, despite the growth of hi-tech ties, some sectors still suffer from export 
limitations stemming from the aborted Sino-Israeli arms deal blocked by the US during 
the 2000s. Shichor (2014) contends that when it comes to exports to China, Israel’s hi-
tech industry can get bogged down by vague US regulations. He asserts that some 
companies do not know what is or is not appropriate. It is important to note that even 
seemingly “innocent” civilian technologies can fall under export limitations to China if 
they are classified as dual use technologies. Of course, Shichor (2014) adds that some 
Israeli companies try to find some ways to bypass these limits through other countries or 
companies.  
Another noteworthy aspect of knowledge sharing in Sino-Israel relations has 
emerged through academia starting mostly in 2011. Academic exchanges between Israel 
and China have been on the rise providing new avenues to advance bilateral dialogues. 
One of the most active organizations promoting academic exchanges is an NGO called 
Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (SIGNAL). Carice Witte founded 
the organization in 2011 to help foster bilateral ties through enhanced academic 
interactions. SIGNAL has created a forum to promote the exchange of ideas between 
Chinese and Israeli scholars on mutual bilateral concerns. The organization facilitates the 
 133 
hosting of Chinese delegations visiting Israel and setting up joint research endeavors. 
SIGNAL is not an official Israeli government organ, but it enjoys support from Jewish 
American organizations and its accomplishments are acknowledged by the Israeli 
government. SIGNAL has privately helped to introduce Israel studies centers at major 
Chinese Universities. Witte (2014) contends SIGNAL’s NGO status grants it more 
latitude than official government bodies since some potential partners are often wary of 
state sanctioned initiatives. Nevertheless, the organization’s independent dealings in 
China also play a part in government-to-government partnerships. Witte (2014) suggests 
the organization was established to fill a void in Sino-Israeli relations because 
government dealings focused almost entirely on economic related issues. 
A notable feature behind SIGNAL’s strategy is the premise that knowledge about 
Israel made available to Chinese scholars could be passed along to key decision-makers 
whom they may advise. Witte contends tapping elite scholars who help develop policy is 
the most efficient pathway to leaders. Iber (2015) points out that joint academic 
exchanges of recent times signal a growing cultural interest in Israel in the PRC. 
Increasingly Judaica Centers are being established at various Chinese universities, and 
joint institutes are beginning to appear there. In Israel, China studies and the study of the 
Chinese language have become very popular especially after the opening of Confucius 
Institutes at Tel Aviv University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.  
Witte (2014) asserts that regional turmoil triggered by the 2011 Arab Spring has 
been a factor in spurring intensified Chinese interest in Israel by way of academic 
partnerships. The PRC is interested in advances in Israel’s hi-tech, but also tapping its 
knowledge about the Middle East. Recently, the Israel Institute of Technology also called 
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the Technion, teamed up with Shantou University (STU) in Guangdong Province to open 
a new academic facility there. The joint venture marks a stepped up combination of 
technical and academic cooperation involving Guangdong Province, Shantou 
Municipality, the Technion, and STU. The project also makes the Technion the first 
Israeli University to have a campus in China. It is important to note the Technion and 
other Israeli institutions like Tel-Aviv University and Hebrew University achieved 
notable rank positions in the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities.  
The upsurge in Chinese interest in Israel in recent years, together with SIGNAL’s 
push to engage scholars in China has brought about the emergence of Israel Studies 
programs, which did not exist before 2011. China’s Ministry of Education began to 
recognize Israel as an area of study eligible for state funding. The establishment of Israel 
Studies programs, largely at prominent institutions, signifies an official stamp of approval 
and more importantly a shift away from previous periods when the study of Israel and 
overtly open ties with Israel were generally not encouraged.  
Closer academic ties have widened points of contact between the two countries 
and perhaps indicate a more willingness to soften China’s approach with regard to 
Israel’s political claims. SIGNAL has organized a number conferences and symposiums 
for Chinese and Israeli academics in China and Israel. At the first ever China-Israel 
Strategic Studies Conference in 2013 (organized in part by SIGNAL) near Tel-Aviv, the 
keynote speaker, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi described Israel “as an ancient land 
of the ancient Jewish people”. While symbolic, the statement perhaps suggests empathy 
toward Israel’s biblical and core claims to territory. The remark underscores a glaring 
departure from previous policy statements usually very critical of Israel.  Furthermore, as 
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Witte asserts, the appearance of a top Chinese official at the gathering speaks volumes 
about the significance given to Sino-Israeli ties. Meanwhile, since 2011 China has been 
increasing the flow of delegations to Israel, thus raising bilateral engagement. Witte 
makes it clear that Israel’s skills are the big draw for China but acknowledges like Abadi 
(2015) that generally nothing is expected of China with regard to foreign policy. 
Furthermore, when considering the overall weight of Chinese energy and other interests 
in the Middle East against those of Israel it is not surprising that some scholars altogether 
discount the notion of political gain for Israel as a product of bilateral technical ties. 
While Sino-Israeli relations have flourished in key sectors, China has politically 
maintained a somewhat pro-Palestinian stance. This state of affairs is echoed by 
Bitzinger (2014) and Shichor (2014) who do not give much currency to the notion that 
technology relations have political punch in favor of Israel. However, Shichor adds that 
technical ties do help develop trade relations but within limits. Adelman (2015) points out 
that competing interests greatly limit Israel’s ability to influence Beijing. Pingan (2014) 
nevertheless asserts that moving forward, China will maintain a more neutral and 
unbiased attitude on Middle East affairs, and try to avoid direct involvement in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. An illustration of Beijing’s balanced tone surfaced when 
Israeli and Palestinian leaders visited China just a week apart in 2013. The Chinese 
President Xi Jinping made similar pledges to both Israeli and Palestinian leaders. First to 
Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas vowing support to the people of 
Palestine, and then a week later, expressing support for the people of Israel to Prime 
Minister Netanyahu. In doing so, the Chinese leader avoided taking sides, highlighting 
more balanced policy statements with regard to the Palestinian – Israeli conflict. 
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However, Chinese statements at the United Nations in recent years about the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict do suggest a modification in tone from those statements made 
in past decades. In 2012, Li Baodong, China's permanent representative to the UN, stated 
“China hopes that all the relevant parties will resolve their disputes through political 
negotiations on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions, the principle of land 
for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the road map for peace in the Middle East, with a 
view to establishing an independent State of Palestine, with Palestine and Israel living 
peacefully side by side.” The statement dramatically differs in tone from a statement 
made by Chinese Ambassador Li Luye, in 1985 in the same UN forum: “China’s stand on 
the question is clear and consistent. It is again Israel’s policy of aggression and expansion 
that has posed a grave threat to and seriously disrupted peace and security in the Middle 
East, causing the prolongation of the agony of war and turmoil in the region.”  Albeit, the 
statements above represent but just a minuscule sample of China’s stand on the Middle 
East and Israel over time. However, a side-by-side comparison of these statements 
reveals a clear modification of China’s diplomatic tone in recent years. The language 
used to characterize Israel in recent periods has softened and policy statements on the 
conflict with the Palestinians are noticeably more balanced and devoid of rigid 
descriptions about the role of the Jewish state in the conflict.  
Have Beijing’s political positions on the Middle East not changed as some 
suggest? Or has a softening of political policies taken place? The following section 
evaluates China’s Israel policy over a span of more than two decades by drawing on data 
trends and content analysis.   
 
 137 
CONTENT ANALYSIS AND DATA TRENDS  
 
Sino-Israeli bilateral relations have come a long way since launching formal ties 
in 1992. Relations between China and Israel have blossomed through a combination of 
government to government, NGO and commercial exchanges as technology and 
knowledge have emerged as prominent components of country-to-country dialogues. In 
contrast to the views referenced earlier doubting the prospects of political policy shifts as 
a product of technical ties, Levin (2013) suggests an opposing view, which sees Israel as 
quietly hopeful that sharing its experiences and technologies would help garner some 
Chinese government support for the Jewish State in international arenas. Nevertheless, 
whether with or without open political support, China’s willingness to do business in 
itself was a particularly attractive prospect for Israel, especially against the backdrop of 
successive efforts to de-legitimatize and isolate the Jewish state. The start of China’s 
modernization campaign, in the 1970s, made room for flexible policies in foreign 
relations and spelled new opportunities for countries seeking contacts with the PRC. 
Overall, the dissertation seeks to evaluate the weight of Israel’s technical offerings as 
tools of achieving diplomatic gains. In the context of this study, diplomacy broadly 
defined constitutes advancing bilateral ties in three primary areas: trade, bilateral 
exchanges and policy towards the Middle East as detailed in chapter two.  
      It is hoped that a combination of data trend charts and content analysis, which 
follows, will help build a clearer systematic understanding about the mechanics of Sino-
Israeli ties even if it partially confirms or refutes the dissertation hypothesis as described 
in chapter 2.  
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CONTENT ANALYSIS  
 
    Content analysis is mostly focused on the qualitative summative method, which 
considers word occurrences, significance, positioning and interplay of words or concepts 
in statements made by Chinese officials. It is important to note that qualitative content 
analysis rests on subjective choices of the researcher with regard to data labeling, 
classification, and other data filtering. Furthermore, research strategies are guided by 
researcher interest, literature content, expert conversations and trial and error limitations. 
Thus, the analysis here constitutes forms of researcher (personal) assessments in 
determining possible links between study variables: independent (technology transfers), 
dependent (robust relations comprised of trade, bilateral exchanges and policies towards 
Israel) and at times the impact of intervening variables (Middle East conflict flare-ups, 
economic and political factors).  
      An assessment of technical ties and bilateral exchanges in Sino-Israeli relations will 
draw on a review of tens of thousands of media pieces (articles) and official government 
sources. Interpretations about variances in China’s policies towards Israel/Middle East 
will be based on Chinese statements at the UN over the study period (1989-2014).  
Since the dissertation mostly draws on a significant quantity of textual data, the 
study also utilizes (NVivo) software to implement content analysis. The software is used 
to perform specified text searches and create coding filters, which involves but is not 
limited to the search of keywords (terms), defining timeframes or range of dates, and 
country names. NVivo offers users multiple methods to achieve any given research goal. 
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Particular methods were used in consultation with a committee member who is familiar 
with the software. What follows are descriptions of the NVivo based techniques used.    
 
DATA TRENDS 
 
      The study draws on a number of quantitative (mostly economic trends) data as part 
of its examination of Sino-Israeli ties. Namely, an evaluation of trade/economic based 
Comtrade data. Comtrade is the UN organ which tracks country-to-country commerce as 
reported by member states themselves. Also considered below are data trends about 
bilateral exchanges in the form of number of official visits and treaties. To better 
understand the significance of the numbers, the datasets are visualized below in the form 
of tables and graph charts.  
 
DATA START DATES  
 
  Please note that data collected and used for the purpose of content analysis does 
not include all time periods identified in the narrative above. This is the case for two 
main reasons. First, the analysis portion of the study does not cover the entire historical 
narrative of Sino-Israeli relations. Second, data availability was limited. The declared 
analysis portion of the study period starts only from the end of the1980s just before 
diplomatic relations started in 1992. However, reliable official data on trade is only 
available from 1995 onwards, while official bilateral exchanges data becomes available 
from the early 1990’s when relations became formalized and less secretive. Though UN 
data in the form speeches and statements documenting county political positions go back 
decades, the study period begins at the end of the 1980s. Therefore, UN political data is 
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collected from that time. While the start date of all data types is not uniform due to 
availability limitations, there is adequate overlapping or concurrent periods of data for the 
purpose of assessing possible covariance of trends.   
 
 
CHINA’S POLITICAL APPROACH TOWARDS ISRAEL/MIDDLE EAST (CONTENT ANALYSIS) 
 
 
The dissertation examines statements made at the UN by Chinese representatives 
on Israeli-Palestinian conflict-specific issues. It is important to note that UN voting 
patterns can not and should not be taken as full testimonies in accurately describing 
Israel’s diplomatic achievements. Certainly, the nature of votes in the world body 
pertaining to Israel and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict say something about attitudes 
toward the Jewish State but offer only a partial picture of Israeli relations with nation 
partners like China. More importantly, given Israel’s record of quiet or backdoor 
diplomacy, what may matter more goes beyond the number of votes at the UN for or 
against the Jewish State. It is the moderated rhetoric and the “behind the scenes” 
dynamics which are contributing factors in the building and maintaining of resilient 
bilateral relations. Diplomatic gains may be tacit in the form of quiet joint collaborations. 
As Callick (2012) notes, Israel has gained ground in gradually building relationships with 
Asian countries, even as a trend of hostile votes against it in international arenas persist. 
The purpose of this analysis is to assess how China’s policy on the Middle East 
has evolved. In particular, it looks to see if policy statements are more accommodating of 
Israel given growing technical cooperation over the study period. To do this, names of 
Chinese UN ambassadors who served during the study range of years (1989-2014) were 
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identified. Then, ambassador name-specific searches were conducted within the UN 
Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) database. This is the forum, 
which features debates on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The searches are purposed to 
isolate all documents, which contain names of Chinese ambassadors but which may also 
include remarks and speeches of representatives from other countries. The contents of 
retrieved resultant documents were loaded into NVivo and further filtered (coded) to 
isolate speeches by Chinese representatives from remarks of other diplomats also 
participating in the same debate. Next, the isolated Chinese diplomat-specific texts were 
classified by year. The classification permits observations of possible variance in Middle 
East policy from year to year. Then, through NVivo, a word frequency query was 
launched to determine the 1000 most common words used in debates about the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict from 1989-2014 for full list see Appendix 1. The word 
frequency results were reviewed and further narrowed down by identifying a limited 
number of terms routinely used to describe Israeli policies in the context of the conflict 
with the Palestinians. The word selections were based on the researcher’s personal 
assessments, which drew on the scholarly literature, media reports, interview 
conversations, and overall first hand familiarity with conflict contexts (while working as 
TV news producer in the region). Next, these word choices were coded as either 
“negative” or “positive” with regard to Israeli actions/policies in the conflict. For 
example, the expression “negotiations” was considered positive since it does not single 
out Israel for criticism, and is generally used in the framework of advancing a resolution 
to the conflict. A word like “aggression” is typically used to critically describe Israeli 
military actions, therefore it would be coded as negative. The words selected in the 
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positive category are peace, coexistence, parties, constructive, process, and 
negotiations. The use of the word “parties” in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict generally infers positive connotations. This is the case because the usage of the 
term refers to the actions of both sides in the dispute. Thus, the use of the word “parties” 
projects a neutral stance which avoids the singling out or any particular side for criticism, 
namely Israel. On that point, the usage of the term “parties” overall tends to be in the 
framework of balanced statements which do not single out Israel but address the 
wrongdoings of all “parties”. In doing so, the use of the word suggests both sides are 
accountable in the conflict and must do their part in advancing dialogue and peaceful 
resolution. The use of the term mitigates-criticism of Israel hence, a positive factor in the 
realm of Israeli diplomacy.   
The words selected in the negative category are occupied, abuse, rights, 
activities, brutal and aggression. The use of the word “activities” has negative 
connotation (when referring to Israel) in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Typically, in UN debates on the conflict the term is used in referencing the actions of a 
single side in the hostilities, specifically those of Israel. Two forms of “activities” are 
often objects of criticism toward Israel. One being Israeli military “activities” in 
Palestinians territories. Military “activities” could be in the form of raids, roadblocks and 
area closures all of which are considered by most UN member states as sources of 
friction and counterproductive in the pursuit of peace. The second form of usage of the 
word “activities” is often associated with Israel’s settlement “activities” which is a major 
source of criticism of Israeli policies. Settlement “activities” are expressed in reference to 
the expansion of existing Jewish settlements or the construction of new ones. Settlement 
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“activity” has been considered by both opponents and friends of Israel as obstacles to 
achieving peace. The use of the term typically indicates criticism of Israel hence a 
negative factor, in the realm of Israeli diplomacy. See Appendix 2 for actual verbatim 
examples of how each (selected) word is used either in positive and negative contexts in 
comments made by Chinese envoys at the UN.  
The sample words were cross-tabulated as part of a matrix. Three matrices were 
produced. The first matrix features positive category words cross-referenced against 
ambassador statements categorized by year dates. The second matrix features negative 
category words cross-referenced against ambassador speeches categorized by year dates.  
The third matrix displays a side-by-side comparison of aggregate frequency sums of 
negative words vs. aggregate frequency sum of positive category words. Matrix results 
are visualized in the form of 3D bar graphs as shown below. In this way, the selected 
words whether projecting positive or negative notions can be observed for variance over 
the span of the study period on a year-by-year basis.     
 
POSITIVE WORDS   
 
  Figure 2 below displays the frequency use of positive words: peace, co-existence, 
parties, constructive, process and negotiations. These words are typically used to express 
softer attitudes towards Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 1 
(also below) offers a word frequency table displaying precise frequency numbers of 
positive terms.  
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Figure 2 - China Ambassador Positive Word Frequencies 1989 – 2014 
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Table 1 - China Ambassador Positive Word Frequencies 1989 – 2014 
 
 
 
The positive words generally infer steps to peacemaking implying a more 
evenhanded approach towards all sides in the conflict. In figure 2, the word “peace” is 
more prevalent in usage in the last decade. The words parties, constructive, process and 
negotiations all follow the same patterns. The increase in usage of the word “peace” 
perhaps most signifies a more conciliatory and less one-sided approach towards the 
conflict. For example, this was the case in 2009 and 2014, when intense battles between 
Israel and Hamas in Gaza erupted and raged for weeks, lending the need to use “peace” 
in UN debates at higher frequencies.  The expression “Peace” is directed at both parties 
rather than solely at Israel alone. In that sense, it suggests a more equalized even handed 
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approach. There was also, an increase in the frequency usage of the word “parties” also 
most notably in 2009 and 2014.  
  
NEGATIVE WORDS   
 
 
  Figure 3 below displays the frequency use of negative words: occupied, abuse, 
rights, activities, aggression and brutal. These words are typically used to express critical 
attitudes towards Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 2 (also 
below) offers a word frequency table displaying precise frequency numbers of terms.  
 
Figure 3 China Ambassador Negative Word Frequencies 1989- 2014  
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Table -2 - China Ambassador Negative Word Frequencies 1989-2014 
 
 A : OCCUPIED B : ABUSE C : RIGHTS D : ACTIVITIES E : AGGRESSION F : BRUTAL 
1989 luye  3 1 3 0 0 1 
1990 Li Daoyu  11 0 2 0 0 0 
1991 Li Daoyu 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 Li Zhaoxing  2 0 2 0 0 0 
1995 Li Zhaoxing  1 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 Qin Huasun  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 Qin Huasun  0 0 1 0 0 0 
1998 Qin Huasun  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 Qin Huasun  1 0 1 0 0 0 
2000 Wang Yingfan  2 0 1 1 0 0 
2001 Wang Yingfan 1 0 0 1 0 0 
2002 Wang Yingfan  4 0 4 3 1 1 
2003 Wang 
Guangya 
1 0 1 0 0 0 
2004 Wang 
Guangya  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 li Zhaoxing  0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 Wang 
Guangya  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 Zhang Yesui  0 0 0 2 0 0 
2009 Zhang Yesui  13 0 24 8 0 0 
2010 Baodong  6 0 3 2 0 0 
2010 Zhang Yesui  1 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 Baodong  1 0 1 1 0 0 
2013 Baodong  3 0 0 3 0 0 
2014 Jieyi  4 1 3 5 0 0 
 
 
The word “occupied” in figure 3 is often used to direct criticism towards Israel. 
Israeli governments tend to reject the term “occupied” territories to describe the status of 
lands it seized in the Arab-Israeli 1967 Six-Day War.  The term “occupied” seems to be 
used in equal proportions by Chinese representatives in the distant past and in more 
recent years. However, a spike in the frequency usage of the word “occupied” is most 
notable in 2009. This upsurge is likely due to debates generated by the new major round 
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of fighting in 2009 between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Battles started in late December 
2008, but spilled into January 2009 before a ceasefire was reached. At that time, the 
extent of damage and casualties emerged prompting charged deliberations. The same 
overall word frequency pattern is echoed in 2014, albeit to a lesser extent, when the next 
Israel-Gaza war unfolded. This suggests a less critical approach by China in 2014 at a 
time when the Sino-Israeli relationship has shown signs of cooperation strengthening as 
political instability spreads across the Middle East following the Arab Spring.  
Figure 4 below shows a side-by-side comparison of the total sum of positive and negative 
category word frequencies. For a word frequency table displaying precise frequency 
numbers of terms see Appendix 3. 
Figure 4 - China Ambassador Negative Vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014 
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Figure 4 shows the frequency of both negative and positive category words has 
increased in more recent times. However, interestingly, positive category word usage has 
grown significantly more than usage of negative category words. Put differently, this 
further enforces a suggestion of an overall trend of more balanced language by Chinese 
representatives at the UN about the Palestinian conflict. However, this tendency does not 
necessarily translate into actual policy shifts in the form of UN votes in support of Israel, 
but does suggest willingness to abstain from harsh public criticism of the Jewish State.  
As illustrated earlier, technology cooperation plays a significant role in 
stimulating Sino-Israeli ties. The section below explores if the terms technology and 
cooperation are dominant in conversations about relations between the two countries. 
This was accomplished through an NVivo assisted analysis of tens of thousands of media 
reports, each of which simultaneously referenced China and Israel in the period between 
1989 and 2014. The captured media (press) textual data was classified (coded) by year of 
publication. The classification was done to standardize time units of analysis like UN 
speeches data and trade data, which are also sorted on year-by-year basis. The results of 
the analysis are visualized in figure 5 below. For a word frequency table displaying 
precise frequency numbers of terms see Appendix 4. 
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Figure 5 - Israel-China Technology Word Frequencies 1988 – 2014  
 
 
Figure 5 above shows the word frequencies “Israeli’, “technology” and 
“cooperation”. The chart shows similar growth patterns from year to year for all 3 words. 
As the word frequency of one term grows so does the usage of the other two words. This 
pattern suggests a covariance between the terms “Israeli” and “technology” and “Israeli” 
and “cooperation”. In other words, the more Israel is referenced in stories which include 
text about China the more technology and cooperation are part of the conversation.  
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TRADE – ISRAELI EXPORTS TO CHINA (DATA TRENDS) 
 
Israeli exports to China are important outputs of Israeli diplomacy broadly 
defined. Israel-China trade figures used here are sourced from Comtrade. Comtrade is the 
UN trade-tracking organization used by individual UN member states themselves to 
report on their own international commerce. Table 3 below shows Trade volumes in 
yearly increments. Increased trade or export volumes from Israel to China is a central 
indictor of robust ties between two states. The figures considered below are limited to 
export flows from Israel. This approach is adopted since the focus of the dissertation 
pertains to gains for Israel. Comtrade statistics cover 1995-2014; therefore, they do not 
concur with full expanse of the study period (1989-2014) yet overlap enough to be 
meaningful in gauging the vigor of bilateral ties.  What follows are trade figures in table 
form (table -3) and below in chart form (figure 6).  
Table - 3           UN Comtrade Trade – figures as reported by Israel  
Year Trade Flow Reporter Partner Trade Value (US$) 
 1995 Export Israel China 84546000 
 1996 Export Israel China 82715000 
 1997 Export Israel China 71307000 
 1998 Export Israel China 129593000 
 1999 Export Israel China 190434000 
 2000 Export Israel China 261585000 
 2001 Export Israel China 349575000 
 2002 Export Israel China 426538000 
 2003 Export Israel China 612588000 
 2004 Export Israel China 786971000 
 2005 Export Israel China 747983000 
 2006 Export Israel China 958661000 
 2007 Export Israel China 1040682000 
 2008 Export Israel China 1293392000 
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2009 Export Israel China 1044572000 
 2010 Export Israel China 2046856000 
 2011 Export Israel China 2718198000 
 2012 Export Israel China 2758007000 
 2013 Export Israel China 2886195000 
 2014 Export Israel China 2792891000 
  
 
Figure 6 - Israel Exports to China 1995-2014 
 
Source: Comtrade (United Nations)  
 
Figure 6 above generally demonstrates a strong growth in Israeli exports to China. 
Growth is slow in the early years of formal relations but dramatically picks up pace in 
more recent years. This upward trend indicates a tightening of ties, and contrasts previous 
decades dominated by covert and/or informal interactions and the absence of formal 
trade.   
There are also noticeable dips in otherwise significant export growth in the years 
1997, 2005 and 2009. It is unclear why there was a minor drop in 1997. However, an 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) report points to, an overall downturn in the global 
economy in 1996, which it attributes to a financial slowdown in Asia. Also, in the 
previous year China and US were at odds over large-scale Chinese military exercises in 
the strait of Taiwan, and this may have curtailed Israeli exports. It should be noted that 
Israeli foreign relations might be informally pegged to forms of quiet political directives 
from Washington. In 2005, Israeli exports decreased, at that time Sino-Israeli relations 
experienced tensions and political fallout as Israel was forced by the US to cancel a 
crucial arms agreement with China. While exports figures displayed in the chart above do 
not include armaments, the aborted deal with China may have negatively impacted the 
flow of technologies, which are civilian in nature but which could be converted for 
military applications. These are known as dual use technologies. The significant drop in 
Israeli exports in 2009 seen in the chart above is likely associated with the worldwide 
recession, which began the previous year and produced an overall international trade 
slowdown.  
One should take into account that actual trade volumes are likely significantly 
higher than Comtrade numbers indicate. This is the case because Comtrade statistics are 
based solely on member state reporting which exclude military commodities. Typically, 
arms technology transfer flows and volumes are a sensitive matter for most states and 
hence handled discreetly. International military sector deals have been notoriously 
clandestine undertakings as part of secret partnerships. The Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is a think tank devoted to the study of conflict, 
armaments, arms control and disarmament. Interestingly, SIPRI has a presence in 
Beijing. Through its website the research center points to an overall lack of transparency 
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by states in the reporting of arms imports and exports. SIPRI specifically names China 
and Israel as countries, which have never published reports on their international arms 
transactions. Furthermore, SIPRI also points out that reporting on United Nations 
Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) by member states has been consistently low.  
However, the institute published independent statistics about Israeli military exports to 
China. The following chart (figure 7) below was generated based on SIPRI assessments. 
The chart begins in 1990 because this is the first year data was available Israeli military 
transfers to China.  
 
Figure 7 - Israeli Arms Transfers to China 1990-2014 (in millions of US dollars)  
 
Source: SIPRI 
The chart clearly shows an abrupt end to Israeli military exports to China after 
2001. This reflects Israel’s change of policy on arms transfers to China in the wake of 
staunch US opposition. Since military transactions are typically shrouded in secrecy, it is 
highly possible that SIPRI numbers do not tell the full story. In other words, actual 
military exports could be even higher and extend beyond the years SIPRI data suggests. 
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SINO-ISRAELI EXCHANGES  
 
 
Another metric to gauge bilateral ties is mutual exchanges. Exchanges for the 
purpose of this study are comprised of two components: mutual visits and bilateral 
treaties. Visits are only considered here provided they are official state sanctioned events. 
A list of visits was compiled based on information publically available on official Israeli 
and Chinese Government on-line portals and publications. Exchange visits can be at any 
government level, like national, provincial, or municipal, or of other kinds, like academic 
exchanges. Only exchange visits officially publicized either by Chinese or Israeli 
government sources are considered. Furthermore, a visit exchange event is considered a 
single occurrence regardless of how many meeting encounters take place. For example, if 
an official met just one or more counterparts on a single visit, the exchange would still be 
registered as a singular event. The second component of the exchange metric is the 
number of bilateral agreements.  The mutual exchanges metric quantity is determined by 
adding the number of exchange visits plus the number of treaties on an annual basis. See 
Appendix 4 for complete list of exchanges (visits and treaties).  Figure 8, below displays 
number of exchanges. 
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Figure 8 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1991 -2014  
 
 
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China and Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs  
  
Figure 8 shows there have been up and down fluctuations in the number of 
exchanges from year to year, but overall there has been a rise in the number of exchanges 
since the start of formal relations in 1992. A surge in the number of exchanges happened 
in the years immediately following establishment of relations. The chart also shows 
significant drops in the number of exchanges during and after 2000.  At this time, the US 
forced Israel into cancelling the Phalcon Airborne Early Warning System to China. As 
mentioned earlier, the cancellation damaged Israel's credibility in the eyes of China’s 
policymakers. In 2005 another arms agreement between China and Israel was cancelled 
under US pressure -- this time the upgrade of Israeli made drones. In 2007, the number of 
exchanges surged coinciding with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s visit to Beijing in a bid 
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to repair and boost bilateral ties by resetting the trajectory of the relationship from 
military to civilian centered technology transfers. 
 
TECHNOLOGY FACTOR (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)   
 
 
BEFORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS TIMELINE  
 
 
As we have seen in the sections above, overall Sino-Israeli ties have generally 
grown by way of expanded trade and bilateral exchanges. Also noted, is a trend of softer 
diplomatic tone by Chinese representatives in the UN.  Namely, a more balanced stance 
on issues concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, analysis of media 
materials over the last few decades revealed that as ties between Israel and China 
strengthened, the frequency of the word “technology” in news coverage also rose. The 
positive covariance between the growth of bilateral ties and the use of technology at the 
very least implies technology is a principal topic in conversations about Israel – China 
ties. Nevertheless, how does this relate to the main research question of this study?  
To further explore the suggestion of a possible tie in, however loose, between 
technology transfers and the strength of Sino-Israeli relations, the study considers a series 
of timelines, which illustrate how technology and knowledge sharing occurrences are key 
milestones in the advancement of Sino-Israeli ties. Figure 9 below shows how early 
contacts between the two countries primarily revolved around technology issues.  For 
example, as noted earlier, in 1975 at a time when China began to open itself to the 
outside world, it also conveyed interest in the Israeli Pavilion at the Paris Airshow which 
featured mostly military hardware. The Chinese delegation visit to the pavilion set the 
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stage for a string of future contacts in the form of quiet military and technology centered 
cooperation dialogues. 
 
Figure 9 – Narrative Timeline 1975-1979   
 
 
    In the following decade and the years leading to full formal ties (see Figure 10), 
contacts between the two countries rose to a new level. It is interesting to note that the 
first face-to-face high-level encounter between officials from Israel and China was 
distinctively technology related. In 1985, the Science Ministers of the two countries 
met at a conference in the US. Such informal contacts were perhaps stepping stones 
leading to a series of technical meetings in the mid to late 80s and beyond. The secret 
visit of a Chinese delegation to Israel in 1985 to discuss joint venture prospects is one 
example.  
 
 
 
 
1975 Chinese Delegation Visits 
Israeli Pavillion at Paris 
Airshow  
Secret Sino-Israeli Military Meetings 
Late 70s Increased Chinese Interest 
in Israel’s Developmental and 
Security Experiences
Late 70s Israeli Arms 
Industry Delegation in 
China
1979 Discreet Israel China Commercial  
Links Begin
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Figure 10 – Narrative Timeline 1985-1987   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1985 first Sino -Israeli Ministerial
Meeting (Science Ministers)
Mid 80s Indirect Cooperation in Agriculture
1985 Chinese Delegation in Israel 
for Joint Technology Projects 
(Agriculture and Robotics ) 
Mid 80s China Seeks Israeli Batttle 
Experience Against Soviet-Made 
Arms.
1987 China Imports Israeli Technologies
1987 Israeli Government  Company (Copeco ) 
established and foster commercial with China
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The opening of The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities Office in Beijing 
just ahead of the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992 is another example (see 
Figure 11).  
 
 
 
Figure 11 – Narrative Timeline 1991-1992   
 
 
 
 
AFTER START OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
 
 Following the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992, Sino-Israel technical 
cooperation flourished. During the first decade of formal ties from the early 90s into the 
early 2000s military and agricultural ties swelled. During this time span the increase of 
military technology transfers propelled Israel into becoming a significant armaments 
supplier to the PRC. The period also marks the introduction of visible larger scale 
cooperation in agriculture. In 1993, just a year after the start of formal ties the first Sino-
1991The Israel Academy of 
Sciences and Humanities Office 
Opens in Beijing
1991 Chinese Tourist Office 
Opens inTel Aviv
1992 Embassies Open in Tel 
Aviv and Beijing Full Diplomatic 
Relations 
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Israeli demonstration farm went into operation (see timeline figure 12 below). As a full 
working farm, it features local adaptations based on the Israeli agricultural experience.  
 
 
Figure 12 – Narrative Timeline 1992-2000   
 
Moving forward into the middle of the 1990s the Jewish State increased transfers of 
aviation specific military technology to the PRC. During this period official trade 
statistics (UN/Comtrade) became available as shown in figure 13 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
1992 Embassies Open in Tel Aviv 
and Beijing Full Diplomatic 
Relations 
1993 Chinese-Israeli Agriculture Training Center 
1990s (mid and late 90’s) sale 
of Israeli Harpy drones to 
China 
Israel was China’s second largest 
source of military aviation 
technology in 1990s
1996 Sino Israel Demonstration farm Beijing 
Early  2000s, States forced 
Israel to give up two 
important military deals, 
military technology had 
been the main Israeli 
export 
2000 Phalco Military Plane Deal Cancel
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Figure 13 – Israel Exports to China 1995-2000 
 
 
 
So while Israeli transfers activities increase generally, volumes of Israeli commercial 
exports to China too echo a clear upward trend.  
Also, bilateral exchanges in the way of number of treaties and visits largely 
showed an upturn during the initial honeymoon period of diplomatic relations (see figure 
14 below). While levels of exchanges fluctuated in the mid 1990s they did so at higher 
activity levels when compared to levels at the start of formal ties. However, a downturn 
trend unfolds towards the year 2000--a time of crisis as Israel backed out of the Phalcon 
early warning surveillance arms deal.  
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Figure 14 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1991 - 2000  
 
 
 
Furthermore, in the same time span we see in figure 15 below an overall increase 
of balanced language usage by Chinese representatives during UN debates on the Israeli - 
Palestinian conflict. The chart illustrates a higher frequency of positive terms vs. negative 
terms as defined earlier. While the language used is not devoid of criticism towards 
Israel. it occurred at lower tones and generally avoided exclusively singling Israel out for 
direct blame in conflict actions. 
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Figure 15 - China Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1991 - 2000  
 
 
 
Nevertheless, Israeli military technology transfers to China began to slow after the 
early 2000s as American objections to weapon flows to the PRC hardened. As the 
movement of armaments declined, cooperation in agriculture tended to pick up as new 
Sino-Israeli demo farms begin to operate in 2001and 2003 (see figure 16 below) 
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Figure 16 – Narrative Timeline 2000-2003   
Conversely, during this period Israeli commercial exports to China demonstrate 
impressive gains as exhibited in figure 17 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Until Early 2000s, Military 
Technology Was Main Israeli 
Export
2001 Sino-Israeli Diary Demonstration Farm
Near Beijing Opens 
Early &Mid 2000s US Obliged Israel
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2002 Sino-Israeli 
Demonstration and 
Training Center for 
Agriculture in Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous
2003 Israel Suspends Military Export 
Contacts with China
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Figure 17 – Israel Exports to China 2000-2003  
 
 
 
There was also a temporary surge in bilateral exchanges in 2002 as shown in 
Figure 18 below. 
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 Figure 18 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 2000 - 2003  
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, in the same period between 2001and 2003 language usage 
tendencies by Chinese officials at the UN shown in figure 19 below continue to support a 
more balanced stance on the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. Note a higher frequency of 
positive terms than negative terms in the chart below. 
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Figure 19 - China Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 2000 - 2003  
 
 
 
 
In the mid-2000s Israel’s cancellation of the planned upgrade of Harpy drones for 
the PRC introduced tensions into bilateral relations. This happened as American pressure 
to halt Israeli military exports to China mounted as displayed in figure 20 below. In 2011, 
the outbreak of the Arab Spring spread worrisome political and military instability across 
the Middle East, putting Chinese interests at risks. The unrest spurred re-assessment in 
Beijing about its ties in the region and with Israel. By this time in 2011, tensions between 
China and Israel over cancelled arms deals have subsided, and Chinese policy makers 
sought to learn whatever possible about the changing dynamics in the region and 
considered ties with Israel to be of significance in this endeavor. 
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Figure 20 – Narrative Timeline 2005 - 2011   
 
 
 
The cancellations of arms sales to China at the request of the US generated 
resentment in Beijing triggering a waning of relations. During this time Israeli 
commercial exports generally rise but as figure 21 below also shows there was a slight 
trade slowdown coinciding with a height of friction between Israel and China in 2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 Harpy Drone Crisis
2005 US Pressures Israel to Kill Arms  Dealings 
with China
2011 Arab Spring  Triggers
Instability Across the Middle 
East
2011 China Seeks Israel’s knowledge about the 
Middle East
2011  Sino-Israel Global Network & 
Academic Leadership (SIGNAL) Begins 
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Figure 21 – Israel Exports to China Trade 2004 - 2011  
 
 
 
In 2006, a year after the Harpy arms crisis, bilateral exchanges dipped but 
rebounded in 2007, see figure 22 below. The jump in 2007 exchanges is not entirely 
surprising considering 2 years passed since the Harpy crisis and as the political fallout 
settled, a heightened need for high-level meetings emerged to mend trouble spots and 
promote new directions in the relationship. In 2007, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert 
traveled to China. On the occasion of his visit, the Prime Minister announced the 
establishment of the China-Israel National Fund for Investment in hi-tech R&D. The 
initiative is further testimony to the transformation in technical ties between the two 
countries from armaments to civilian centered technologies. Bilateral exchanges 
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experience a rise in 2011 with the onset of the Arab Spring and with it mounting 
uncertainty for Chinese interests in the Middle East. Also in 2011 is the notable first visit 
of the Chief of the Chinese Military to Israel. General Chen Bingde’s visit to discuss 
defense cooperation was not necessarily in contradiction with a change in Israeli policy 
about the cessation of technology transfers to the Chinese military. Defense cooperation 
also entails non-technology (hardware) transfers like intelligence sharing.  
 
Figure 22 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 2004 - 2011 
 
 
Furthermore, in the same period from 2004 to 2011 the frequency of positive 
terms (softer on Israel) heavily outweigh the frequency of negative terms in China’s 
language at the UN regarding debates on the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. As illustrated in 
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the dispute with the Palestinians.  This trend is even maintained (but to a lesser extent) in 
2006 in the immediate aftermath of the Harpy deal withdrawal the number of both 
positive and negative words used remain steady but at lower levels than in later years.  
 
 
Figure 23 - China Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 2004 - 2011 
 
 
 
Beyond 2011, China’s renewed interest in Israel reinforces bi-lateral ties in the 
form of joint academic and non - technology ventures see figure 24 below. In 2012 the 
cornerstone was laid for Sino-Israeli Technology Park planned in Dongguan, South 
China. In 2013 The Israel Institute of Technology (Technion) opens the first Israeli 
University Campus (The Guangdong Technion-Israel Institute of Technology (GTIIT) in 
Shantou, in the Guangdong province of southeastern China.) The new university is a 
result of collaboration between the Technion and Shantou University.  
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Figure 24 – Narrative Timeline 2011 to 2014   
 
 
 
During this period from 2012- 2014 Israeli exports to the PRC demonstrate a 
steady upward as show in figure 25. 
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Figure 25 – Israel Exports to China Trade 2012 - 2014  
 
 
 
The number of bilateral exchanges in this time frame is significantly higher in 
comparison to previous periods in Sino-Israel relations as shown by figure 26-- a 
testament to the increased technical cooperation.   
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Figure 26 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 2012 - 2014 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, in the same period we see in figure 27 below that overall China’s 
language at the UN with regard to the Israeli - Palestinian conflict maintains a higher 
frequency of positive terms (softer on Israel) than negative terms. As mentioned, this 
trend takes place at the same time as an increase in technical collaboration. There were no 
Chinese UN Ambassador statements found (within the defined negative and positive 
word criteria) in 2012, hence the year is not represented in figure 27.  
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Figure 27 - China Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 2013 - 2014  
 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
The chapter considered how China’s history, geography, political and economic 
systems, and national vulnerabilities tie into the development and growth of Sino-Israeli 
relations. In doing so, it explored historical milestones in Sino-Israeli relations drawing 
on a host of primary and secondary sources. Through a string of expert interviews, review 
of the literature, examination of UN documents, and an examination of media reports 
spanning decades. The chapter outlined the mostly sluggish and secretive progress 
towards full diplomatic relations, but also sketched the ebb and flow of bilateral ties after 
the exchange of embassies in 1992.  
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After the death of Chairman Mao and the rise of new leadership in the 1970s, the 
PRC embarked on far-reaching political and economic reforms. China’s new leaders 
shied away from orthodox communist principles while pushing to modernize key sectors 
like agriculture, military and science/technology. In the process, a gradual shift from a 
centralized to a mixed market economy was introduced. The changes aimed to help 
advance the country’s competitiveness in the emerging global economy and boost 
standards of living. As the PRC’s development accelerated, policymakers in Beijing 
sought ways to improve China’s technological capabilities and grapple with on-going 
challenges like how to boost food production and modernize an aging military. To that 
end, China opened itself to wider international engagement, and decision makers in 
Beijing began to look outward to the international community for new technologies and 
techniques. At the same time, Israeli leaders strove to establish new contacts beyond 
traditional allies in the West, and turned eastwards to Asia. 
Israel’s ongoing campaign to minimize its political isolation coupled with Chinese 
interest in Israeli experiences and technologies in specialized areas like agriculture and 
military affairs created a pathway to bring the two countries closer. Technical 
cooperation became a cornerstone of covert contacts, which eventually transformed into 
open dialogue and then advancing to full formal ties. Since the opening of embassies in 
Beijing and Tel Aviv, there has been significant growth in terms of bilateral exchanges, 
trade and cooperation in important sectors. However, hiccups in Sino-Israeli relations in 
the form of political tussles stemming from aborted arms deals created doubt in China 
about Israel’s ability to keep future commitments without Washington’s approval. 
Overall, long-term relations were not harmed as exports in military hardware were cut 
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and civilian commerce increased. Israel is a relatively small trading partner for China. 
However, China offers Israel access to huge markets and a sea of capital for Israeli hi-
tech firms and institutions. Israel has not significantly impacted the PRC’s support for the 
Palestinian cause in international arenas like the UN, but enjoys strong broad cooperation 
with China independent of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. China’s United Nations voting 
records of the last few decades confirm a general pro-Palestinian stance. Some scholars 
maintain there has been little or no change in China’s official political policy towards 
Israel despite growing technical ties. However, there have been subtle but noticeable 
changes in terms of diplomatic rhetoric about the Palestinian Israeli conflict. Namely, 
more moderate tones expressed by Chinese representatives at the UN. In more recent 
years, the PRC appears to be less vocal in outright condemnation of Israel and instead 
express more middle-of-the-road balanced statements. Generally, China, supports Israel’s 
right to defend itself but with reservations or at times expressing opposition to excessive 
violence.  
As demonstrated above, technology has played a central role in all stages of Sino-
Israeli relations. The chapter sought to investigate a possible link between technical 
cooperation in the form of technology transfers as factors in bolstering Sino-Israeli 
diplomatic ties broadly defined (trade, exchanges & policy towards Israel and the Middle 
East).    
As mentioned, technical ties have generally not produced outright official policy 
changes in the case of Sino-Israeli relations with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
However, it would be difficult to deny that technical engagement with China has not 
produced tangible worthy gains for Israel. On the contrary, data trends and NVivo 
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assisted content analysis infer that technology transfer engagements have helped create 
settings which promote bilateral dialogue, collaboration, increasing commerce as well as 
more moderated rhetoric towards Israel.  
Also, it was postulated at the start of this chapter that specified intervening 
variables could perhaps foster or impede the vitality of connections between the 
independent (technology transfer) and dependent variables (trade, exchanges and policies 
towards Israeli Palestinian conflict). What follows is a synopsis of how the intervening 
variables played a role Sino-Israeli relations: 
 
• Technology transfer addresses priorities. The PRC has sought ways to boost 
agricultural/food output while combatting water scarcity and desertification. 
These issues have spurred Chinese interest in the Israeli agricultural experience 
producing a myriad of contacts and collaborations with Israel 
• Security/military/terror threats. Here too China looked to Israel’s experience in 
intelligence sharing, experience fighting Soviet armaments and accessing 
advanced military hardware.  
• Access to the US through Israeli channels. There is no evidence suggesting this 
intervening factor is a significant variable on the political plane in Sino-Israeli 
relations. However, ties with Israel may have helped boost Beijing’s access to 
influential leaders in the American Jewish Business Community.  
• Geo-Political Shifts. This refers to issues like the change of Chinese leadership 
after the death of Chairman Mao, border tensions with the Soviet Union, Cold 
War dynamics, Middle East interests, the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, the Israeli-
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Palestinian conflict, and Arab Spring. All of these have either hindered ties or 
opened opportunities for contacts between China and Israel. For example, the 
1956 Sinai War froze any potential progress towards formal ties. On the other 
hand, concerns about upheavals in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring 
uprisings prompted China to look for ways to reduce risk and diversify its 
interests in the region through the rejuvenation of ties with Israel.    
 
  Technology and knowledge ties have been central drivers in Sino-Israeli relations. 
The Israeli experience in security and agriculture was crucial in helping to open bilateral 
contact opportunities. In that sense, it can be argued that Israeli technology offerings 
were and are sources of attraction to Israel in the context of Nye’s soft power.   
  The next chapter examines the impact of technical ties in the case of Israel’s 
relationship with China’s neighbor and principal nuclear rival, India.  
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APPENDIX 1 
1000 most frequently used words in debates on Israeli-Palestinian conflict at UN  
Word Count 
 
Peace 490 
Middle 347 
Israel 308 
Palestinian 287 
China 280 
International 267 
Palestine 266 
Security 224 
Council 222 
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Israeli 188 
Process 159 
Situation 158 
Parties 150 
Question 147 
People 144 
Chinese 140 
Efforts 125 
Concerned 123 
Talks 104 
Humanitarian 102 
United 99 
Nations 97 
Conflict 92 
Violence 90 
Settlement 82 
Political 79 
General 76 
Resolution 76 
Support 72 
Occupied 71 
Resolutions 70 
Region 69 
Secretary 64 
Government 62 
Relevant 62 
Civilians 61 
Negotiations 59 
Continue 58 
Solution 58 
Issue 54 
Rights 54 
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Sides 53 
Achieve 52 
Possible 52 
Territories 52 
Early 51 
Spoke 51 
Including 50 
Promote 47 
Comprehensive 46 
Force 46 
State 46 
Lasting 45 
Countries 44 
States 44 
Jerusalem 43 
Thank 43 
Lebanon 42 
Military 42 
President 42 
Order 41 
Basis 40 
Casualties 39 
National 39 
Syria 39 
Always 38 
Independent 38 
Action 37 
Since 37 
Stability 37 
Development 36 
Assistance 35 
Create 35 
Measures 35 
Principle 35 
Conditions 34 
Necessary 34 
Actions 33 
Concern 31 
Current 31 
Innocent 31 
Meeting 31 
Delegation 30 
Representative 30 
Towards 30 
Adopted 29 
Exercise 29 
Recent 29 
Resumption 29 
Supports 29 
Immediately 28 
Mutual 28 
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Ceasefire 27 
Draft 27 
However 27 
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Promoting 27 
Right 27 
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Initiative 26 
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Statement 26 
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Human 25 
Legitimate 25 
Serious 25 
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Progress 24 
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Today 24 
Achieving 23 
Authorities 23 
Briefing 23 
Month 23 
Strip 23 
Tension 23 
Express 22 
Present 22 
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Constructive 21 
Crisis 21 
Critical 21 
Effective 21 
Fully 21 
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Particular 21 
Peaceful 21 
Positive 21 
Welcome 21 
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Responsibility 20 
Taken 20 
World 20 
Already 19 
Believe 19 
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Minister 19 
Occupation 19 
Provide 19 
Sovereignty 19 
Special 19 
Cease 18 
Common 18 
Conducive 18 
Effort 18 
Ensure 18 
Hopes 18 
Immediate 18 
Important 18 
Maintain 18 
Maintaining 18 
Reasonable 18 
Recently 18 
Respect 18 
Statements 18 
Trust 18 
Years 18 
Blockade 17 
Bring 17 
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Continued 17 
Developments 17 
Foreign 17 
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Convening 16 
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Implementation 15 
Large 15 
Peoples 15 
Practical 15 
Ready 15 
Regard 15 
Remain 15 
Report 15 
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Seriously 15 
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Terrorism 9 
Unacceptable 9 
Unremitting 9 
Agreements 8 
Alleviate 8 
Ambassador 8 
Another 8 
Appreciation 8 
Attentively 8 
Bombings 8 
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Secondly 6 
Seeking 6 
Seize 6 
Sensitive 6 
Sincere 6 
Sovereign 6 
Successful 6 
Suppression 6 
Thirdly 6 
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Track 6 
Ultimate 6 
Urges 6 
Urging 6 
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Violate 6 
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Words 6 
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Appreciate 5 
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Appropriate 5 
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Areas 5 
Aspiration 5 
Assume 5 
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Causes 5 
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Created 5 
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Earnest 5 
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Imperative 5 
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Intensified 5 
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Leader 5 
Leading 5 
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March 5 
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Moment 5 
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Opposed 5 
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Overcome 5 
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Points 5 
Policy 5 
Power 5 
Press 5 
Proper 5 
Provided 5 
Realistic 5 
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Regrettable 5 
Reiterate 5 
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Request 5 
Require 5 
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Respected 5 
Response 5 
Responsibilities 5 
Restored 5 
Restrictions 5 
Second 5 
Sense 5 
September 5 
Session 5 
Several 5 
Severe 5 
Shoulder 5 
Spite 5 
Success 5 
Suffered 5 
Supplies 5 
Table 5 
Third 5 
Transition 5 
Trend 5 
Viable 5 
Vigorously 5 
Violated 5 
Violations 5 
Volatile 5 
Willing 5 
Worried 5 
Acceptable 4 
Accordance 4 
Address 4 
Advancing 4 
Agreement 4 
Annex 4 
Aspirations 4 
Attaches 4 
Balanced 4 
Blind 4 
Bloodshed 4 
Brutal 4 
Cherish 4 
Communiqué 4 
Concluded 4 
Condemned 4 
Condolences 4 
Consequences 4 
Consolidate 4 
Constitutes 4 
Contrary 4 
Conventions 4 
Convinced 4 
Courage 4 
Deployment 4 
Despite 4 
Destruction 4 
Determination 4 
Detrimental 4 
Dignified 4 
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Easily 4 
Emphasized 4 
Engaged 4 
Ensuring 4 
Equally 4 
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Established 4 
Every 4 
Exacerbate 4 
Expand 4 
Extend 4 
Extensive 4 
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Founding 4 
Framework 4 
Freedom 4 
Fulfill 4 
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Helping 4 
House 4 
Hussein 4 
Increasingly 4 
Influence 4 
Instability 4 
Interim 4 
Investigations 4 
Jenin 4 
Latest 4 
Launched 4 
Launching 4 
Leads 4 
Losses 4 
Maintenance 4 
Mandate 4 
Maximum 4 
Million 4 
Negotiated 4 
Nevertheless 4 
Norms 4 
Observers 4 
Occasions 4 
Opening 4 
Opposition 4 
Outcome 4 
Playing 4 
Pragmatic 4 
Presiding 4 
Proactive 4 
Proceed 4 
Prolonged 4 
Prompt 4 
Protect 4 
Provisions 4 
Pushing 4 
Questions 4 
Rather 4 
Received 4 
Recognized 4 
Refugee 4 
Related 4 
Relative 4 
Relaunching 4 
Release 4 
Renounce 4 
Repeated 4 
Restart 4 
Restarting 4 
Rockets 4 
Saddened 4 
Safeguard 4 
Series 4 
Shared 4 
Shown 4 
Stalled 4 
Stand 4 
Stood 4 
Strategic 4 
Subject 4 
Suffer 4 
Swift 4 
Tracks 4 
Unanimously 4 
Unfettered 4 
Using 4 
Utmost 4 
Views 4 
Voted 4 
Weeks 4 
Withdrawal 4 
Witnessed 4 
Working 4 
Accept 3 
Accord 3 
Adopting 3 
Adoption 3 
Affected 3 
Agenda 3 
Aggravated 3 
Aggression 3 
Algeria 3 
Applicability 3 
April 3 
Assist 3 
Assistant 3 
Attacked 3 
Beginning 3 
Belief 3 
Benefit 3 
Bigger 3 
Breakthrough 3 
Bringing 3 
Camps 3 
Capacity 3 
Century 3 
Cessation 3 
Chamber 3 
Choices 3 
Cities 3 
Collective 3 
Complex 3 
Comprehensively 3 
Concrete 3 
Conduct 3 
Confronted 3 
Congratulations 3 
Consultation 3 
Contacts 3 
Continuation 3 
Contributions 3 
Convened 3 
Coordinator 3 
Coudcil 3 
Counter 3 
Countering 3 
Damage 3 
Daoyu 3 
Death 3 
Deaths 3 
Declaration 3 
Delay 3 
Deliver 3 
Delivery 3 
Demanding 3 
Demolition 3 
Demonstrating 3 
Deserve 3 
Desire 3 
Disengagement 3 
Dispatch 3 
Document 3 
Donors 3 
Durable 3 
Either 3 
Elapsed 3 
Eliminate 3 
Encourage 3 
Endorsed 3 
Enormous 3 
Environment 3 
Equal 3 
Erroneous 3 
Escalated 3 
Ethnic 3 
Eventually 3 
Exacerbation 3 
Exert 3 
Exist 3 
Expansion 3 
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Expectations 3 
Expeditiously 3 
Expressing 3 
Expression 3 
Extreme 3 
Facilitating 3 
Failure 3 
Feltman 3 
Fifthly 3 
Finally 3 
Flexible 3 
Focus 3 
Forms 3 
Found 3 
Friendly 3 
Gravity 3 
Grief 3 
Halted 3 
Hardship 3 
Heart 3 
Historical 3 
Holding 3 
Hostility 3 
Hotspot 3 
Illegal 3 
Importantly 3 
Inalienable 3 
Include 3 
Included 3 
Inclusive 3 
Increase 3 
Internationally 3 
Introduced 3 
Involved 3 
January 3 
Justice 3 
Killed 3 
Killing 3 
Killings 3 
Lands 3 
Majority 3 
Marked 3 
Member 3 
Message 3 
Months 3 
Moral 3 
Moreover 3 
Negative 3 
Neighbor 3 
Nepal 3 
Object 3 
Objectives 3 
Obstructions 3 
Occurred 3 
October 3 
Operations 3 
Opinion 3 
Organizations 3 
Partners 3 
Patience 3 
Persist 3 
Persons 3 
Played 3 
Players 3 
Please 3 
Policies 3 
Practices 3 
Preside 3 
Pressing 3 
Prime 3 
Prisoners 3 
Promptly 3 
Protracted 3 
Providing 3 
Realized 3 
Recognition 3 
Reduce 3 
Refused 3 
Reiterating 3 
Religious 3 
Remove 3 
Repressive 3 
Requires 3 
Returning 3 
Rigid 3 
River 3 
Rocket 3 
Round 3 
Satisfactory 3 
Separately 3 
Serry 3 
Setback 3 
Setbacks 3 
Settled 3 
Sharm 3 
Sheikh 3 
Shocked 3 
Shoulders 3 
Shows 3 
Siege 3 
Signal 3 
Significance 3 
Smoothly 3 
Solutions 3 
Source 3 
Specific 3 
Stalemate 3 
Statehood 3 
Stopped 3 
Strengthened 3 
Strict 3 
Stronger 3 
Subjected 3 
Supporting 3 
Sustained 3 
Synergy 3 
Terrorist 3 
Throughout 3 
Tinian 3 
Tranquility 3 
Twelfth 3 
Unconditionally 3 
Unfortunately 3 
Union 3 
Unresolved 3 
Uphold 3 
Uprising 3 
Violating 3 
Visit 3 
Visited 3 
Whereby 3 
Worse 3 
Wounded 3 
Yugoslavia 3 
Zhaoxing 3 
Abbas 2 
Abuse 2 
Accomplishment 2 
Account 2 
Accountable 2 
Acquire 2 
Activity 2 
Addresses 2 
Advancement 2 
Advocated 2 
Aggressive 2 
Agree 2 
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APPENDIX 2  
Verbatim samples positive and negative word category entries. 
 
Positive Category   
 
“Peace”  
Ambassador Liu Jieyi at UN (2014)  
“Meanwhile, the legitimate security concerns of Israel should be addressed. Peace and 
security should be enjoyed and maintained by both Palestine and Israel” 
“Palestine and Israel live next to each other as neighbors. Peace between them will 
therefore require goodwill from both sides.” 
 
“Coexistence”  
Ambassador Li Zhaoxing at UN (1995)  
The Declaration of Principles signed by the PLO and Israel at the end of 1993 marked a 
breakthrough in the Middle East peace process. It was an important step towards a 
comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East and towards harmonious coexistence 
between the Arab and Jewish nations. It has paved the way for a final, comprehensive, 
just and lasting settlement of the conflict between Palestine and Israel. 
 
“Parties”  
Ambassador Zhang Yesui at UN (2009)   
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“Israelis should enjoy equal rights to survival and personal security. We oppose any 
violence against civilians and urge the parties concerned to comply with international 
humanitarian law and human rights conventions.” 
 
“Constructive”  
 
Ambassador Li Baodong at UN (2011)  
 
“China supports all efforts aimed at facilitating the Middle East peace process and will 
continue to play a positive and constructive role in promoting the achievement of a 
comprehensive, lasting and just peace in the Middle East.” 
 
“Process”  
Ambassador Zhang Yesui at UN (2009)  
“We call on the international community to make vigorous efforts for the peace process, 
push for a just and equitable settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian issue and work towards 
real and enduring peace in the area.” 
 
“Negotiations”  
Ambassador Li Baodong at UN (2010) 
“China maintains, as always, that political negotiations are the only way to solve the 
Middle East question. We support negotiations between Palestine and Israel so that they 
can live side by side in peace as two States.” 
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Negative Categories  
 
“Occupied”  
Ambassador Mr. Li Baodong at UN (2010) 
“The humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, and the Gaza Strip in 
particular, remains grim. Israel’s blockade has inflicted great suffering on more than 1 
million residents of Gaza, whose rights to life and development have been gravely 
violated” 
 
“Abuse”  
 
 Ambassador Liu Jieyi at UN (2014) 
“In spite of repeated calls by the international community, Israel has continued with its 
large-scale aerial bombardment against Gaza and has launched a ground invasion into 
Gaza, resulting in heavy civilian casualties, including women and children. China is 
deeply concerned and grief-stricken at this development. China condemns all abuse of 
force, whatever the excuse.” 
 
“Rights”  
Ambassador Wang Yingfan at UN (2002) 
“Such acts have also seriously violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people 
and have led to a grave humanitarian situation” 
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Activities 
Ambassador Li Baodong at UN (2013) 
 
“China has consistently rejected Israel’s settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian 
territories, including East Jerusalem and the West Bank.” 
 
“Brutal”  
Ambassador Wang Yingfan at UN (2002)  
“Such acts of violence must be condemned. However, to the world’s great dismay, the 
humanitarian tragedy caused by the Israeli army’s brutal military attacks continue” 
 
“Aggression”  
Ambassador Li Luye at UN (1987) 
“The Israeli government should change its erroneous policy and go along with the trend 
of historical development and demonstrate the necessary political will to convene an 
international conference aimed at achieved a just and lasting of the middle east question 
including the issue which is at its heart, the question of Palestine. Continued    
intransigence and an obstinate clinging to its stand of aggression and occupation will 
lead no where” 
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APPENDIX 3  
AGGREGATE WORD FREQUENCY COUNTS IN NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE  
CATEGORIES BY CHINESE AMBASSADORS AT UN  
 
  
UN Ambassadors A : 
POSITIVE 
B : 
NEGATIVE 
1989 luye  3 8 
1990 Li Daoyu  16 13 
1991 Li Daoyu  2 2 
1994 Li Zhaoxing  12 4 
1995 Li Zhaoxing  27 1 
1996 Qin Huasun  31 0 
1997 Qin Huasun  41 1 
1998 Qin Huasun  9 0 
1999 Qin Huasun  16 2 
2000 Wang Yingfan  37 4 
2001 Wang Yingfan  47 2 
2002 Wang Yingfan  48 13 
2003 Wang Guangya  20 2 
2004 Wang Guangya  8 0 
2006 li Zhaoxing  26 0 
2006 Wang Guangya  27 0 
2008 Zhang Yesui  12 2 
2009 Zhang Yesui  169 45 
2010 Li Baodong  63 11 
2010 Zhang Yesui  20 1 
2011 Li Baodong 2011 36 3 
2013 Li Baodong 2013 27 6 
2014 Liu Jieyi  163 13 
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APPENDIX 4 
WORD FREQUENCY ISRAELI/TECHNOLOGY/COOPERATION 
 
 A : ISRAELI B : TECHNOLOGY C : COOPERATION 
1 : 1988 1083 264 77 
2 : 1989 703 280 51 
3 : 1990 956 315 95 
4 : 1991 973 409 77 
5 : 1992 1628 887 100 
6 : 1993 1085 459 90 
7 : 1994 1106 417 92 
8 : 1995 1046 618 89 
9 : 1996 1543 410 139 
10 : 1997 1537 521 121 
11 : 1998 1900 1015 179 
12 : 1999 1454 865 112 
13 : 2000 3521 1793 325 
14 : 2001 3365 1040 336 
15 : 2002 3502 1182 242 
16 : 2003 2800 857 249 
17 : 2004 3760 1189 247 
18 : 2005 4288 1690 645 
19 : 2006 10847 3784 3013 
20 : 2007 6317 2178 1703 
21 : 2008 7439 2373 1180 
22 : 2009 7751 2273 1749 
23 : 2010 9502 3836 2072 
24 : 2011 7961 3433 2754 
25 : 2012 10889 3271 2235 
26 : 2013 9169 3796 2417 
27 : 2014 13387 3909 2986 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 5 OFFICIAL (STATE SANCTIONED) EXCHANGES (VISITS AND TREATIES)  
 
 
Sources: (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s 
Republic of China, Embassy People’s Republic of China in Israel, Embassy of the State 
of Israel in China  
 
2014 Visits  
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming Meets with Israeli Delegation of Young Diplomats  
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui Meets Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Hanegbi 
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming Meets with Former Prime Minister Barak of Israel  
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China's Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue Wu Sike Visits Israel  
Liu Yandong Meets President Peres and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu   
Xi Jinping Meets President Shimon Peres of Israel,  
Wang Yi Meets with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel  
  
1. 7 Total Visits in 2014 
 
 
2013 
 
Zhao Yong, Deputy-Secretary of CPC Hebei Provincial Committee visits Israel  
Delegation of Chengdu City visited Israel.  
Delegation of Shandong Province People's Congress visits Israel  
Delegation of Xinhua News Agency Meets with Israeli President Peres  
Chinese Communist Party official Liu Qibao visits Israel  
Delegation of China Society of Administrative Reform visits Israel  
Mr. Zhaluo Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, visits Israel  
Wang Yi Holds Talks with FM Liberman of Israel and PM Netanyahu 
2.  
3. 8 Total Visits in 2013 
 
2012  
Chen Zongxing, Vice-Chairman of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
visits Israel  
Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress Visits 
Israel 
Delegation of City of Yiyang headed by its mayor, Mr. Hu Zhongxiong visit Israel 
Mr. Chen Xiaodong, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mrs. Ruth Kahanoff, Israeli 
Foreign Ministry held a new round of annual institutional consultations between the two 
foreign ministries. 
Delegation of Shanghai Municipal People's Congress Standing Committee headed by its 
Chairman Mr. Liu Yungeng visited Israel.  
Signing Memorandum of Understanding on Exchanges and Cooperation for between the 
city of Shanghai and the city of Haifa  
China's Special Envoy to the Middle East Mr. Wu Sike Meets with Israeli FM Avigdor 
Lieberman and PM Netanyahu's Special Envoy Yitzhak Molcho 
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao exchanged congratulatory messages 
with their Israeli counterparts Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu on the 20th 
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations  
Bilateral Video Conference for Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of Sino-Israeli 
Diplomatic Relations.  
China's Middle East Envoy Wu Sike Meets Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon  
Vice President Xi Jinping meets Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman  
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Holds Meets Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman  
Chinese, Israeli Leaders Exchange Congratulatory Messages on 20th Anniversary of 
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Diplomatic Ties  
  
4. 12 Total Visits in 2012 
 
2011  
Guizhou Provincial Delegation visit Israel.  
Fujian Provincial Delegation, visited Israel.  
Delegation prominent Chinese academic leaders and officials visit Israel  
Chinese chief of staff General Chen Bingde Israel Visit 
Chinese Middle East Envoy Wu Sike met Israeli Intelligence Minister Meridor  
 
 5 Total in 2011 Visits + 1 AGREEMENT 
 
2010 
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin and   
Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon  
State Councilor Dai Bingguo Holds Talks with Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Minister 
for Strategic Affairs Ya'alon  
 
2 Total Visits in 2010 + 1 Treaty 
 
2009 
Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun and Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei meet  with 
Israel's Foreign Ministry Director-General Gal  
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya Meets with Delegation of Israeli Knesset  
China's Mideast Envoy Meets with Peres  
Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with a Delegation of Israeli Young Diplomats  
Israeli President Peres, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Lieberman 
meet Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi  
5 Total Visits in 2009 
 
 
2008  
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jieyi Meets with Head of the Center for Political 
Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel  
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with Colette Avital, Deputy Speaker 
of the Knesset of Israel  
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei Meets with Deputy Director General for 
Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel  
Israeli Minister of trade Eli Yishai in China   
4 Total Visits in 2008 
 
2007 
 
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets with Israeli Prime Minister Olmert  
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Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meet with Israeli Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni  
Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with Israeli National Security Council 
Chairman Mizrahi and  Israeli Deputy Speaker of the Knesset Whbee  
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets with Director General of Israeli Foreign Ministry 
(2007-06-26) 
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Holds Talks with Director General of Israeli 
Foreign Ministry  
Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao Meet with Israeli Prime Minister  
5 Total Visits in 2007 
+ 1 Treaty  
 
 
2006 
 
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun in Israel (2006-12-07)  
1 Total Visit in 2006 
 
2005 
 
Li Zhaoxing Meets with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Foreign Ministers of 
the United Kingdom, France, Israel and Other Countries (2005-09-21) 
Israeli President Katsav Meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (2005-06-22) 
2 Total Visits in 2005  
 
2004 
 
Tang Jiaxuan meets with with Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
Israeli President and Prime Minister 1 Total Visit in 2004  
 
2003 
 
 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao Meets Visiting Israeli President 
Moshe Katsav  
1 Total Visit in 2003 + 1 Treaty 
 
2002 
 
Vice Premier Qian Qichen Met with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Sharansky  
Foreign Minister Tang Jianxuan and His Israeli Counterpart Talk by Phone  
Vice-Premier Qian Qichen, Premier Zhu Rongji, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan 
Met with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (2002-03-26) 
3 Total Visits in 2002 
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2001 
 
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan had a phone conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister  
1 Total conversation in 2001 + 1 Treaty  
 
2000 
 
President Jiang Zemin in Israel 2000  
1 Total Visit in 2000+ 2 Treaties  
 
1999 
 
Defense Minister of China, Chi Haotian in Israel meets Prime Minister Ehud Barak,  
Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Defense Minister Chi Haotian 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Li Peng  
Israeli President Weizman visits China  
4 Total Visit in 1999 + 1 Treaties  
 
1998 
 
Israeli Minister of Defense Mordechai in China  
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in China  
2 Total in 1998 + 1 Treaty 
 
 
1997 
 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (twice, the second time as Vice Premier and Foreign 
Minister)  
Chinese Vice Premier Li Lanqing in Israel  
Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Levy in China  
3 Total in 1997+ 1 Treaty 
 
1996 
 
Chinese State Minister of National Science and Technology Commission Song Jian in 
Israel  
1 Total Visit +3 Treaties  
 
 
1995 
Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Wu Yi in Israel 
1 Total Visit in 1995+ 3 Treaties 
1994 
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Micha Harish in China    
Vice Premier Zou Jiahua,  in Israel  
2 Total Visits in 1994+ 2 Treaties 
 
1993 
 
Foreign Minister Peres in China  
Prime Minister Rabin in China   
 
2 Total Visits in 1993 + 4 Treaties 
1992 
 
President Herzog in China 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Shi Guangsheng visited 
Israel  
Israeli Foreign Minister of Israel David Levy visits China  
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Israel  
4 Total Visits in 1992 + 1 Treaties 
 
1991 
 
Israeli Defense Minister of Israel Moshe Arens in China  
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Fuchang visits Israel  
2 Total Visits in 1991 
 
SINO –ISRAELI BILATERAL TREATIES   (YEAR BY YEAR)  
      
1992 Trade   
1993 Air transport, Cultural, Health, Education (Joint Farm and Agriculture Training 
setup)  
1994 Post, Tourism  
1995 Financial evasion, protecting investment, technology and science  
1996 Medical, Post, Technical Cooperation  
1997 Maritime   
1998 Customs  
1999 MASHAV technical training  
2000 Education, Industrial development  
2001 MASHAV Training  
2002 no treaties  
2003 Agriculture, Phytosanitary  
2004 no treaties 
2005 no treaties 
2006 no treaties 
2007 no treaties 
2008 Industrial Development  
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2009 no treaties 
2010 Technology and Innovation  
2011 Industrial Research  
2012 no treaties 
2013 no treaties 
2014 no treaties 
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CHAPTER V ISRAEL IN INDIA  
  
INTRODUCTION  
 
 The massive markets and growing clout of China and India no doubt offer 
substantial caches of diplomatic and bilateral opportunities. For several decades Israel has 
strived to reap the benefits offered by expanding contacts in East and South Asia. 
Overall, the Jewish State’s push to formalize diplomatic relationships in the region has 
been slow in achieving tangible outcomes. India’s early ties to Israel were dogged by a 
series of secretive, drawn-out and irregular contacts. In effect, mimicking much of the 
antics encountered in Sino-Israeli relations. Formal and informal links with India offered 
Israel the prospects of building new important partnerships. Closer ties could translate 
into strategic collaboration and importantly much sought after access to an increasingly 
influential player in the international community. 
Though, Israel maintained varied degrees of ties with India decades before the 
start of full diplomatic relations in1992, interactions were largely inconsequential and 
void of meaningful growth. India’s tendency to limit grander associations with Israel was 
guided by a combination of noteworthy factors. Domestic politics, Middle East dynamics, 
and geopolitical considerations dictated by the Cold War as well as other issues all played 
roles in holding back movement towards full formal relations. Yet, once full ties became 
a reality, Indo-Israeli relations experienced impressive growth. The pathway to robust 
relations came about only after decades of painfully slow stop-and-go progress that was 
marred by a string of setbacks along the way. This chapter traces the significance of 
knowledge and technology sharing as notable features in bringing India and Israel closer 
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together despite political obstacles and efforts by Israel’s adversaries to confine the 
Jewish State’s international reach.   
Israel has managed to establish and then nurture a significant number of bilateral 
ties in Asia but at pointedly different levels as mentioned in the previous chapter. Israel’s 
interactions with India have been at remarkable levels when compared with others in the 
region like tiny neighboring Nepal. Israel has even cultivated expanded economic and 
military ties with unlikely partners like majority Muslim former Soviet Republics 
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Most significant by far in terms of economic and strategic 
value are the relations, Israel achieved ties with China and India which cover wide-
ranging forms of cooperation. The seeds of Israeli ties with these two regional powers 
were sown several years before the establishment of full formal relations.  
Vast physical dimensions, diverse geography, demographics and a huge populace 
make India vulnerable to an array of challenges. Some of the most persistent challenges 
have been in the realm of food production, national defense, and overall developmental 
issues. India, like China, was compelled to take steps in overcoming these types of 
pressing issues. Indian policymakers sought ways, to boost standards of living, bolster 
national defense capabilities, and elevate the country’s international standing. In an effort 
to reach such goals, international technology transfers offered new tools with which to 
tackle deep-rooted domestic ails while enhancing the country’s competitiveness in the 
global economy. However, access and use of technology does not operate in isolation and 
is usually dependent on a variety of political, social and economic components. 
Significant transformations in India facilitated new pathways by which to pursue helpful 
problem solving technologies from outside the country.  
 
 206 
The convergence of two principle interests helped to steer Israel and India toward 
each other. First, India’s desire to find ways to alleviate domestic challenges, and second, 
Israel’s diplomatic ambitions seeking to achieve productive relationships in South Asia.  
India’s interests encouraged Indian leaders to consider and seek the kinds of knowledge 
Israel was selling to the world. For Israel, it created opportunities to highlight how its 
experience could be of benefit in approaching problems India was up against. The 
prospects of expanded relations for Israel and helpful technologies for India inched the 
two sides to closer dealings (initially in secret).  
The sections below consider the efficiency of technology transfers as tools with 
which to jump start dormant Indian-Israeli relations. To facilitate the probe of possible 
associations between technology transfers and the robustness of bilateral relations, the 
study considers independent, dependent, and intervening variables. The independent 
variable represents technology transfers to India (as forms of attraction) in favor of Israel. 
The dependent variable represents diplomacy. Diplomacy broadly defined for the purpose 
of this study is the robustness of bilateral relations between Israel and India. Robustness, 
as was the case in Sino-Israeli relations, is based on three categories. Each of which are 
dependent variables: 
 
1. Trade volumes  
2. Indo-Israeli exchanges like visiting delegations and treaties 
3. India’s policies towards Israel/ Middle East based on statements made during 
official UN speeches 
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Intervening variables represent factors, which may influence cause and affect outcomes 
between the independent and dependent variables (variables and methodology mirror 
China case analysis) They include: 
 
• Technology that addresses national priorities in India. For example, crop growing 
techniques, which can raise the levels of food and human security.    
• Common security concerns like military capabilities and/or terror threats.  
• Efforts to better gain access to the US through Israeli channels.  
• Geopolitical shifts like: leadership changes, shifts in alliances (end of Cold War), 
Middle East politics (Arab Spring), Middle East conflict flare-ups.   
 
As mentioned previously, it is important to note that technology transfers may be 
labeled differently depending on the actual transaction. For example, transfers could 
include: arms transfers, military weapon sales, developmental cooperation, technical 
assistance, technology collaborations, joint ventures, intelligence sharing and other forms 
of sharing know-how.  Any of these, and a host of other possible similar terms, could be 
considered independent variables for the purpose of this study.  
To best explore the particulars of Israel’s relationship with India (past and 
present) the chapter will be structured in the following manner: A country profile section 
of India will survey India’s geography, challenges, modern history, political/economic 
systems and foreign policy of relevance to Indian-Israeli relations. A portion on India’s 
challenges will review notable national vulnerabilities (i.e. conflict, national security and 
food production /agriculture). A history of the Indian-Israeli relationship section will 
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feature a sketch of similarities between the two countries and historical breakpoint 
periods. A shared interests /areas of cooperation segment will consider different sectors, 
which have given rise to Indian-Israeli collaboration. A data trends and content analyses 
section will aim to examine the validity of the hypothesis of the dissertation exploring 
possible covariance between the independent and dependent variables (detailed earlier). 
This section mostly involves qualitative analysis methodologies using NVivo software. 
This chapter too draws on a diverse inventory of primary and secondary sources like 
interviews, media reports, scholarly literature, government and NGO documentation as 
illustrated in the previous chapter. The final portion of this chapter will offer conclusions 
about the role of technology and knowledge transfers in Indo-Israeli relations.  
The transfer of knowledge and/or technology in the context of this dissertation is 
not meant to infer in any way that the technology sender (Israel) is overall more 
sophisticated or advanced than the receiver (India). Both parties have much to learn from 
each other. However, the study underscores the value of Israeli specialized know-how as 
a boon of attraction (soft power) in favor of Israel in relations with India. 
To be clear, this study is also not suggesting that knowledge transfer programs in 
themselves guarantee diplomatic sway in the case of Indian-Israeli relations. Instead, the 
dissertation argues that technology and other intellectual capital transfers are factors, 
which can promote country-to-country engagement. In doing so, transfers of technology 
can and often do open opportunities for Israel to achieve gains in bilateral relations.  
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INDIA COUNTRY PROFILE (OVERVIEW)  
 
 
India is the second largest Asian country in terms of territory, and the second 
most populous in the world. It shares borders with main rivals Pakistan, China and other 
neighbors like Bhutan, Burma and Bangladesh. India’s physical geography is varied 
featuring a multitude of landscapes such as rugged mountains, valleys, plains, and 
islands. The country has several topographically distinctive regions: Himalayan 
mountainous region, the Indo-Gangetic Plain, Peninsular Plateau, Coastal Plains, Thar 
Desert and off shore Islands. The country’s climatic and physical features are important 
aspects of India’s regional position. These facets of India are factors that have direct 
bearings on the country’s capabilities and constraints in areas of national defense, and 
agro-economics, which are also important features in ties with Israel. 
The tall Himalayas mountain range in the northern part of the country provides a 
natural physical barrier between India and neighboring countries, but most notably the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Pakistan. India has clashed with China and 
Pakistan in territorial wars over parts of the mountainous area. The border region remains 
a tender topic of contention.  
The Gangetic plain in the north and east holds major rivers systems (Ganges, 
Indus and Brahmaputra). This part of the country is where most of India’s large scale 
farming is situated. The Peninsular Plateau region, which spreads across southern India, 
contains several terrain types like plateaus, valleys, and hills. On India’s coast are vast 
plains, which are seated along the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The coastal 
regions are of national and regional significance in terms of population, food production 
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and international trade. First, the coastal areas are home to large population 
concentrations. Second, the coast is where important seaports like Mumbai which are 
gateways to the significant import and export business. Finally, the coastal areas also 
produce commercial quantities of food staples like rice and sugarcane. In northwest India, 
the remote, vast and arid Thar Desert provides a natural border buffer with major rival 
Pakistan. The Thar Desert was the site of India’s first and controversial nuclear weapons 
explosion test site in 1974. India also controls a string of islands in the Indian Ocean.  
India became independent in 1947, when Britain ended its rule over the Indian 
subcontinent, and separated the territory into two countries: India, with a Hindu majority, 
and Pakistan, with a Muslim majority. The split triggered civil strife and mass migration 
leading to a refugee crisis. The partition set the stage for Indian and Pakistani cross 
border tensions and several major conflicts in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 especially over 
the highly contested Kashmir region, a territory located at the top of the Indian sub-
continent. The Kashmir conflict remains unresolved in present times. In 1971, the two 
countries also waged war as New Delhi supported forces fighting to breakaway from 
Pakistan to form what is now Bangladesh. Adding weight to the Indian-Pakistani rivalry, 
and producing mounting international concerns is the fact both nations possess nuclear 
weapons. India also clashed with China on the Tibet border in the late 1950s.  A few 
years later in 1962, China captured mountain passes along India’s northeastern frontier 
producing border altercations. A ceasefire was later declared, but some boundary issues 
linger. India has also experienced territorial disputes with other neighbors like 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan. 
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In the first few decades after independence (50s and 60s), as Corbridge (2009) points 
out, a large proportion of the Indian populace resided in rural areas and the majority of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rested on agricultural production. Challenged by 
swelling population growth in the early 1960s, India struggled to produce sufficient 
amounts of foodstuffs. Protracted poverty and bouts of famine touched the lives of 
millions of Indian citizens. 
In response to these serious problems, India’s decision makers sought to come up 
with ways to curb food shortages, alleviate poverty, and, importantly, generate job 
growth. To produce more food, better farming practices in terms of fertilizers and 
irrigation were pursued and introduced as part of India’s so called Green Revolution. The 
Green Revolution achieved higher crop yields through improved technological means. 
However, beyond agriculture, India also introduced significant economic and political 
reforms to stimulate productivity in the national economy.  
 In 1991, the Indian government started to steer the economy to a system, which 
favors a larger private sector driven by market forces. The idea was to make India more 
attractive to foreign investment, which the country needed. The transformation to a more 
market based economy also entailed a major reorganization of the public sector.  
Economic liberalization coupled with the gradual globalization of India’s economy 
created more public awareness and debate about the country’s foreign dealings. This 
meant that what India did with other countries (like Israel) became more of a concern to 
citizens who realized international agreements could have direct bearing on their lives. 
Today, India enjoys one of the world’s fastest growing economies, and as 
Corbridge (2009) suggests, the country is on a track to likely become the third largest 
 
 212 
economy in the world after the US and China in the coming decades. Some of India’s 
largest sectors include food production, textiles, and computer software. India’s main 
agricultural output comprises wheat, cotton, rice, sugarcane, dairy, tea products, and 
livestock, all of which demand much attention in the way of applying irrigation 
management technologies.  
India is famously known as the largest parliamentary democracy in the world. 
Executive and legislative bodies administer the country. The government comprises a 
chief of state and a head of government. There are two lawmaking bodies: The Council of 
States also called Rajya Sabha, and the People's Assembly known as Lok Sabha. India is 
a federation of 29 states and 7 union territories. Since gaining independence in 1947, 
India has maintained formal ties with most countries. It also played a leading role in the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (more on this later in the chapter). India’s individual 
states and NAM membership each have a role in the dynamics of Indian-Israeli relations 
 
INDIA’S CHALLENGES    
 
Like China, India too has achieved substantial economic development in the last 
few decades, and yet continues to grapple with a host of persistent problems. Despite 
undergoing significant changes and overall progress India, has experienced major social, 
environmental, food security and national security issues. Amarasinghe, Malik and 
Sharma (2010) point out environmental constraints have threatened India’s agricultural 
output capacity. The country has suffered from an assortment of environmental issues, 
which impaired its capacity to produce food. The culprits include soil erosion, 
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overgrazing, desertification, and water pollution from raw sewage and agricultural 
pesticides. On top of these troubles, a growing demand for water for non-farming uses 
has further frustrated the availability of adequate amounts of potable water in some parts 
of India. Hence, water use and its distribution have been two of the key challenges for 
Indian policymakers to overcome. India has sought to improve water usage efficiency 
especially in agriculture. Effective irrigation is one of the most workable ways to ease 
water waste. Irrigation by flooding, a system used in India, mostly proved inefficient in 
delivering ideal amounts of water to critical plant areas (roots). As described in an earlier 
chapter 4, drip irrigation delivers the means to use less water while still enabling an 
increase in crop outputs. Farmers in many areas of India rely on monsoon rains for crop 
water. Advanced water management (drip irrigation) not only saves water, but also helps 
farmers reduce the dependency on seasonal conditions, and allows the seeding of crops 
irrespective of rain (monsoon) dispositions. Higher crop outputs enhance food security 
and help raise revenues not only for large farming enterprises but small farms as well. 
Thus, effective water management can be a key tool in mitigating malnutrition and 
poverty, which have plagued rural India. Amarasinghe, Malik and Sharma (2010) echo a 
linkage between water usage efficiency troubles and agricultural technology deficiencies 
in India. They argue the absence of technological means has played a role limiting the 
ability to increase food production. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some plants in 
particular require large amounts of water to grow. This is the case in the cultivation of 
critical crop types like grains, which are high water consumers. The most common food 
grains are wheat, corn and rice, which are also principal sources of protein.  However, 
corn unlike other grains, can also be used for non-consumption industrial purposes. Grain 
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foods are important in terms of providing nutrition, but also as sources of revenues in 
India’s large agrarian sector.  
Another major challenge for India is National Security. Nuclear-armed India has 
one of the largest militaries in the world. Given the history of conflict in the region, 
India’s armed forces must be prepared to respond to threats along her borders posed by 
neighbors like Pakistan and a rising China. Karim (2015) explains some border issues 
between India and China have lingered for decades. India unilaterally determined the 
border with Tibet in 1950, but the move has not been recognized by China. The Indo-
Sino 1962 War has left a legacy of claims and counter claims over the legitimacy of the 
border between them. However, the mostly quiet border has been maintained through 
agreements. Final status terms of a settlement are pending and there have been episodes 
of heightened tensions over some disputed territories. Karim (2015) suggests a history of 
cross-border incursions have pressed India to attain the technological military means to 
secure equivalence along border fronts. As Kumar (2014) points out, in addition to 
challenges associated with dispute issues, India’s border with China is technically 
difficult to demark because of harsh terrain conditions. Also, India and Pakistan have 
fought several border wars (more on these conflicts later in the chapter). Besides external 
threats, India suffers from complex domestic security pressures. Overall, these issues 
make India a market for military surveillance technologies that can help to monitor 
expansive areas like rugged topographic settings and thousands of miles of coastlines. 
India's economic and political ascension in global rankings prompted leaders in 
New Delhi to also be wary of dangers posed by mounting maritime threats and defense 
vulnerabilities. Besides dealing with complex tactical territorial disputes, India’s military 
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leaders must contend with securing thousands of miles of open coastlines. Importantly, 
they must also ensure a free flow of traffic through vital ocean shipping lanes. Pant 
(2009) rightly asserts India's economic growth largely rests on the unhindered passage of 
cargo ships through the Indian Ocean. Disruption of shipping lanes is a major concern. 
Interruption of maritime traffic, including the transportation of energy sources, could 
severely impact economic and social structures, and would put India’s stability at risk. 
Interference of ocean vessel traffic through pivotal passageways like the Strait of 
Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Malacca would be damaging 
not only to India but other countries as well. Ocean routes are lifelines for India’s 
developmental prosperity. Also, un-protected shores offer opportunities for sea-based 
infiltration by non-state actors like international crime and terrorist groups. In 2008, 
scores of people were killed and injured in Mumbai after terrorists launched an attack 
from the sea. The tragic events unfolded over the course of multiple days and paralyzed 
much of the city. The attack was extensively covered by the international media but also 
played heavily in the Israeli press. It was also a point of interest in Israel’s counter-
terrorism community. Israeli citizens were among the dead as a Jewish Center was also 
one of the targets of the attack. It was alleged the perpetrators came from Pakistani 
territory but the point was they did not penetrate India over land but by sea. Rath (2014) 
asserts the terror raid revealed a devastating breakdown in internal security. The tragedy 
created a tremendous public uproar and stirred doubt about the effectiveness of India’s 
internal security structure. The tragedy underscored the importance of refreshing India’s 
security toolkit.  
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A HISTORY OF ISRAELI-INDO RELATIONS (LEAD UP TO FORMAL TIES)  
 
 
Indian relations with Israel have to some degree echoed the trajectory of Sino-
Israeli relations. India, like China, has maintained contacts and assorted technical ties 
with Israel in the years before establishing full formal ties with the Jewish State. There is 
one noteworthy difference between early Indian and Chinese relationships with Israel. 
India recognized Israel in 1950, and permitted the opening of an Israeli consulate in 
Bombay (now Mumbai). No such representation was offered to Israel in the case of early 
relations with China. Nevertheless, the pace of development to full relations between 
India and Israel, like Sino-Israeli relations, was also was slow and prolonged taking over 
4 decades before developing into full diplomatic relations in1992.  
The path to comprehensive bilateral ties was jarring, unsettled by episodes of 
antagonism on the part of India towards Israel. India’s approach towards Israel was 
generally indifferent for a host of reasons, but in large part to maintain and promote a 
favorable standing for itself in the Arab World. A stronger stature for India in the Middle 
East meant a better position from which to garner Arab political support especially in the 
context of India’s deep, bitter rivalry with Pakistan. Furthermore, India, like many other 
countries, simply understood an irrefutable reality. The potential payback of good 
relations with 22 Arab countries overshadowed any benefits from ties with Israel. After 
all, the Jewish State was not endowed with valuable natural resources, such as petroleum. 
Israel could not provide work for large numbers of Indian expatriates or large scale trade 
prospects offered by the wider (other than Israel) Middle East. These and other 
explanations deterred movements toward closer ties with Israel. Indian-Israeli relations 
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also did not advance in a linear fashion, instead unfolding through a series of seemingly 
gains and retractions. Overall, during a prolonged period, New Delhi repeatedly rebuffed 
Israeli suggestions of upgrading relations.  Although there were occasional signs of 
improvement in relations from time to time, no significant advancement in elevating ties 
took place for decades. The subsequent finalizing of full diplomatic ties came only after a 
sluggishly paced sequence of quiet Indian-Israeli encounters. Meetings took place in a 
variety of venues in the US, Europe, and Asia. Despite contacts between the two 
countries, public statements by Indian officials were not generally friendly towards Israel. 
Furthermore, media organizations in India sustained hostile views about the Jewish State. 
 The section below considers milestones in the Indian-Israeli narrative as 
technical ties intertwine with overall bilateral relations. It surveys what has been written 
or said about the development of Israel’s ties with India. It draws on information sourced 
from the literature, research interviews and media reports. Indian-Israeli relations can be 
chronologically demarcated by the following periods (see Figure 1).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 218 
Figure 1 Timeline Overall India-Israel Relations  
 
 
1947 – MID 1980S CONTACTS WITHOUT FULL FORMAL RELATIONS  
 
India and Israel are clearly very different in terms of population size, 
demographics, and physical dimensions, but they also share some noteworthy historical 
similarities. Both countries were created less than a year apart. India gained independence 
in August 1947, while Israel became a state in May 1948. Statehood came for both Israel 
and India after the conclusion of British rule. Furthermore, both countries emerged out of 
armed struggles, experiencing much bloodshed and migration of refugees. They are both 
parliamentary democracies that see themselves as modern states, which are linked to 
ancient civilizations. In 2003, Indian National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, 
addressed the American Jewish Committee in Washington underscoring democratic 
similarities between the US, Israel and India. In a bid to mount a connection with the 
American Jewish community he emphasized India is one of only a few countries with no 
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history of anti-Semitism. Just a year before in 2002 Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee met with representatives of major Jewish organizations met with Prime 
Minister while in New York for meetings at the UN.  
India and Israel both have large devoted diasporas in the US, where Jewish and 
Indian-American groups have been collaborating on common interests. In 2003 the US 
Indian Political Action Committee (USINPAC) along with the American Jewish 
Committee, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) held the first 
joint forum on Jewish-Indian relations in Washington. The gathering included 
involvement by a mix of political activists, US lawmakers, Israeli and Indian diplomats. 
Kamdar (2007) notes Indian American political activists have looked to the pro-Israel 
organizations and Jewish groups as successful lobby models, which have clenched results 
on Capitol Hill and affected US foreign policy. 
Kumar (2014) points out that if you look a map from Israel to India you’ll find 
there are the only two countries that can claim to be liberal democracies. Israel and India 
boast free presses, vibrant civil societies, and political environments where government 
policies are openly criticized, in domestic politics. Importantly, aspects of India’s 
domestic political debates directly set the tone of ties to Israel as will be noted later in the 
chapter. 
The beginnings of Indian-Israeli relations can be traced back dozens of years 
before the exchange of embassies in New Delhi and Tel Aviv became a reality in 1992. 
India’s embassy is positioned in Tel Aviv even though Jerusalem is the actual seat of the 
Israeli Government. India does not formally recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. This 
diplomatic policy with regard to Jerusalem is the norm, and is not unusual. All other 
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countries, which maintain formal missions in Israel including the US, Israel’s staunchest 
ally have placed their embassies in or near Tel Aviv.  
Initial contacts between India and Israel came as early as 1948 when Indian and 
Israeli officials met in the US. Kumaraswamy (2010) points out that even in the absence 
of deep ties and India’s refusal to fully recognize Israel, India sought and received Israeli 
technical assistance in agriculture following meetings between Israeli and Indian 
representatives in 1949. Additionally, India’s leaders also quietly sent Indian agricultural 
specialists to Israel to observe farming techniques. There were also some high-level 
contacts between the 2 countries. While visiting the US in 1950, India’s founding Prime 
Minister Nehru made time for a conversation with one of Israel’s top diplomats in 
America. In the same year, two years after the establishment of the State of Israel, a 
reluctant India ultimately recognized the Jewish State. In 1950, India also agreed to allow 
an Israeli presence in the form of an immigration office, which later turned into a 
consulate in what was then Bombay (currently Mumbai). However, despite the 
diplomatic gesture allowing the Israeli presence, the Indian government severely 
constrained the scope of the mission’s operations. Geographic limitations were imposed 
on the consulate’s outreach efforts, restricting where it could operate. The limitation, 
positioned Israeli diplomats in awkward situations, and created frictions with Indian 
officials. Nevertheless, Israeli consulate envoys could engage high-ranking Indian 
officials. Restrictions on consulate operations would be eased in 1989. The change in 
policy was perhaps a precursor of significant progress in relations to come just three 
years later with the start of full ties in 1992. In 1951, India’s Prime Minister Nehru met 
with a senior Israeli diplomat. In the meeting, pledges were made by the Indian leader to 
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forge formal ties with Israel.  A year later in 1952, Israeli diplomat, Walter Eytan, also 
had talks with senior Indian figures, and even Prime Minister Nehru. Overall, though, as 
Kumaraswamy (2010) emphasizes officials in New Delhi systematically turned away 
Israeli suggestions of advancing towards full ties.  Despite contacts in early and later 
(1948-mid 1980s) periods, the two countries simply failed to produce measurable 
developments in bilateral relations. Years of diplomatic stagnation have been attributed to 
a number of general concerns on the Indian side. These include India’s deep and strong 
ties to the Arab world, but also being responsive to the sensitivities of large domestic 
Muslim communities (Kumaraswamy, 2010). However, there were also distinct events, 
which inhibited closer ties, like the outbreak of the 1956 Suez War.  The crisis came 
about after Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the strategic canal prompting Israel, 
Britain and France to team up and take military action against Egypt in the Sinai 
Peninsula. The Sinai was captured but was returned to Egypt as part of a cease-fire 
agreement. Seeking to maintain important ties in the Middle East, India sided with Egypt 
stepping in line with Pan Arab positions. In doing so, India distanced itself from Israel, 
thus dashing prospects of better ties with the Jewish State at that time. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the Suez crisis was also a source of diplomatic tensions inhibiting 
progress in advancing Sino-Israeli relations. Overall, political pressure from the Arab 
World on India squashed prospects of improved ties with Israel. 
In 1961, another hindrance to closer links between the two countries came about 
when India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). New 
Delhi’s leading role in NAM politically positioned India at odds with the notion of open 
relations with Israel. NAM is an international forum of countries that oppose being 
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formally identified as an ally of any particular country or power. Created in 1961, the 
organization assembled a substantial membership roster of states, which are also active 
members of the United Nations. India’s first Prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was one of 
the founding fathers, along with other leaders including Egypt’s President Nasser. The 
movement gained significance mostly during the Cold War. A close review of NAM’s 
history suggests the name of the organization was somewhat of a misnomer since some 
member states did build alliances. Furthermore, historically, most NAM member 
countries traditionally identified with the Arab World and the Palestinian cause.  Hence, 
NAM members routinely joined efforts to challenge Israel in international forums. 
Bitzinger (2014) and Panda (2016) assert India was essentially demarcated by traditional 
“Third World” and Non-Aligned Movement-inspired sympathies for the Palestinian 
cause. Besides foreign factors, domestic politics played a defining role in shaping the 
strength and openness of relations with Israel. It is not surprising though that the prospect 
of relations with Israel was controversial in Indian politics. Since independence, India’s 
political system has been dominated by two prominent parities: Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) and Congress Party. Generally, the BJP has mostly held pro-Israel positions. In 
contrast, the Congress Party has traditionally followed a more pro-Arab stance. Dhume 
(2014) contends the Congress Party’s pro-Palestinian position stems from its reign as a 
ruling party in a liberal democracy. As such, it was obliged to be sensitive to the 
sentiments and concerns of the electorate, which includes India’s large Muslim 
community. 
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LARGE MUSLIM MINORITY  
 
Millions of India’s Muslim citizens tend to identify with the Palestinian 
cause. Many in the community view Israel as responsible for the plight of Muslim 
sacred sites, especially in Jerusalem. In the 1967 Six-Day Arab-Israeli War, Israel 
took control of Arab East Jerusalem including the ancient Old City. The Old City 
bears spiritual significance to all three Abrahamic Faiths. However, Islam’s third 
holiest shrine and Judaism’s most sacred place of worship are positioned in an 
overlapping space. The site is a point of contention between Jewish and Muslim 
claims, which extend far beyond the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Even the name of 
the site is conflict-ridden. The area is known in the Muslim World by its Arabic 
name “Haram al-Sharif” (meaning the Noble Sanctuary). In the Jewish faith, the site 
is referred to by the Hebrew name “Har ha-Bayit” meaning Temple Mount. It should 
be mentioned that while Israel controls the Old City, the Jordanian-based Jerusalem 
Islamic Waqf is mandated to oversee Islamic religious structures. Besides the 
religious controversy, Israel’s control of all of Jerusalem poses a problem for the 
Muslim community in India and others supporting the Palestinian cause. The 
Palestinians see parts of Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian State. 
Nevertheless, Kumar (2014) and Inbar (2014) point out Islam in South Asia is 
generally less staunchly practiced and more moderate than in the Middle East. 
Kumar (2014) asserts you will still have pro-Palestinian protests in South Asia 
(India), but the nature of hostility against Israel is less forceful than in the Arab 
World. In Pakistan, and even in India, only a tiny minority actively take part in 
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protests against Israel, and it is much more about politics than anything else.  As 
Kumaraswamy (2010) notes, most Muslims in India are more likely tuned in to day-
to-day needs than foreign policy issues, whatever they may be. Nevertheless, against 
this background, many Indian policymakers felt compelled to offer support for the 
Palestinian cause.  
When it came to the Cold War, Israel and India were on opposing sides. As a 
major military client of Moscow, New Delhi adhered to pro-Soviet positions, while Israel 
was identified as a western aligned country.  The end of the Cold War offered a political 
environment for less resistance on the part of India to expand ties with Israel and the 
opportunity to fill a void created by the fall of the Soviet Union as will be further detailed 
below. 
On the regional level, India vied for Arab support in its conflict with Pakistan. 
Closer and open ties with Israel would put in peril Indian efforts to gain vital wide 
Middle Eastern political support vis-a-vis Pakistan. Yet, despite a generally detached 
stance towards expanding relations with Israel, Indian leaders like (Prime Minister 
Nehru) sought Israeli input in matters of agriculture, military and intelligence. Inbar 
(2004) points out the early encounters between Israel and India involved some limited 
military contacts, which were exemplified by Israeli assistance in India’s confrontation 
with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. In the years between those conflicts 
there were notable high-level talks between officials of both countries. Indian Foreign 
Minister Dinesh Singh and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban met in 1969. There were 
also a number of quiet exchanges in the period before the maturing of full relations. 
Indian officials also traveled to Israel to closely view the workings of Israeli agriculture. 
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Israeli scientists and senior officials like Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in 1977 went to 
India. Kumar (2014) points to a backdrop of forms of technical cooperation in the 60s 
and 70s as a factor in creating contact opportunities between the two countries even 
though the relationship between them was cold.  Despite a history of high-level contacts 
with Israel, India backed a 1975 controversial UN resolution introduced by Arab and 
Islamic members, which equated Zionism with racism. Zionism is the ideological 
foundation on which the Jewish State was created. In essence, support for the resolution 
questions the very legitimacy of the Jewish State. (India eventually retracted its position.) 
The stagnant state of affairs of zero movement towards more comprehensive political ties 
between Israel and India generally showed no signs of abating until the late 80s a few 
years before full bilateral ties were finally formed in 1992.       
 
MID 1980S – 1992 
 
During the 1980s, India begins to show a willingness to openly engage Israel 
when Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met 
at the UN in 1985.  Kumaraswamy (2010) suggests the encounter itself was significant 
because it likely set, precedent as the first meeting between the Israeli and Indian Prime 
Ministers. Kumar (2014) asserts agricultural technology played a major role in Indian-
Israeli contacts in the late 80s. Technical cooperation was a major facilitator of 
communications, but in the broader context, there were other undercurrents which 
affected ties between the two countries. Still, no meaningful policy changes in relations 
occurred for some time. However, a turn of events in the Middle East in part created a 
political environment, which helped India edge closer to open ties with the Jewish State. 
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For decades India’s pro-Palestinian stance was well received in the Arab World. 
However, that policy proved problematic during the 1991 Gulf War. At that time, India 
expressed support for the Palestinian position in the conflict against the strong objections 
of influential Arab Gulf States. The Palestinian leadership expressed support with the 
Iraqi President when he sent forces to invade Kuwait. By extension New Delhi’s, support 
of the Palestinian position in the war was seen by Gulf States as support for their nemesis 
Saddam Hussein.  In the aftermath, strains in relations with Gulf States over India’s 
initial position in the war prompted New Delhi to reassess its policies in the region. The 
reevaluation of policies toward the Middle East triggered a new diplomatic approach, 
which created a pathway for Indian policymakers to separate support for the Palestinian 
cause from other interests in the Middle East. This change was extended to India’s Israel 
policy. 
The policy shift was just one of the factors which helped ease India’s longtime 
constrained Israel policy. Essentially, India began to de-link the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict from its overall approach toward Israel. In doing so, it demonstrated a notable 
policy shift (Singh, 2012). In 1991, India also made a dramatic policy reversal when it 
decided to withdraw its original support for the controversial UN resolution, which 
equated Zionism with racism.  
Another factor in nudging India towards broader ties with Israel came after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was India’s primary arms supplier. Soviet 
armaments were the backbone of the Indian military. The end of the Cold War meant 
India lost military support from Moscow. This new situation created a need for New 
Delhi to find new partnerships. Inbar (2009) asserts India’s move to normalize relations 
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with Israel was as part of a broader post-Cold War strategy to help India develop new ties 
with major international actors like the United States, while at the same time accessing 
advanced technologies available from Israel to enhance national security. Israel’s battle 
experience was of special interest to India in the face of regional security challenges from 
neighboring countries (specifically a nuclear-armed Pakistan and a powerful China). 
Kumar (2014) points out the quiet history of Israeli arms supplies to India during 
conflicts in the 1960s against China and Pakistan created a tacit understanding that 
India’s Armed Forces could learn more from the Israeli defense strategy and system once 
full relations were established. On that point, India also sought to make its own weapons 
and looked to other countries, like Israel, which it saw as having built a successful 
military industry.   
Mounting Indian disappointment about a lack of reciprocal political support from 
the Arab World in the lingering rivalry with Pakistan also chipped away resistance 
towards a softer policy towards Israel.  Despite New Delhi’s consistent and ardent 
backing of the Palestinian cause, India felt Arab states did not demonstrate ample support 
for its claims against Pakistan over Kashmir. Kumar (2014) portrays the existence of a 
very strong pro-Arab lobby in India’s capital in the 60s and 70s, characterizing New 
Delhi’s relationship with Arab countries as very significant. Similarly, changes in India’s 
domestic politics, namely the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, Hindu Nationalist), 
which favored normalization with Israel, contributed to the prospects of closer relations.  
             As we have seen, the decades leading to formal ties were dotted with generally 
limited and infrequent encounters between Israeli and Indian officials, which did not 
visibly advance ties between the two countries. However, some of these contacts 
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provided some evidence about the significance of technical cooperation in the areas of 
military and agriculture in helping to establish common ground and laying the 
foundations for formal ties once conditions were ripe. Changes in India’s foreign policy 
in the early 1990s created wider prospects for India to look outward and reach out for 
more technical collaborations to help grapple with major chronic challenges. New Delhi 
increasingly looked to the West to access and utilize new problem solving technologies. 
In this setting, Israel already had a history of collaborations with India making way for 
reviving once dormant ties. Unlike interactions of earlier periods, the exchanges of the 
early 90s produced tangible progress towards expanding ties and ultimately establishing 
full formal diplomatic relations.    
 
1992 FULL FORMAL RELATIONS AND BEYOND 
 
         Indian-Israeli ties have generally flourished since formal ties were established. 
Furthermore, security ties between New Delhi and Jerusalem were not met with forms of 
fierce objections from Washington, as was the case in Sino-Israeli relations. 
Nevertheless, full diplomatic relations did not put to rest internal political opposition in 
India, which questioned the merits of the relationship with Israel. That being said, 
Bitzinger (2014) suggests India’s NAM association was less of a negating factor in 
relations with Israel as might have been back in the 1970s and 1980s, when Zionism was 
deemed akin to Nazism. 
India’s move towards closer formal relations with Israel meant it now had other 
policy options in the Middle East, which do not necessarily automatically conform to 
Arab World positions, as was the case for decades. Put another way, an alliance with 
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Israel offered India some leverage in its dealings with other countries in the Middle East, 
which it did not have before. Prior to diplomatic relations with Israel, India could not 
play the “Israel Card”, signifying its traditional pro-Arab World stance could no longer 
be taken for granted. Relations with Israel gave more weight to India’s positions on 
Middle East issues at the UN.     
It is important to note that while the scale of Israel’s specialized sectors like 
military and agriculture are tiny by Indian standards, the level usefulness of the Israeli 
experience in those industries was ample to attract substantial interest in New Delhi’s 
policy-making circles. Kumar (2014) contends Indian-Israeli relations can be compared 
to the mechanism of a dam. The metaphor goes like this: efforts to forge ties were held 
back much like a dam blocks the flow of water, but once the dam was opened a strong 
stream ensued. So while progress toward full relations was slow and at times at a stand 
still, collaboration between Israel and India took off at an accelerated pace once the 
embassies opened. MASHAV, the development agency that organized advanced training 
for Indian farm experts since the early 1950s, stepped up its cooperation activities in 
numerous areas covering vocations in areas of agriculture, community development, 
public health, technology, and education (Ben Meir, 2011).  
The establishment of diplomatic relations brought about several joint ventures in 
agriculture involving the delivery of technology as well as consultation. The first visit by 
an Israeli President to India in 1996 was marked by noteworthy agricultural 
collaboration. During the trip, the Indo-Israel Research and Development Farm was 
launched as part of the Indian Agriculture Research Institute (IARI) in New Delhi. The 
farm would demonstrate Israeli farming techniques in seeking to develop different 
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cultivation methods for use in India’s various climates. Other joint demo-farms would be 
opened as bilateral relations matured.  
Indian-Israeli dealings in the defense sector also progressed. Although Madan 
(2016) suggests that Israel was not a major defense supplier to India in the early 1990s, 
India’s limited dealings with Israel in the first decade of full formal ties would grow 
beyond traditional cooperation sectors and branch out to other more specialized 
collaborations in the form of joint ventures, naval cooperation, counter-terrorism and 
military training exercise and even space technology. It is believed thousands of Indian 
military personnel have trained in Israel in anti terror tactics. In 2008, India launched an 
Israeli satellite into orbit. The use of Indian venues to launch Israeli satellites is 
significant in terms of technical capabilities. Given Israel’s location and political 
constraints in the Middle East, it can only launch satellites westward over the 
Mediterranean Sea. Interestingly, a launch westward curtails Israel’s ability to ideally 
position a spy satellite to monitor central Asia and particularly Iran. Iran has openly 
threatened to destroy the Jewish State.   
In 1999, India and Pakistan were at war once again in the Kargil which is part of 
Kashmir mostly along the Line of Control (LOC) or border area.  It was a border battle 
fought in exceptionally difficult to maneuver, high altitude, mountainous terrain. The 
Kargil conflict proved to be a turning point in defense relations between Israel and India. 
Israel was one of a few countries to offer India military support. The Israelis provided the 
Indian military with various warfare tools like ammunition and night vision instruments. 
At that time international sanctions (including on arms shipments) were in place on India. 
The arms embargo came after India carried out nuclear tests in the Thar Desert despite 
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international protests. Israel’s Kargil involvement in favor of India ushered a new level of 
weapons dealings between the two countries. Blarel (2015) contends the Kargil crisis 
exposed weaknesses and gaps in India’s intelligence gathering and military capabilities. 
The deficiencies highlighted India’s need to be able to more efficiently carry out 
surveillance and reconnaissance missions covering stretches of vast territory. India made 
an attempt to develop its own aerial surveillance systems, but the outcome did not meet 
operational expectations for successfully monitoring border areas. The situation prompted 
India’s attention to seek other options like Israeli border sensors, drones and the Phalcon 
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). After the Kargil crisis, overall 
bilateral relations leaped forward. Just a year later, in 2000, two top Indian officials, 
Home Minister, L.K. Advani and External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, traveled to 
Israel. India became a regular consumer of Israeli surveillance technologies. After the 
crisis, but especially from the mid 2000s, Israel became one of India’s top military 
suppliers. However, since military dealings are largely secretive, it is unknown by public 
accounts if Israel in particular is the second or third largest weapons supplier to India.  
Indian-Israeli relations took some time to mature but nevertheless ties between the 
two countries have continued to be a source of poignant debate. On one side of the 
political aisle, proponents of tighter ties relations with Israel touted the idea that closer 
relations would be of benefit to India’s national interests as it strived to cope with 
tenacious and emerging domestic and external threats. Dhume (2014) points out that 
during a 2012 Indian election campaign, a candidate was quoted as promising to making 
an area suffering from water scarcity to “bloom like an Israeli desert”. On the other side 
of the political aisle, opponents of tighter ties with Israel argue cozy relations with the 
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Jewish State amount to a de-facto abandonment of support for the Palestinian cause. 
Madan (2016) correctly points out that while India’s relationship with Israel advanced, 
the level of ties between the two countries was highly susceptible to which political party 
led the Indian government. Different governments practiced different Israel policies, 
marked by varied levels of openness. While full formal ties with Israel began under the 
Congress Party which ruled from 1985 to 1998, ties became closer and more open during 
the rule of the BJP led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) between 1998 and 2004. 
Interestingly, technology cooperation continued to progress regardless of political 
changes in New Delhi. However, Dhume (2014) notes that when the Congress Party 
returned to power in 2004, Indian-Israeli relations were handled more discreetly. 
Furthermore, India renewed support for the Palestinian cause. In addition, while senior 
level government exchanges diminished in volume, other aspects of bilateral relations in 
trade, defense and intelligence cooperation continued. The Indian based think tank, 
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, suggests that throughout the 2000s India 
obtained billons of dollars worth of Israeli military equipment. Israel did not deliver large 
weapons like aircraft or ships; instead it initially focused on upgrading India’s Russian 
made fighter jets, missiles and tanks. Shukla (2010) contends the experience gained in 
India gave Israel the knowledge needed to further market its upgrading services wherever 
Soviet equipment existed worldwide. This helped Israel brand itself as a leader in the 
weapons modernization market.  
          In 2006, an Agricultural Cooperation Agreement was signed between Israel and 
India. The agreement was implemented with the participation of MASHAV. The deal 
called for the establishment of multiple joint model farms where an array of innovative 
 
 233 
agricultural practices would be demonstrated. The farms are known as Centres of 
Excellence in Agriculture. Majumder (2012) notes the prime purpose of the Centres of 
Excellence is to expose Indian farmers to Israeli agricultural techniques and technologies. 
Initially, as part of the setup of the Centres, Israeli trainers would train local trainers who 
would then train others. This practice is part of what MASHAV calls its focus on 
building human capacity, which it asserts is the optimal way to achieve the greatest 
impact and sustainable growth. In 2008, the Israel-Indian Agriculture Cooperation 
Agreement finalized plans to set up projects in several Indian States like Punjab, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and West Bengal. Centres typically 
showcase Israeli based nursery and fruit cultivating technologies, which are adapted for 
Indian conditions by local experts. The Centres also provide access to courses on how 
farmers can boost their incomes. Hafeez (2009) describes joint agricultural projects, such 
as the Centres, as engaging farmers through learning about groundbreaking techniques. 
The demonstration farms also involve the introduction of new crop types like novel 
strains of citrus, olives, dates, pomegranates and guava.  In 2011, the agreement was 
further widened to promote more visits by farming specialists and classes for farmers. 
Transfers of knowledge include the demonstration of technologies which advance ways 
to best utilize poor quality water for irrigation, water management and polyhouse 
farming. Polyhouses are climate-controlled structures, mostly used for the growing of 
vegetables, flowers and fruit. This method sidesteps growing crops traditionally in an 
open field. A sizeable number of farmers in the vegetable growing areas surrounding 
New Delhi have adopted Israel’s polyhouse farming method. The technique helps 
significantly boost yields but also allows farmers to grow new strains of vegetables like 
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cherry tomatoes and others. The Indo-Israeli Centre of Excellence for Vegetables has 
become a vehicle of change in cultivation practices in India. One of the more notable of 
these joint demonstration farms was established in the north central Indian State of 
Haryana. The farm demonstrates a range of technologies in horticulture providing 
training and showcasing agricultural achievements. The Centres aim to help fight low 
productivity and lack of resources, which have been obstacles especially in small farms. 
Feller (2012) points out agricultural development is a national concern in India for 3 
primary reasons: 1) farming is a source of employment for the majority of the rural 
population, 2) agriculture generates a sizable part of the country’s GDP and 3) a 
developed sector can help curb food security threats.   
The Indo-Israeli relationship rests on exchanges on multiple levels.  
Beyond cooperation on national levels, cooperation on subnational state levels, is also 
significant. However, each level copes with different concerns and constraints. On that 
point, bilateral cooperation in agriculture regularly extends to paradiplomacy 
partnerships. Paradiplomacy engagements entail forms of cooperation between national 
and sub-national state actors. In paradiplomacy sub states generally seek foreign 
government partners to solve specific local problems and overall to improve standards of 
living through infrastructure upgrades, better food security, and other developmental 
improvement projects. Sub State leaders are typically less worried about diplomatic 
intricacies and more focused on overcoming local issues. In the realm of Indian-Israeli 
ties, Israel has sealed agreements with several Indian state governments to set up 
Agricultural Centres of Excellence. Abadi (2015) postulates that regardless of politics 
what Israel has to offer in technology is attractive on the sub-state level.  Indian states are 
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pragmatic and care less about Mideast politics. Kumar (2014) and Madan (2016) contend 
that after formal ties were established in 1992 Israel aggressively instructed its diplomats 
to visit various Indian states and meet with local officials and chiefs of states. There have 
also been an unusually high number of Indian state leaders visiting Israel. Shichor (2014) 
notes Israel has real relationships with individual states as governors of states interact 
directly with Israel often because of what it can offer in terms of proven useful problem 
solving technologies. Israel’s paradiplomacy relationships were fostered to produce 
mutual benefits, but formed mostly around two notable specializations which Israel can 
offer in the agriculture sector: irrigation and horticulture. Kumar (2014) contends that 
when you engage at these paradiplomacy levels you are afforded positive public opinion 
opportunities. Local farming achievement accounts in association with Indian-Israel 
demonstration farms injects positive news about Israel-- something that was rare in 
previous periods when mostly negative images about the Jewish State were more 
prevalent in Indian society. The introduction of Israeli agricultural technology in arid 
areas of India created opportunities for non-conflict neutral news about Israel to reach 
Indian media. In that context, it helped soften perception of Israel, which was more 
associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Madan (2016) contends that agriculture 
cooperation provides a public relations platform for Israel in individual Indian states. 
Furthermore, Kumaraswamy (2014) notes that farming cooperation offers the most 
benefit to the largest amount of people. Essentially, technological cooperation in 
agriculture showed that there were tangible benefits to the relationship between the two 
countries, especially in impoverished rural areas. In fact, in 2009, published conclusions 
of an Israel government commissioned international public opinion suggested that India 
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is the most pro-Israel country compared to other influential countries. The study also 
examined Israel's public stature in several countries like Canada, the US, Britain, France, 
China, and Russia. The study did not directly make a connection between pubic opinion 
conclusions and Israeli technology transfers. However, it did imply that perceptions of 
Israel’s technological achievements could, in part, be contributing factors in boosting a 
favorable view of Israel. Study participants were asked to rate Israel before and after 
watching videos about the country, which featured among other things Israeli 
technological innovations. Inbar (2014) expresses reservations about the findings that 
India is the most pro-Israel country in Asia. Nevertheless, the report perhaps points to a 
rise in more positive or moderate public opinion positions about Israel among Indian 
citizens. Seethi (2014) notes that for more than six decades, India created an image of 
Israel as an adversary given the consistent support extended to the Palestinian movement. 
He also points out that the nature and context of the support changed considerably over 
several years, and it is important for Israel to be in a close relationship with India to 
remove fearful perceptions about the Jewish State.  
As noted, Israel-Indian paradiplomacy typically involves development 
cooperation like farming.  On the national level, cooperation is more centered on issues 
like national defense, counter-terrorism and space/scientific cooperation. At the that 
(federal) level, the strength of the India-Israel relationship rests on interactions through 
several branches of government. For example, India’s Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperation and its Ministry of Defense manage bilateral working relationships with 
their Israeli counterparts. Kumaraswamy (2010) asserts India and Israel do not portray 
their relationship as an alliance, but instead a friendship. Regardless of how the 
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relationship is branded, it is difficult to deny the significant role the military and 
agriculture sectors in bilateral interactions both before and after normalization of 
relations. Kumar (2014) contends Israel was very aggressive in efforts to make inroads 
into Indian public opinion. At the same time India looked for technical solutions. These 
two interests appear to converge and translate into extensive cooperation in farming, 
national defense issues, and other areas. 
 
INDIA-ISRAEL SHARED AND CONVERGING OF INTERESTS  
 
No doubt India and Israel have a wide scope of mutual interests, and the base of 
cooperation in various sectors has been expanding over the years. When it comes to 
defense cooperation, Withington (2001) contends each country has something the other 
needs. India seeks to upgrade its military, while Israel looks to secure a part in a big 
lucrative market. Israel’s military equipment is battle proven offering India an array of 
supply sources, but equally important a way to lower reliance on other weapons suppliers 
like post-Cold War Russia. Furthermore, Indian-Israeli military cooperation gained 
special significance in lieu of Washington’s arms sanctions imposed on New Delhi after 
the series of Indian underground nuclear tests. Withington (2001) suggests India’s move 
to formalizing relations with Israeli was in part motivated by the wish to increase 
cooperation in the security sector. 
With the start of full formal relations in 1992, India and Israel began a partnership 
in aerospace, which came after an Israeli industry delegation visited India. In the 
following years, multiple military equipment deals were signed. For example, in 1995 
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when Israeli avionics and surveillance systems were used to upgrade the performance of 
aging Soviet era jets, the deal marked India's first major military technology transfer from 
Israel. Also, in 1995, Israel and India agreed over the sale of Harpy Reconnaissance 
Drones (like those sold to China but later stopped under US pressure). Later, India also 
sought Israeli Barak naval defense missiles. Barak anti-missile defense systems are 
designed for warships. 
A scandal associated with the acquisition of the Barak system ensued starting in 
2001, involving an investigation and arrest of senior Indian officials over bribery 
allegations. Eventually, the case was closed due to insufficient evidence without 
damaging Indian-Israeli relations. Other notable military transactions include the 2004 
sale to India of Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS). As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Israel cancelled the sale of the Phalcon system to 
China. Abadi (2015) notes that India received Israeli equipment, which the US opposed 
transferring to China. In other words, India received what China did not obtain from 
Israel. India also got unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), surveillance radars and small 
weapons like sniper and assault rifles. 
Israel and India have also collaborated extensively in counter terrorism. In 1994, 
India expressed interest in Israeli surveillance technologies, which can track human 
movement and could be used on the Indian-Pakistan Kashmiri frontier. In 2000 the Indian 
Home Minister Advani visited Israel and looked at the workings of monitoring systems 
deployed on the Israeli-Lebanese border. The two countries also set up the India-Israel 
Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counter Terrorism. This is a bilateral forum in which 
both sides meet regularly to discuss counter terrorism measures on regional and global 
 
 239 
levels. Discussions tend to cover state sponsored terrorism and the prevention of transfer 
of weapons to terrorists. India has routinely suggested Pakistan has had a hand in 
supporting radical Islamic groups. Israel made similar accusations about Iran’s relations 
with Palestinian organizations like HAMAS, which Israel and the US label a terrorist 
group. 
The exact start date of the JWG forum is unclear, but both Israeli and Indian 
foreign affairs sources characterize the 2013 gathering as the 8th annual meeting. The 
buildup and growth of Israel-India military ties has been an open secret. Nevertheless, 
both governments have mostly kept a lid on defense cooperation keeping it hidden from 
public view. Chong (2014) contends that military issues associated with Israel have been 
kept off the public agenda because a sizable minority can stir up political turmoil about 
getting too close to Israel. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, India has been hesitant about 
displaying open military ties with Israel in part because of objections in India's large 
Muslim community and also by overall worries of harm to India’s interests in the wider 
Middle East. When considering military dealings, Inbar (2014) suggests an important 
distinction when it comes to transparency between military and civilian sectors dealings. 
Civilian technology transactions generally operate in an open market, while the transfer 
of military technology usually takes place in a closed, (concealed) market out of the 
public eye. Kumaraswamy (2014) notes the military is the number one sector of 
cooperation in sheer terms of dollars. In contrast, agricultural cooperation yields the most 
in terms of number of beneficiaries.  
Military cooperation is one of the most contentious aspects of Indian-Israeli 
relations but also a matter of mutual country-to-country trust. India had concerns about 
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Israeli involvement in Chinese defense projects. In turn, Israel had concerns about India’s 
close ties with Iran, which could pose possible risks of technology forwarding. 
Technology forwarding is the passing of technology to a third party, which can be 
authorized or unauthorized by the technology producer. Furthermore, with the export of 
defense technologies, Israel had to be mindful of American concerns about arms transfers 
to India especially since Washington viewed New Delhi with concern after its 1998 
nuclear tests. 
 
2014 MODI AND ISRAEL  
 
Cooperation between India and Israel dramatically strengthened and were made 
more visible in 2014 after the election of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. When 
Modi visited Israel several years before as Chief Minister of the State of Gujarat he 
openly talked about Israel as a success story and model to be followed. In the months 
following the start of his term as Prime Minister, Israel increased the quantity of weapons 
and defense items transferred to India. In 2014, India was the largest buyer of Israeli 
military equipment. Dhume (2014) asserts increased openness in Indian-Israeli relations 
by the Modi government perhaps suggests a strategic partnership with Israel carries more 
weight for India than solidarity for the Palestinian cause. A seemingly subtle shift in 
policy may be evidenced by India’s abstention on a pivotal vote at the UN aimed at 
denouncing Israel for its 2014 military operation in Gaza. India expressed concern over 
civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip but also blamed HAMAS rocket fire into Israel calling it 
a provocation. The abstention could be seen as a diplomatic victory for Israel when 
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compared to past resolutions. For example, India voted previously at the UN to condemn 
the building of Israel’s security or separation wall in the disputed West Bank territory.  
 
SOFTER ISRAEL POLICY? 
 
Kumaraswamy (2014), Kumar (2014) and Gilboa (2014) describe India’s foreign 
policy towards the Middle East as a dichotomy, which is seemingly contradictory. While 
India broadened economic, military and scientific ties with Israel it for the most part 
simultaneously maintained pro-Palestinian policy positions on key Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict points of contention such as Israeli settlements, borders, and refugees. India’s 
voting record on the Middle East at the United Nations has not dramatically changed 
even after the establishment of formal relations with Israel. In 2012 India supported the 
Palestinian bid at the UN for observer state status in opposition to Israeli objections. 
Furthermore, Indian officials even expressed support for designating East Jerusalem as 
the capital of a proposed State of Palestine. That notion is something the leaders of Israel 
have repeatedly vowed they would never agree to as mentioned previously. However, 
there are some subtle signs of change of India’s policies at the UN even before Modi 
entered office in 2014. 
In 1985 (seven years before full formal ties), Natarajan Krishnan, India’s 
Ambassador to the UN, in a speech to the General Assembly, characterized Israel as a 
perpetrator of “acts of repression and terror, denial of fundamental rights and various 
violations of human rights.” He added, “Israel is seeking to bring about permanent 
geopolitical and demographic changes in the region at the expense of the Palestinians and 
this must be prevented”. No doubt these are punitive statements. However, in 2012 (two 
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decades after formal ties were established) Hardeep Singh Puri the Indian Ambassador to 
the U. N. maintained a somewhat critical yet moderated tone towards Israel stating, “the 
situation in the occupied Palestinian territories has been deteriorating due to settlement 
activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Those activities are creating new realities 
on the ground and threaten the very premise of a two-state solution”. He also added, “our 
Prime Minister, Mr. Manmohan Singh, reiterated India’s unwavering support for the 
Palestinian people’s struggle for a sovereign, independent, viable and united State of 
Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, living within secure and internationally 
recognized borders, side by side and at peace with Israel, as endorsed in the Arab Peace 
Initiative, the Quartet road map and relevant Security Council resolutions”. The statement 
suggests that India, like China, remains highly critical toward Israel but in a moderated 
voice. The tone might not sound the friendliest to the ears of Israeli policymakers, but can 
be considered moderate when compared to statements in pre-full formal ties times like 
the one above. The statement about the Jewish State is not exclusively critical, and it also 
accounts for Israel’s right to exist in the framework of peaceful side-by-side existence. 
India’s pro-Palestinian stance has been an understandably delicate issue in Indian-Israeli 
dialogues since the start of full diplomatic relations in 1992. Yeager (2004), points out 
India has also looked to avoid sponsoring anti-Israeli UN resolutions since forging formal 
relations in 1992 even as it continues to support the Palestinian cause at the UN. Have 
India’s political positions on the Middle East gone unchanged or has a softening of 
political policies taken place? Buttressing the above analysis, the following section 
evaluates India’s Israel policy over a span of more than two decades by drawing on a 
combination of data trends and content analysis.  
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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND DATA TRENDS  
 
Israel's ties with India, like those developed with other Asian nations including 
China, have made significant strides after more than two decades of full diplomatic 
relations. Bilateral ties have grown through a myriad of government to government, 
NGO, and commercial exchanges as technology and knowledge based collaborations 
have emerged as major features in the narrative of Indian-Israeli relations.  
   In the previous (China) chapter, several scholars interviewed for this 
dissertation expressed doubt that Israel's technology ties are somehow determinants in 
shaping the policies of other countries towards the Jewish State. The speakers notably 
spoke in general terms but implied that Israel’s technical cooperation operations bear 
little or negligible consequence in the policies of countries towards the Middle East and 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. 
Given India’s general interests in the Middle East, some scholars are skeptical 
that Israel has outright achieved political gains as a consequence of technical ties. Inbar 
(2014) discounts the prospects of political gains given Indian-Israeli technical 
collaborations, asserting that it is simply a matter of business, and has nothing to do with 
politics. Inbar, however, concedes that India, like China, would not be attracted to Israel 
if Israel had nothing of value to offer. Gilboa (2014) agrees with the notion that there is 
no direct translation from the technology transfers to political dividends since strategic 
cooperation does not extend to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but adds gains can be 
achieved in terms of trade. Gilboa (2014) also revealed that while on an academic 
research trip to India, his hosts stressed that what India says about the Palestinians in 
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international arenas is really not important, what India buys from Israel and what Israel 
and India do together is more important. Panda (2015) also throws in a measure of doubt 
regarding whether technical ties with India yield forms of soft power for Israel.  
  However, Indian-Israeli ties like Sino-Israeli relations reveal evidence 
suggesting that technical ties, while not perfectly correlated, do offer viable opportunities 
to promote bilateral relations, and by extension, open pathways to wider understandings 
between partner countries even on controversial political issues.  Said differently, non-
political technical cooperation may help to create settings, which promote forms of 
diplomatic accommodations like softer language towards Israel in international arenas.  
Seethi (2014) adds to the chorus of voices who downplay the idea that technical ties have 
directly affected New Delhi’s Middle East policy, also acknowledges India has made 
moves to balance relations in the region in response to emerging Middle East realities. 
Pant (2016) posits India has veered toward being more even handed in its approach to the 
Israel-Palestinian issue. Kumaraswamy (2014) reluctantly leaves the door open to the 
possibility of minor policy adjustments by India like the softening of diplomatic language 
toward Israeli policies in international arenas. Bitzinger (2015) suggests technology ties 
may soften Indian policies towards Israel in the context of the Palestinian Israeli conflict, 
although only to a limited extent. Bitzinger affirms that India is still committed to the 
Palestinian cause, but questions what that support actually means in more recent times 
(after 2014). In doing so, he suggests that India’s support for the Palestinians is somewhat 
murky, not as defined or solid given as it was in past periods, and has perhaps de-facto 
diminished in nature. Abadi (2015) generally agrees that technology based relations do 
not have any pull on India’s Israel policy, yet points out a decrease in anti-Israel 
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sentiments in India during the 2014 Gaza War. Regardless of the magnitude of gains for 
Israel, Israeli policymakers generally regard any diplomatic gains as gains. This notion of 
achievements was implied in a conversation with an official at the Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. India's eventual receptiveness to advance relations to full 
formal ties was in itself an achievement.  As outlined earlier, India's loss of Soviet 
support after the Cold War, coupled with economic liberalization and political reforms 
created openings for new directions in New Delhi’s foreign policies. All of these factors 
worked to advance expanded engagements with Israel, which were limited before 1992. 
Below, the chapter next considers the weight of Israel’s technology transfers in assessing 
trade, bilateral exchanges and policy towards the Middle East using data trends and 
content analysis. 
 
CONTENT ANALYSIS  
 
       The content analysis below emulates the methods used in the previous chapter. 
This chapter also utilized the qualitative summative method, which considers word 
occurrences, significance, positioning and interplay of words or concepts in statements 
made by Indian officials. It is important to reiterate that the qualitative content analysis is 
based on subjective researcher choices with regards to data labeling, classification, and 
other data filtering. Furthermore, research strategies are guided by researcher interests, 
literature content, and insights gained from conversations with experts. The strategies 
used are a product of trial and error efforts which are mindful of the study’s overall 
research constraints. 
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  An assessment of technical ties and bilateral exchanges in Indian-Israeli relations 
draws on a review of tens of thousands of articles and government sources. 
Interpretations about variations in India’s policies towards Israel/Middle East are based 
on official Indian statements at the UN over the study period (1989-2014). Since the 
dissertation draws on a significant quantity of textual data, NVivo content analysis 
software is utilized to preform the analysis. NVivo is used here in the same manner it was 
utilized in the previous chapter. Three chart categories are displayed below: Trade, 
Bilateral Exchanges, and UN Ambassador Positive/Negative Words. 
  
DATA TRENDS   
 
   The study also makes use of selected quantitative (mostly economic statistics) 
data as part of its examination of Indian-Israeli ties.  It will evaluate trade/economic 
based Comtrade data.  Also considered are data figures about bilateral exchanges in the 
form of number of official visits and treaties. To better understand the significance of the 
numbers, the datasets are visualized in the form of tables and graph charts as was also 
done in the previous China case chapter. 
 
  DATA START DATES  
 
          Please note, like in the previous chapter data collected and used for the purpose of 
analysis does not include all time periods identified in the full narrative of Indian-Israeli 
relations described above. This is the case for two main reasons. First, the analysis 
portion of study is not intended to cover the entire historical narrative of ties between 
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Israel and India. The declared analysis portion of the study period starts from 1989, a few 
years before full diplomatic relations started in 1992. Second, data availability was 
restricted. Reliable official data on trade is only documented from 1995 onward, while 
official bilateral exchanges data become available from the early 1990’s at the time when 
relations became formalized and less secretive. Though UN data in the form speeches and 
statements documenting country political positions go back decades, the study period 
begins at the end of the 1980s. Therefore, UN political textual data is collected from that 
time onward. Hence, the start dates of the data types utilized here are not the same 
because of availability limitations. However, despite this constraint the data groups do 
represent adequate overlapping time periods to enable a reasonable capability to assess 
covariance of variable trends.  
 
INDIA’S POLITICAL APPROACH TOWARDS ISRAEL/MIDDLE EAST (CONTENT ANALYSIS)  
  
The dissertation examines statements made at the UN by Indian representatives 
on Israeli-Palestinian conflict specific issues. As explained fully in the previous chapter, 
UN voting patterns should not be taken as complete testimonies to assess Israel’s 
diplomatic achievements. It is the toned-down rhetoric and the “behind the scenes” 
dynamics which likely most matter in the making of durable bilateral relations.  
The purpose of the content analysis is to assess how India’s policy on the Middle 
East has changed over the past few decades. In particular, it seeks to determine if policy 
statements are more accommodative of Israel given growing technical cooperation. As a 
first step, the names of Indian UN ambassadors who served during the study range of 
years (1989-2014) were identified. Then, ambassador name-specific searches were 
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conducted within the UN Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) 
database. As mentioned earlier, this is the forum, which features debates on the Israel-
Palestinian conflict. While the search results of ambassador name queries capture 
documents, which contain Indian ambassador statements they also include speeches made 
by representatives of other countries. This content was further filtered (coded) to isolate 
speeches by Indian representatives from those of other diplomats participating in the 
same debate session. Next, the isolated Indian diplomat-specific texts were classified by 
year dates. The classification by year dates enables the tracking of possible changes in 
India's Middle East policy on an annual basis.  
Then, with the assistance of NVivo software, a word frequency query was 
launched to determine the 1000 most common words used in debates about the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict from 1989-2014 see full list (Appendix 1). The word 
frequency results were reviewed for guidance to select a number of terms routinely used 
to describe Israeli policies in the context of the conflict with the Palestinians. The word 
selections were based on the researcher’s personal assessments, which drew on the 
scholarly literature, media reports, interview conversations, and overall first hand 
familiarity with conflict contexts (while working as TV news producer in the conflict 
region). The list of the 1000 most common words generated by NVivo in the case of 
Indian diplomat speeches is similar to the list generated by their Chinese counterparts. 
However, this list is not an exact duplication. Therefore, the pool of 1000 words in the 
case of Indian diplomats is not an exact copy of the pool of 1000 words drawn from 
speeches of Chinese representatives. 
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Selected word choices were coded as either “negative” or “positive” with regard 
to Israeli actions/policies in the conflict with the Palestinians. For example, 
“negotiations” was considered positive since it doesn’t single out Israel for criticism and 
generally used in the framework of promoting conflict resolution. However, a word like 
“aggression” is typically used to criticize Israel’s military operations and therefore would 
be coded as negative. The words selected in the positive category are peace, coexistence, 
parties, achievements, solution, and negotiations. The words selected in the negative 
category are occupied, rights, activities, settlements, military and aggression. See 
Appendix 2 for actual verbatim examples of how each (selected) word is used either in 
positive and negative contexts in comments made by Indian envoys at the UN.  
The selected sample words were cross tabulated as part of a matrix. In all, three 
matrices were produced. The first matrix features positive category words cross-
referenced against Indian ambassador statements categorized by year dates. The second 
matrix features negative category words cross-referenced against Indian ambassador 
speeches categorized by year dates.  The third matrix displays a side-by-side comparison 
of aggregate frequency sums of negative words vs. aggregate frequency sum of positive 
category words. Matrix results are visualized in the form of 3D bar graphs as shown 
below. In this way, the selected words whether projecting positive or negative notions 
can be observed for variance over the span of the study period on a year-to-year basis.     
  
POSITIVE WORDS   
 
 
  Figure 2 displays the frequency use of positive words: peace, co-existence, 
parties, achievement, solution and negotiations. These words typically allude to softer 
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attitudes towards Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 1, also 
below, offers a word frequency table displaying precise numbers of positive words.  
 
Figure 2 - India Ambassador Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014 
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Table 1 – India Ambassador Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014 
 
 
 
The positive words generally suggest steps towards peacemaking and in doing so 
imply a more balanced approach towards all sides in the conflict. In Figure 2, the word 
“peace” is more predominant in usage in the last decade, which was also the case with 
China. Other words like parties, negotiations, and solution follow similar trends. There 
are also distinct spikes in word frequencies of the featured words, especially during major 
events like conflict escalations (for example, Gaza wars of 2009 and 2014) or peace 
initiatives (for example, peace efforts in the mid-1990s). However, the frequencies of 
these terms are lower in years between such major events. It is important to note an 
obvious yet necessary point: the word frequency counts are based solely on Indian 
statements. Low frequency count does not necessarily imply Indian diplomats were less 
present during sessions. In fact, Indian representatives may have been present in debates 
but for whatever reason did not necessarily make remarks. Passive participation could 
possibly imply a form of abstention on behalf India (Gilboa, 2014). An abstention, by 
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extension, can reduce diplomatic pressure on Israel. Nevertheless, an overall upward 
trend of positive word usage is noticeable in Figure 2.  
The increase in the frequency of the word “peace” appearing, feasibly suggests a 
more restrained approach towards the conflict by India, and arguably avoids the 
perception of leaning in favor of one particular side.  The 2014 Gaza War exemplifies 
this possibility as Israel and HAMAS (the group which rules the coastal strip) took to the 
battlefield. Efforts and calls to stop the fighting produced more frequent use of the term 
“peace”. The term is an all-embracing concept usually directed at all conflict parties 
rather than merely laying blame for the violence on one particular side, namely Israel. As 
mentioned earlier, historically India has been routinely critical of Israel at the UN. Trends 
shown in Figure 2 suggests a more evenhanded approach during some distinct periods. 
 
NEGATIVE WORDS   
 
Figure 3 shows the frequency use of negative words: occupied, rights, activities, 
settlements, aggression and military. These words are typically used to express rigid 
attitudes towards Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 2, also 
below, offers a word frequency table displaying precise numbers of negative words.  
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Figure 3 - India Ambassador Negative Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014 
 
 
Table 2 - India Ambassador Negative Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014 
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 Critics of Israeli policies regularly use the word “occupied”. Usually usage of 
“occupied” signifies a strong challenge to the Jewish State’s claims over lands it seized in 
the 1967 Six-Day War.  As shown in Figure 3, the term “occupied” seems to have been 
used in equivalent proportions by Indian representatives both in the distant past, prior to 
full ties with Israel, as well as in more recent years.  As suggested earlier, India has, to 
some degree, remained pro-Palestinian. Yet the frequency usage of the word “occupied”, 
and other negative category words did not increase in 2009 as would be expected with the 
onset of a new round of fighting in Gaza during that year. The UNISPAL debates 
generated by the 2009 flare-up between Israel and HAMAS in Gaza did not increase 
rhetoric on the part of India, but did in the case of China as shown in the previous 
chapter. The fighting started in late December 2008, but extended to January 2009 before 
a ceasefire was reached. In the immediate aftermath, as the extent of damage and 
casualties emerged, charged deliberation took place at the UN. The same overall word 
frequency pattern is repeated in 2014, albeit to a lesser extent, when another Israel-Gaza 
war unfolded. This suggests a less critical approach by India in 2014 when the Indian-
Israeli relationship had shown signs of stronger bilateral cooperation. At this time, 
political uncertainty persisted across the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring, 
which started in 2011. The political instability tended to foster a more balanced policy 
vis-à-vis the region with India shying away from being too over critical about Israel. The 
2014 election of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi may have contributed a 
moderating tone since he had already developed close ties with Israel as leader of the BJP 
and as former Chief Minister of Gujarat as part of paradiplomacy initiatives.  
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The following Figure 4 shows a side-by-side comparison of the total sum of 
positive and negative category word frequencies. For a word frequency table displaying 
precise frequency numbers of terms see Appendix 3. 
 
Figure 4 - India Ambassador Negative Vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014 
 
 
Figure 4 shows a side-by-side comparison of the total sum of positive and 
negative category word frequencies. The frequency of both negative and positive 
category words has increased in more recent years. Interestingly, however, here too, as 
was the case in the previous China chapter, positive category word usage has grown 
significantly more than usage of negative category words. Put differently, this suggests an 
overall trend of greater balanced language usage by Indian representatives at the UN 
about the conflict. This does not necessarily translate into actual policy shifts in the form 
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of UN votes in support of Israel, but does suggest willingness to abstain from harsh 
criticism of the Jewish State.  
  As demonstrated throughout the chapter, technology based collaboration has 
emerged as a significant factor in Indian-Israeli ties. The section below explores whether 
the terms technology and cooperation are dominant in conversations about relations 
between the two countries. This was accomplished through an NVivo assisted analysis of 
tens of thousands of media reports, each of which simultaneously referenced India and 
Israel during the period between 1989 and 2014. Press textual data has been classified 
(coded) by year of publication. The classification was done to standardize time units of 
analysis like UN speeches data and trade data, which are also sorted on a year-by-year 
basis. The results of the analysis are visualized in Figure 5 as follows. For a word 
frequency table displaying precise numbers of terms see Appendix 4. 
Figure 5 - Israel-India Technology Word Frequencies 1988 – 2014  
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        Figure 5 above shows the word frequencies “Israeli’, “technology” and 
“cooperation”. The chart shows similar growth patterns from year to year for all 3 words. 
As the word frequency of one term grows, so does the usage of the other two words. This 
pattern implies a covariance between the terms “Israeli” and “technology” and “Israeli” 
and “cooperation”. In other words, the more Israel is referenced in stories, which include 
text, or stories about India and its relationship with the Jewish State, the more technology 
and cooperation are part of the conversation.  
 
TRADE – ISRAELI EXPORTS TO INDIA (DATA TRENDS)  
 
Israeli exports to India are important components of Israel’s diplomatic efforts 
broadly defined. Israel-India trade figures utilized here are sourced from Comtrade as in 
the pervious chapter. Comtrade is the UN trade-tracking organization in which individual 
UN member states self report on their trade with other members.  
       Annual trade or export volumes, from Israel to India are a central indicator of robust 
ties between the two countries. The trade figures considered below are limited to export 
flows from Israel. This approach is adopted since the focus of the dissertation pertains to 
gains for Israel. Comtrade statistics cover only the period 1995-2014; therefore, they do 
not correspond to the full expanse of the study period (1989-2014), yet they overlap 
enough to be meaningful measures of the scale of bilateral ties.  What follows are trade 
figures in table form (Table 3) and below in chart form (Figure 6).  
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Table 3           UN Comtrade Trade – Figures as Reported by Israel  
 
 
Year Trade Flow Reporter Partner  Trade Value (US$)  
 
1995 Export Israel India  $314,499,008.00  
 
1996 Export Israel India  $315,743,000.00  
 
1997 Export Israel India  $364,817,000.00  
 
1998 Export Israel India  $334,476,992.00  
 
1999 Export Israel India  $536,244,000.00  
 
2000 Export Israel India  $556,936,000.00  
 
2001 
 
Export 
 
Israel 
 
India 
  
$473,430,000.00  
2002 Export Israel India  $613,829,000.00  
 
2003 Export Israel India  $717,936,000.00  
 
2004 Export Israel India  $1,037,793,000.00  
 
2005 Export Israel India  $1,222,754,000.00  
 
2006 Export Israel India  $1,289,329,000.00  
 
2007 Export Israel India  $1,613,630,000.00  
 
2008 Export Israel India  $2,361,225,000.00  
 
2009 Export Israel India  $1,810,744,000.00  
 
2010 Export Israel India  $2,890,155,000.00  
 
2011 Export Israel India  $3,036,385,000.00  
 
2012 Export Israel India  $2,460,832,000.00  
 
2013 Export Israel India  $2,237,992,000.00  
  
2014 Export Israel India  $2,202,593,000.00  
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Figure 6 - Israel Exports to India 1995-2014 
Source: Comtrade (United Nations)          
 
Figure 6 (generated from Comtrade figures) generally demonstrates strong 
growth in Israeli exports to India. Growth is slow in the early years of formal relations 
but accelerates in more recent years. This pattern was also indicative in the case of Sino-
Israeli relations. The upward trend suggests a dramatic tightening of ties and contrasts 
with previous decades dominated by informal quiet interactions in the absence of full 
formal relations.   
There are also noticeable dips, in particular in 1998, 2001, 2009, 2011 and 2013 
but otherwise export trends demonstrate noteworthy gains. It is not fully clear why 
slowdowns occurred in those years. However, a financial crisis in Asia most notably in 
1997 affected countries in the Far East like South Korea and Thailand and may have also 
spilled over into the economies of South Asia in 1998 and thus also impacted economic 
engagement with India. Also an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report points to 
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overall difficulties in the global economy in 1996, which it attributes to a financial 
slowdown in Asia. 
In 2001, Israeli exports slightly decreased but picked up the next year. While 
exports figures displayed in the chart above do not include military products, the aborted 
defense deal with China (detailed in the previous chapter) may have indirectly adversely 
impacted the flow of consumer goods, which may be considered by the US and 
international treaties as dual use technologies. Such products are intended for commercial 
use but encase technologies, which can also be utilized for military purposes. These 
commodities may be in the form or hardware, software or even a chemical. This 
backdrop may have curtailed the range of Israeli goods for export even to India. Israeli 
companies, unsure if their products could be considered dual use by the US, tended to be 
more cautious about what to export for fear of being perceived as non-compliant with 
Washington’s policies. As a consequence of non-compliance, Israeli companies (whether 
private or public entities) run the risk of being barred from the lucrative US market. The 
significant decline in Israeli exports in 2009 seen in the chart above is also likely 
associated with the worldwide recession, which began the previous year (2008) and 
produced an overall international trade slowdown.  
         It should be noted that actual volumes of Israeli exports to India (like in the case of 
China) are in reality significantly higher than Comtrade data suggest. This scenario is 
realistic because Comtrade indicators are based on country self-reporting. This kind of 
reporting allows the reporting country (Israel) to omit information about the transfer of 
military commodities. As stated earlier, arms technology transfers are usually done 
secretly. Most state-to-state military transactions take place away from the public eye as 
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suggested by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI is a 
think tank that monitors armaments, arms control and disarmament. It names Israel as 
one of the few countries, which have not publically disclosed details about the export of 
defense products. On the the arms receiving side (India), Kumaraswamy (2010) points 
out the Indian government did not declassify official documents about the country’s 
external relations. This includes arms arrangements with Israel. India did introduce a 
right to information act in 2005, but the measure did not apply to documents on foreign 
policy dealings. Nevertheless, SIPRI has published independent statistics about Israeli 
military exports to India. The following chart (Figure 7) was created based on SIPRI data.   
 
Figure 7 - Israeli Arms Transfers to India 1989-2014 (in millions of US dollars)  
 
 
Source: SIPRI 
           
         The chart above shows a steady increase in Israeli military exports to India from the 
late 90s to the mid 2000s. This trend is especially noticeable in the immediate years after 
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the 1999 Kargil War between Pakistan and India. During the crisis, Israel was one of the 
few countries willing to provide weapons to India despite an arms embargo. Israel’s 
assistance opened the door for additional weapons in the following years. Given the 
challenging mountainous terrain of the battlefield, the conflict exposed deficiencies in 
India’s military defenses, prompting the need to seek new military technologies.      
After this period, a decline ensues. The slowdown may perhaps be attributed to 
the shaping of a more constrained policy by Israel on military related exports in the 
aftermath of Israeli-American tensions over controversial dealings with China. However, 
the downward trend in military exports may also be a consequence of increased joint 
Indian-Israeli ventures in the defense industry. Joint projects in the Indian-Israeli 
relationship tend to entail the setup of manufacturing production lines in India. 
Production in India may lessen the traffic of exported finished defense goods from Israel, 
and thus would not necessarily register in arms trade estimates. In 2006, Israel and India 
signed a joint development agreement to produce a medium range naval air defense 
missile (Barak). The project aimed to help India address its major air defense liabilities 
and to protect key strategic resources and assets. As noted earlier, defense sector related 
interactions are usually secret undertakings, therefore it is likely that SIPRI data might 
not fully capture the true magnitude of military exports, which opens up the possibility 
that actual export volumes of armaments could be higher. Nevertheless, the numbers in 
figure 7 suggest dealings associated with the defense sector are key components in 
Indian-Israeli relations. 
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INDIAN-ISRAELI EXCHANGES (DATA TRENDS)  
 
 Mutual exchanges are another aspect of robustness of bilateral ties. Exchanges 
for the purpose of this study are comprised of two components: mutual visits and bilateral 
treaties. Only official state sanctioned visits are considered. A list of visits was complied 
based on official Israeli and Indian government information. Exchange visits can be on 
any government level, like national, provincial, or municipal, or of other kinds, like 
academic, as long as visits are officially published by either Indian or Israeli government 
sources. A single visit exchange event is considered a single occurrence regardless of 
how many meeting encounters take place. For example, an official may meet just one or 
more counterparts on a visit. In this case the exchange would be registered as a singular 
event. The second component of mutual exchanges are Indo-Israeli bilateral agreements 
in the form of a treaty or memorandums of understanding (MOUs). The total sum of 
bilateral exchanges is the number of exchange visits plus the number of bilateral 
agreements per calendar year. See Appendix 5 for a comprehensive list of visits and 
treaties. These numbers are considered on an annual basis. Figure 8 displays the number 
of exchanges on a year-by-year basis.   
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Figure 8 – Israel-India Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1991 -2014  
 
  
Sources: India Ministry of External Affairs and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 
        Figure 8 depicts downward and upward fluctuations in the number of exchanges 
from year to year. However, overall there has been a rise in the number of exchanges in 
more recent times since the start of full ties in 1992. It is important to note that even after 
1992 India remained somewhat hesitant of openly engaging Israel. This was more the 
case under the rule of the Congress Party and less so under the leadership of Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP). Some Indian politicians, responding to competing domestic and 
international sympathies, were wary of creating a public perception of being seen as too 
close to the Jewish State. The number of exchanges illustrated in Figure 8 is a general 
trend indicator of bilateral exchanges, but they do not necessarily include an absolute or 
true tally of official visits. Gilboa (2014) notes foreign-policy activities may be concealed 
because a partner nation may be party to programs and policies in cooperation with third 
party countries that have some kind of sensitivity to relations with Israel. The numbers 
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displayed in the chart are solely based on Indian and Israeli government sources, and 
hence do not account for an inventory of private meetings which may have transpired. 
Israel and India seem to sometimes adopt opposing approaches about what and what not 
to publish about exchanges. It appears as if, on the Israeli end, policymakers seek to 
maximize the impression of gainful engagement with a major partner, perhaps with the 
aim to dispel notions, which suggest political isolation. On the Indian side, some officials 
may tend to want to minimize the significance of contacts with Israel. This may be 
evidenced in part by inconsistencies between Israeli government and Indian government 
published information on bilateral exchanges (visits and treaties). The official Israeli 
government source shows a more comprehensive list of visit exchanges between the two 
countries than the Indian government source. If you look at the Israeli government 
information, you will find a longer list of bilateral visits than listed by the Indian 
government. It is unknown if the discrepancies between Indian and Israeli government 
information about visits are perhaps simply publishing errors or part of a calculated 
policy. Nevertheless, a distinct spike in the number of exchanges occurred in the years 
just after the upgrading to full diplomatic ties. The chart also displays some “dead” spots 
when the number of exchanges registered 0 instances most notably in 1995 and 1997. 
This does not necessarily mean that exchanges did not happen. They may have indeed 
occurred, but not made public. Unlike the ties with China, Indian-Israeli relations for the 
most part stayed clear of complications and frictions. However, allegations of corruption 
and bribery dogged the important Barak missile deal between Israel and India. The vocal 
controversy over alleged irregularities and bribery could have pressed Indian officials to 
tone down public aspects of ties with Israel. Madan (2016) contends that despite growth 
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in ties, the relationship experienced periods void of many high-visibility visits from India 
to Israel.  
 
TECHNOLOGY FACTOR (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)   
 
  
         As mentioned earlier, overall Indian-Israeli relations have generally grown in terms 
of trade volumes and bilateral exchanges. India has also shown signs of shifting towards 
more neutral or balanced language regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 
international arena. Furthermore, content analysis of media materials of recent decades 
suggests technology is as dominant a theme in Indian-Israeli relations as it was in Sino-
Israeli relations. The main research question of this study explores a possible relationship, 
however loose, between technology transfers and growth of Indian-Israeli relations. To 
illustrate this possibility, a series of timeline diagrams are used to outline technology and 
knowledge sharing occurrences in the Indian-Israeli narrative at distinctive points in time. 
Overall two major time periods are distinguishable: before and after the establishment of 
full diplomatic relations in 1992.  
         
BEFORE FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1948-1992) 
 
 
         Prior to 1992, technology cooperation was less of a factor in contacts between New 
Delhi and Jerusalem. Nevertheless, Israel and India had some early contacts revolving 
around technology sharing exchanges, as Figure 9 below illustrates. For example, as 
noted previously, India sought to draw on the Israeli experience as early as 1949, during 
its first year after independence. At that time, India turned to Israel for cooperation in 
farming. Interestingly, the technical interaction happened in the immediate years even 
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before India initially recognizes Israel and allowed the opening of an Israeli consulate in 
Bombay (now Mumbai).  Despite seeming progress in relations marked by a recognition 
of Israel and the opening of a very limited Israeli consulate, early contacts did not appear 
to produce any significant advancement in ties between the two countries for some time.  
 
Figure 9 – Narrative Timeline 1948 to 1959   
 
 
 
            Nevertheless, as contentious or seemingly non-productive as the interactions 
were, Israel and India did maintain a line of communications which came to play from 
time to time in unique periods. This was the case during the India-China border conflict 
of 1962 when Israel was approached to supply weapons, which it did. In the period which 
follows, (see Figure 10) relations between Israel and India experienced a mix of notable 
high-level meetings and military related contacts. These included meetings of foreign 
ministers and the start of intelligence sharing between India’s security agency, Research 
and Analysis Wing (RAW), and the Israeli Intelligence Agency (MOSSAD).  
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Also, there were additional episodes of Israeli input in India’s military affairs--
this time by the Israelis responding to India’s outreach to secure a supply of weapons in 
the 1965 and 1971 Indian-Pakistan wars. Indian-Israeli exchanges during times of trouble 
have tended to appear isolated and inconsequential in terms of bringing the two countries 
closer in the short run. In the long term such contacts have, at the very least, helped create 
a template for further interactions involving military issues and overall technical 
collaborations. In a sense, even quiet and secret interactions can set precedent and amass 
an inventory of collaborations, which can be leveraged to legitimize future open 
cooperation once, conditions permit.  Once Israel and India upgraded their relations in 
1992, it was expected that defense ties would play a central role in bilateral cooperation 
based on past history. Indeed, that is what happened and continues in more recent times.  
 
Figure 10 – Narrative Timeline 1960s to 1977   
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           In the lead up to expanded ties, Figure 11 illustrates key interactions in the late 
1980s--contacts leading to eventual establishment of full formal ties. This includes more 
cooperation in agriculture and top level meetings. In this period, Rajiv Gandhi becomes 
the leader of India in the aftermath of the assassination of his mother Indira Gandhi. As 
Prime Minister he publicly met with Israeli officials, most notably meeting Israeli Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres in New York in 1985. He also met with American pro-Israel 
groups. Another sign of toward normalization came in 1989 when India allowed the 
upgrading of the Israeli consulate in Mumbai. 
 
Figure 11 – Narrative Timeline Mid-1980s to 1992
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FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1992 AND BEYOND  
 
        
After the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992, Indian-Israeli technical 
cooperation accelerated.  In the first decade of formal ties, levels of cooperation in the 
defense and agricultural sectors rose. The period also marks more visible forms of 
cooperation. In 1993, just a year after the start of formal ties, the first Indian-Israeli 
agriculture agreement was signed (see Figure 12). Given the history of relations, the 
agreement is not the first agricultural interaction between the two countries. However, the 
agreement did formalize a partnership on a larger scale in an area of great significance in 
terms of social and economic benefits to ordinary Indian citizens. The 1993 agreement 
would introduce new Israeli farming techniques adapted to local Indian conditions, but 
also be the start in a series of major agriculture collaborations to come such as the 1996 
Indo-Israel Research and Development Farm.  
Figure 12 – Narrative Timeline 1992 to 1999   
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This time span also saw a noteworthy expansion of military technology transfers 
especially given the 1999 Kargil conflict. The war created more opportunities for Israeli 
arms sales, but more importantly, set the stage for turning Israel into a major armaments 
supplier and joint venture collaborator in the defense industry. During this period, official 
trade data (UN/Comtrade) become available as shown in Figure 13, below. So while 
Israeli transfers activities increased, volumes of Israeli commercial exports to India too 
echoed a general trend upwards as well.   
 
Figure 13 – Israel Exports to India 1995-1999 
 
 
     
        Bilateral exchanges in terms of number of treaties and visits showed some growth 
during the initial honeymoon period after the establishment of full diplomatic relations 
(see Figure 14 below). There are also years in which no activity was registered such as in 
1992 and 1995. In the realm of Indian-Israeli relations, the existence of formal ties did 
not always translate into public bilateral engagement. The visibility of the relationship 
between India and Israel has historically oscillated up and down. The party in power in 
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India was a major factor in determining these oscillations.  During the majority of this 
time period, the Congress Party ruled India. Traditionally, the Congress Party has 
minimized the public display of relations with Israel. This period also saw the beginning 
of regular, high level interactions between the two countries when Israeli President, Ezer 
Weizmann, visited India in 1996. 
Figure 14 – Israel-India Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1991-1999  
 
 
Furthermore, Figure 15 below suggests an overall shift in the type of language 
used by Indian representatives during UN debates about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The chart indicates the easing of rhetoric directed at Israel by depicting a higher 
frequency count of positive terms versus negative terms as defined earlier. While 
language used is not devoid of criticism towards Israel, it occurred in moderated tones 
and generally avoided only targeting Israeli policies.  
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Figure 15 - India Ambassador Negative Vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 1999  
 
 
        Nevertheless, Israeli military technology transfers to India began to pick up after the 
early 2000s (see figure 16). As the movement of armaments increased, India saw the first 
visit by an Israeli Prime Minister. At this time, security matters were a prominent focus 
of ties between the two countries. The very visible visit came while the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) was in power. The Hindu linked BJP tended to favor wider ties with Israel. In 
fact, in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001 India’s BJP government 
concurred with Israel’s assertion of growing threats especially from radical Islamic 
groups. In addition to security matters, growing cooperation in agriculture was a major 
topic of discussion between India and Israel.  
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Figure 16 – Narrative Timeline 2000 to mid-2000s   
 
 
 
During this period, the trend line in Figure 17 below shows Israeli commercial 
exports to India demonstrating strong steady gains from 2000 to 2005. This is an 
impressive increase of more than 100 percent.    
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Figure 17 – Israel Exports to India 1999-2005 
 
 
        In this period there was also an increase of bilateral exchanges as shown in Figure 
18 below. This is noticeable just a year after the Kargil War and Israel’s crucial supply of 
arms in the conflict. Interestingly, prior to the conflict, there were no publicized trips of 
senior Indian officials to Israel despite having full diplomatic ties for eight years.  
However, after the crisis in 2000, BJP leader L.K. Advani visited Israel, becoming the 
first senior Indian minister to do so since 1992.  The visit came a year before Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon’s historic trip to New Delhi. Also in the same year, multiple 
bilateral agreements were signed. In 2004, the Congress Party returned to power. Despite 
a more cautious approach towards Israel in comparison to the former BJP led 
government, the growth of technical relations was not hindered.   
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Figure 18 – Israel-India Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1999 -2005   
 
 
       Additionally, this same period from 1999 to 2005 witnessed a more moderated and 
balanced approach in terms of language used at the UN regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. This is implied by a higher frequency of positive terms versus negative terms in 
the chart below (Figure 19).  
Figure 19 - India Ambassador Negative Vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1999 - 2005  
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The period shown in figure 20 below illustrates milestones from 2005 to 2014. 
During this time, India and Israel increased their collaboration in the areas of agriculture 
and defense. Cooperation in these sectors not only increased in terms of volume but also 
in terms breadth of collaboration. Several joint Indian-Israeli agriculture centers were 
planned and initiated across India as part of an extensive multi-year plan. Furthermore, in 
2007, the two countries moved beyond just the transfer of military equipment. India and 
Israel set in motion a new level of engagement in defense, working on advanced weapons 
as a part of joint production in India. Moreover, in 2011, the Arab Spring spread 
instability across the Middle East. The unrest spurred a re-assessment in India about its 
ties in the region and with Israel. As response to the changing political situation in the 
Middle East New Delhi looked to further foster relations with countries in the region 
including Israel, Gulf States but also Israel’s major foe, Iran. Toward the end of this 
period, the BJP’s Narendra Modi became Prime Minister. His election spurred more open 
ties and indications of political softening towards Israel.  
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Figure 20 – Narrative Timeline Mid-2000s to 2014   
 
 
        During this time period, Israeli commercial exports to India peaked in 2011 as figure 
21 below shows. There was a moderate declining trend after 2011. However, this 
decrease appears not specific to exports to India. In the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, 
overall total Israeli exports slowed in response to global economic uncertainty at the time.  
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Figure 21 – Israel Exports to India 2005-2014 
   
 
 
        During this period, bilateral exchanges were generally dynamic but at variable levels 
(see Figure 22 below). There was a significant spike in exchanges in 2011 coinciding 
with unrest across the Middle East which may have challenged India’s interests in the 
region. Noteworthy exchanges include visits by Israeli Ministers of Internal Security and 
Agriculture to India. In turn, the Chief Minister of the Indian State of Haryana and the 
Indian Minister of Communications and Information Technology visited Israel. 
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Figure 22 – Israel-India Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 2005-2014  
 
In 2005, India and Israel agreed to a research and development cooperation pact 
focusing on specialized technologies covering issues like nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
space, water management and non-conventional energy sources. In the same period, we 
see in Figure 23 below that India’s language at the UN with regard to the Israeli - 
Palestinian conflict shows a higher frequency of positive terms (softer on Israel) than 
negative terms. As mentioned, this trend takes place at the same time as a growth in 
technical collaboration, especially in the field of agriculture, through the setup of multiple 
joint demonstration farms and defense production projects.     
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Figure 23 - India Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 2005 - 2014 
 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   
  
The chapter reviewed India’s geography, recent history, and political and 
economic systems. It looked at how these aspects of India tie into national vulnerabilities 
(national security and food production/agriculture) and created by extension opportunities 
for international engagement and partnerships with Israel in particular. Also, mutual 
interests and milestones in Indian-Israeli relations were considered by drawing on 
primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included expert interviews, while 
secondary sources included scholarly literature, UN documents and news media content 
spanning decades. The chapter sketched the mostly sluggish and secretive progress 
 
 282 
towards full diplomatic relations from 1948 to 1992. It also examined the growth of 
relations after the 1992 opening of diplomatic missions in India and Israel. In addition, 
distinct research methods were outlined.  
Indian-Israeli contacts, which began discreetly, included forms of knowledge 
sharing mainly in agriculture and security. India quietly benefited from ties with Israel 
but held back from developing an open relationship. The prospects of full formal ties 
between India and Israel were frustrated by Cold War politics, pro-Palestinian sentiments 
in India’s large Muslim community, and New Delhi’s need to maintain sturdy ties in the 
Arab world. India routinely demonstrated a pro-Palestinian stance but at the same time 
received Israeli intelligence and military assistance during conflicts with China in 1962 
and with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. After the Cold War ended, India’s policies were less 
ideologically driven and transitioned to a more pragmatic and balanced approach towards 
the Middle East and Israel.  
          Once India and Israel established full diplomatic relations in 1992, bilateral 
cooperation accelerated. Israel and India have developed robust open relations in terms of 
growing trade, political, and cultural exchanges. The two countries have also nurtured a 
better understanding of the other’s political conditions and constraints. India’s economic 
liberalization and political transformations of past decades opened pathways for a 
significant expansion of ties with Israel. Israel’s technical accomplishments and 
experience offered tools which were useful in coping with the challenges faced by India 
amid rapidly growing populations and mounting military threats. Against this 
background, Israel and India expanded collaborations in a broad range of sectors, 
including agriculture, science/technology and military/national security.      
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In essence, a convergence of interests brought India and Israel closer together with 
India’s need to advance critical sectors like agriculture and defense on the one hand, and 
Israel’s desire to expand its international outreach on the other. For India, technology ties 
with the West and Israel aimed at helping to improve standards of living and advancing 
the country’s competitiveness in the global economy. India looked to confront food 
production and national security shortcomings. These are two areas in which Israel has 
gained a reputation for its expertise. Nevertheless, on the political front, India adopted a 
two-track Middle East policy. One track included fostering ties with Israel, and a parallel 
track included managing ties with the wider Middle East.  
Knowledge and technical cooperation proved to be notable hallmarks in bilateral 
ties both before and after the start of full formal relations. In absolute terms, because of 
its very small size, Israel is a negligible market for Indian goods when compared with 
India’s other trading partners. However, India offers a major opportunity in the way of 
large markets for Israeli goods and cooperation for Israeli institutions and hi-tech 
companies. Some scholars interviewed have loosely discounted the notion that technical 
ties could impact India’s Middle East policies. Indeed, despite robust bilateral ties, New 
Delhi has maintained support of the Palestinian cause. However, in more recent times 
India appears to be less vocal in outright condemnation of Israel, adopting a more 
middle-of-the-road stance by use of more moderated language in UN debates about the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.    
A combination of trade data trends (1995-2014) and NVivo assisted content 
analysis of media sources and UN documents (1989-2014) infer technology transfers 
have helped create settings, which help promote bilateral dialogues, softer images of 
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Israel, wider collaborations and growing commerce. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
since the election of Prime Minster Narendra Modi in 2014, India has demonstrated more 
political understanding for Israel, shying away from its traditional diplomatic policies 
related to Middle East issues. Overall, India supports Israel’s right to defend itself, but 
does so in a fashion that does not harm its other interests in the Middle East. Perhaps, on 
the surface, it is difficult to pinpoint outright dramatic political policy shifts towards 
Israel as a result of overall bilateral technical cooperation, however, one would be remiss 
to ignore the immense value of vigorous trade along with military and scientific 
collaborations.  
To summarize, India initially had irregular and private contacts with Israel, but 
later advanced to formal open ties. Changes in international and Indian politics facilitated 
Israel’s ability to broaden her outreach to India. Technology sharing was a vehicle for 
contacts and exchanges between Israel and India before and after the establishment of full 
formal relations. Technical ties mostly addressed matters in areas like the military and 
agriculture, and came about as a product of the convergence of interests between the two 
countries. Technology cooperation in one area helped to open new areas of collaboration. 
Formal relations also produced extensive cooperation between Israel and individual 
Indian states at sub state levels (state governments) as part of paradiplomacy.  
It was postulated at the start of this chapter that specific intervening variables 
could perhaps foster or impede the vitality of connections between the independent 
(technology transfer) and dependent variables (trade, exchanges and policies towards 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict). What follows is a summary of how the intervening variables 
played a role in Indian-Israeli relations: 
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• Technology transfer addresses priorities. India wanted to find ways to increase 
agricultural/food output while combatting water scarcity. These issues compelled 
India to turn to Israel given the latter’s agricultural experience and produced a 
myriad of contacts and collaborations. 
• Security/military/terror threats. India sought Israel’s experience in intelligence 
sharing, upgrading of Soviet armaments, counter terrorism, and military 
hardware.  
• Access to the US through Israeli channels. There are indications that this 
intervening variable maybe a factor in Indian-Israeli relations but indirectly. 
India’s ties to Israel have helped create better access to the American Jewish 
Community and more importantly the pro-Israel lobby group, the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee. (AIPAC) which has worked to shape US foreign 
policy.   
• Geo-Political Shifts. There have been domestic changes (rise of BJP) and 
changes in India’s foreign policies as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, 
and changes in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. 
 
        All of these have either hindered ties or opened opportunities for (further) 
contacts between India and Israel. Since technical ties have been central aspects in 
Indian-Israeli relations, it can be argued that Israeli technology offerings were and are 
sources of attraction to Israel in the context of Nye’s soft power.   
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APPENDIX 1 
1000 most frequently used words in debates on Israeli-Palestinian conflict at UN  
India Ambassador Word Frequency  
Word Count 
Palestinian 491 
India 463 
Peace 435 
Israel 313 
Palestine 266 
People 218 
Also 206 
east 204 
international 196 
process 177 
united 176 
region 170 
support 162 
security 159 
situation 156 
council 149 
state 148 
middle 141 
israeli 138 
violence 138 
nations 134 
Parties 119 
Settlement 118 
Community 116 
General 114 
humanitarian 111 
Efforts 107 
Conflict 106 
Side 103 
Arab 102 
Gaza 102 
comprehensive 100 
Solution 100 
Political 98 
Must 94 
Authority 93 
Resolution 88 
Two 85 
Just 79 
Activities 77 
Assistance 77 
development 77 
Resolutions 76 
Within 75 
negotiations 74 
Including 72 
President 72 
Quartet 70 
Talks 70 
Hope 69 
Issues 69 
Dialogue 66 
palestinians 66 
Minister 63 
Time 63 
Recent 62 
End 61 
Jerusalem 61 
Year 61 
Assembly 60 
government 60 
Secretary 60 
Need 59 
west 58 
important 57 
million 57 
occupied 57 
concerned 56 
years 55 
states 54 
economic 53 
lasting 53 
progress 53 
recognized 53 
since 52 
cause 51 
road 51 
building 50 
construction 50 
territories 50 
towards 50 
based 49 
continue 49 
prime 49 
syria 49 
action 48 
full 48 
syrian 48 
continued 47 
direct 47 
map 47 
countries 46 
last 46 
sides 46 
viable 46 
issue 45 
living 45 
one 45 
secure 45 
solidarity 45 
call 44 
continuing 44 
supported 44 
borders 43 
concern 43 
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like 43 
independent 42 
bank 41 
necessary 41 
conference 40 
occupation 40 
rights 40 
singh 40 
new 39 
status 39 
take 39 
national 38 
tracks 38 
acts 37 
final 37 
legitimate 37 
long 37 
peaceful 37 
relevant 37 
blockade 36 
called 36 
measures 36 
1967 35 
day 35 
taken 35 
therefore 35 
today 35 
essential 34 
first 34 
relief 34 
remain 34 
resumption 34 
membership 33 
steps 33 
human 32 
initiative 32 
may 32 
past 32 
question 32 
territory 32 
loss 31 
made 31 
Non 31 
Sovereign 31 
Agreement 30 
Aspirations 30 
infrastructure 30 
Negotiated 30 
Report 30 
representative 30 
Arafat 29 
Civilians 29 
Delegation 29 
developments 29 
Forward 29 
Immediate 29 
Lebanese 29 
Part 29 
Projects 29 
Puri 29 
Statement 29 
Capital 28 
commitment 28 
Country 28 
Meeting 28 
Movement 28 
Remains 28 
Right 28 
Without 28 
Expressed 27 
implementation 27 
Land 27 
Serious 27 
Struggle 27 
Thank 27 
Training 27 
Well 27 
World 27 
Believe 26 
Durable 26 
However 26 
Lives 26 
Permanent 26 
Remained 26 
return 26 
september 26 
trust 26 
2012 25 
242 25 
338 25 
activity 25 
affairs 25 
allow 25 
budgetary 25 
decision 25 
law 25 
lead 25 
lebanon 25 
member 25 
strip 25 
wall 25 
work 25 
1973 24 
current 24 
deep 24 
life 24 
south 24 
terrorism 24 
unrwa 24 
actions 23 
addressed 23 
establishment 23 
fact 23 
leadership 23 
month 23 
restrictions 23 
self 23 
set 23 
welcome 23 
achieve 22 
basis 22 
consistently 22 
crisis 22 
debate 22 
endorsed 22 
force 22 
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hardeep 22 
held 22 
january 22 
military 22 
near 22 
organization 22 
population 22 
positive 22 
resume 22 
settlements 22 
various 22 
africa 21 
ago 21 
areas 21 
gharekhan 21 
ongoing 21 
several 21 
special 21 
step 21 
withdrawal 21 
come 20 
express 20 
financial 20 
given 20 
institutions 20 
lands 20 
needs 20 
observer 20 
occasion 20 
principles 20 
provide 20 
reiterate 20 
services 20 
stability 20 
technical 20 
way 20 
achieving 19 
address 19 
agency 19 
continues 19 
contribution 19 
early 19 
Even 19 
Fully 19 
Importance 19 
Many 19 
Met 19 
Months 19 
Opportunity 19 
Problems 19 
Result 19 
Resulting 19 
Stop 19 
Strongly 19 
Asia 18 
Attention 18 
Confidence 18 
Cooperation 18 
Future 18 
Ground 18 
History 18 
Implement 18 
Let 18 
Make 18 
memorandum 18 
November 18 
Open 18 
Principle 18 
Refugees 18 
See 18 
Abbas 17 
Accordance 17 
Achieved 17 
Adversely 17 
Always 17 
appreciation 17 
Context 17 
Cycle 17 
Deeply 17 
determination 17 
Difficult 17 
Ensure 17 
Find 17 
Foreign 17 
led 17 
nation 17 
number 17 
opinion 17 
pledged 17 
reiterated 17 
resources 17 
role 17 
sharma 17 
use 17 
works 17 
along 16 
become 16 
brazil 16 
briefing 16 
condemned 16 
convinced 16 
deportees 16 
elections 16 
equal 16 
illegal 16 
indeed 16 
israelis 16 
note 16 
noted 16 
sense 16 
social 16 
soon 16 
stalemate 16 
vote 16 
welcomed 16 
000 15 
2002 15 
affecting 15 
agreements 15 
application 15 
attacks 15 
ceasefire 15 
complete 15 
court 15 
despite 15 
entire 15 
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every 15 
exercise 15 
extended 15 
failed 15 
golan 15 
goods 15 
great 15 
help 15 
innocent 15 
june 15 
leading 15 
move 15 
nambiar 15 
negotiating 15 
now 15 
outside 15 
particularly 15 
per 15 
period 15 
problem 15 
requirements 15 
resolve 15 
respect 15 
severe 15 
sheikh 15 
table 15 
tragic 15 
urgent 15 
wish 15 
allowed 14 
approach 14 
april 14 
back 14 
bring 14 
capacity 14 
civilian 14 
collective 14 
conclusion 14 
convening 14 
critical 14 
cultural 14 
deal 14 
Delay 14 
Democratic 14 
Emergency 14 
Exacerbated 14 
Far 14 
Following 14 
Hoped 14 
Increased 14 
Interim 14 
Madrid 14 
Meaningful 14 
Members 14 
Message 14 
Much 14 
Needed 14 
Order 14 
Outcome 14 
Path 14 
Peoples 14 
Position 14 
Possible 14 
programmes 14 
Put 14 
Reached 14 
reconciliation 14 
Related 14 
Summit 14 
Unilateral 14 
Unwavering 14 
Visit 14 
Access 13 
Addition 13 
Agreed 13 
Almost 13 
Assist 13 
Centre 13 
Complex 13 
coordination 13 
Draft 13 
Effort 13 
equally 13 
events 13 
favour 13 
geneva 13 
implementing 13 
justice 13 
large 13 
legal 13 
material 13 
mukerji 13 
mutual 13 
objective 13 
obligations 13 
october 13 
others 13 
plan 13 
required 13 
restraint 13 
resulted 13 
seriously 13 
stated 13 
suffering 13 
three 13 
view 13 
vision 13 
adopted 12 
aimed 12 
already 12 
best 12 
border 12 
clear 12 
contributed 12 
contributing 12 
ease 12 
enable 12 
facing 12 
goal 12 
grave 12 
hard 12 
health 12 
impact 12 
increasing 12 
independence 12 
july 12 
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justification 12 
late 12 
matter 12 
mission 12 
normal 12 
offered 12 
parts 12 
policy 12 
prosperity 12 
provision 12 
quest 12 
recently 12 
recognition 12 
reconstruction 12 
regional 12 
religious 12 
resolved 12 
session 12 
sharm 12 
signed 12 
unity 12 
vocational 12 
weapons 12 
1397 11 
act 11 
aligned 11 
among 11 
area 11 
authorities 11 
began 11 
cent 11 
clearly 11 
common 11 
create 11 
deterioration 11 
document 11 
established 11 
factions 11 
finding 11 
fund 11 
group 11 
interest 11 
Join 11 
Line 11 
Live 11 
means 11 
meet 11 
mutually 11 
paris 11 
present 11 
previous 11 
Processes 11 
Reach 11 
Realization 11 
Regard 11 
Release 11 
Renewed 11 
Reports 11 
Response 11 
Results 11 
Rise 11 
Source 11 
Terms 11 
Track 11 
understandings 11 
Unifil 11 
unprecedented 11 
1992 10 
1993 10 
1998 10 
2000 10 
2003 10 
2011 10 
Atmosphere 10 
Basic 10 
Begin 10 
Bilateral 10 
Boundaries 10 
Build 10 
Committed 10 
Committee 10 
Contribute 10 
Core 10 
Creating 10 
Decades 10 
Destruction 10 
Elements 10 
environment 10 
Envisaged 10 
Forces 10 
Framework 10 
Gandhi 10 
Genuine 10 
Give 10 
Goals 10 
Historic 10 
Holding 10 
Icrc 10 
Imperative 10 
Incidents 10 
Information 10 
Involved 10 
Joint 10 
Killing 10 
Lack 10 
Liberation 10 
Lift 10 
Links 10 
Lost 10 
Might 10 
Ministers 10 
Multilateral 10 
Nearly 10 
Office 10 
Outset 10 
overwhelming 10 
Personnel 10 
Place 10 
Poverty 10 
Power 10 
Reaching 10 
Ready 10 
Reason 10 
responsibility 10 
Roadblocks 10 
Schools 10 
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Sen 10 
Serve 10 
Share 10 
Significant 10 
Sincere 10 
Supports 10 
Thereby 10 
Unless 10 
Urge 10 
Washington 10 
Yesterday 10 
1515 9 
1988 9 
425 9 
Added 9 
Advisory 9 
Agenda 9 
arrangements 9 
Avoid 9 
Beginning 9 
Believes 9 
Closures 9 
Concerns 9 
Conditions 9 
Consistent 9 
Coordinator 9 
demonstrated 9 
deteriorating 9 
Dignity 9 
Discussion 9 
Earlier 9 
Education 9 
encouraging 9 
Facilitate 9 
Faith 9 
Fields 9 
Focus 9 
Followed 9 
Four 9 
Freedom 9 
Friendship 9 
Good 9 
Hamas 9 
Hopeful 9 
Inalienable 9 
Inclusive 9 
Increase 9 
internationally 9 
Kamalesh 9 
Launched 9 
Leaders 9 
Manmohan 9 
Option 9 
Overall 9 
Persons 9 
Register 9 
Relations 9 
Restart 9 
Spirit 9 
Sponsored 9 
Standing 9 
Statements 9 
statesmanship 9 
Steadfast 9 
Strong 9 
Supplies 9 
Taking 9 
Technology 9 
Threat 9 
Times 9 
Together 9 
Urging 9 
Vital 9 
1978 8 
Advocated 8 
Afghanistan 8 
Annual 8 
Apart 8 
Appeal 8 
Believed 8 
Bid 8 
Bonds 8 
Cessation 8 
circumstances 8 
Close 8 
congratulate 8 
Consider 8 
Cost 8 
Counter 8 
Courage 8 
Damage 8 
Due 8 
Earliest 8 
Elected 8 
emergencies 8 
Encouraged 8 
Ending 8 
Erode 8 
Establishing 8 
Excessive 8 
Face 8 
February 8 
Firm 8 
Form 8 
Forum 8 
Functioning 8 
Groups 8 
Halt 8 
Hardship 8 
Heavy 8 
High 8 
Hostilities 8 
Indian 8 
Inter 8 
Letter 8 
Meanwhile 8 
Meetings 8 
Next 8 
Paragraph 8 
Play 8 
Plo 8 
Presidency 8 
Property 8 
Public 8 
Quickly 8 
Rather 8 
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Reaffirmed 8 
Recognize 8 
Regarding 8 
Resource 8 
Society 8 
Sovereignty 8 
Submitted 8 
Supporting 8 
Symbol 8 
Territorial 8 
Unarmed 8 
understanding 8 
Unfortunate 8 
Urged 8 
Voted 8 
1996 7 
2004 7 
2010 7 
799 7 
Addressing 7 
Affected 7 
Agencies 7 
Alia 7 
Announced 7 
Arabs 7 
Attack 7 
Bear 7 
Certain 7 
Changes 7 
Children 7 
Collapse 7 
Condemn 7 
Conducted 7 
Control 7 
Disputes 7 
Easing 7 
Endeavor 7 
Escalation 7 
Eschew 7 
Essentially 7 
Exacerbate 7 
Extend 7 
Extremist 7 
Faced 7 
Families 7 
Friendly 7 
Frustration 7 
Fulfil 7 
Homeland 7 
Hour 7 
Impasse 7 
Larger 7 
Level 7 
Mahatma 7 
Major 7 
Modern 7 
Momentum 7 
Moral 7 
Natural 7 
Oslo 7 
Party 7 
Premise 7 
Putting 7 
Reality 7 
Regrettable 7 
Saudi 7 
Seek 7 
Separation 7 
Series 7 
Serry 7 
Shah 7 
Short 7 
Shown 7 
Signing 7 
Southern 7 
Spiral 7 
strengthened 7 
Task 7 
Tensions 7 
Terrorist 7 
Tradition 7 
transformation 7 
Undermine 7 
undermining 7 
Undertaking 7 
Utmost 7 
Wider 7 
Wisdom 7 
Women 7 
Yet 7 
1997 6 
2005 6 
Abiding 6 
Able 6 
Accept 6 
Accords 6 
achievement 6 
Adoption 6 
Although 6 
Ambassador 6 
Annex 6 
Annually 6 
Asoke 6 
Available 6 
Behalf 6 
Break 6 
Chairman 6 
Channels 6 
Chemical 6 
Closely 6 
Coexistence 6 
communiqué 6 
Completely 6 
Concrete 6 
Conducive 6 
Connection 6 
consequences 6 
considerable 6 
consideration 6 
Constraints 6 
Convey 6 
Conveyed 6 
Creation 6 
Credible 6 
Crossing 6 
Crucial 6 
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Danger 6 
Dated 6 
Demands 6 
demonstrate 6 
Deprivation 6 
Described 6 
Deteriorate 6 
Differences 6 
Direction 6 
disproportionate 6 
Donor 6 
Doubt 6 
Economy 6 
Effective 6 
Egypt 6 
Enduring 6 
Engage 6 
Engaged 6 
Exchange 6 
Existing 6 
Expressing 6 
Expulsion 6 
External 6 
Firmly 6 
Formation 6 
Forums 6 
Fragile 6 
Frame 6 
Free 6 
Freezing 6 
fundamental 6 
Grievances 6 
Hardships 6 
immediately 6 
Improve 6 
indiscriminate 6 
Insecurity 6 
Institution 6 
intensification 6 
Interested 6 
Interests 6 
Keeping 6 
Largely 6 
legality 6 
library 6 
looked 6 
mahmoud 6 
manjeev 6 
manner 6 
militant 6 
moment 6 
nature 6 
nehru 6 
official 6 
outstanding 6 
passing 6 
peres 6 
personal 6 
positions 6 
potential 6 
prevail 6 
prospects 6 
provided 6 
provisions 6 
pursuit 6 
quarterly 6 
reaffirm 6 
Real 6 
realize 6 
realizing 6 
reasons 6 
redouble 6 
reforms 6 
reliance 6 
require 6 
requires 6 
resolving 6 
retribution 6 
Risk 6 
river 6 
school 6 
similar 6 
smooth 6 
stalemated 6 
stands 6 
still 6 
stock 6 
stood 6 
strategic 6 
temporary 6 
tension 6 
threaten 6 
ties 6 
twice 6 
undertaken 6 
valid 6 
visited 6 
water 6 
withdraw 6 
wye 6 
2013 5 
absence 5 
absolute 5 
abu 5 
acceptable 5 
account 5 
announcement 5 
approximately 5 
arms 5 
aspect 5 
assumption 5 
august 5 
away 5 
beirut 5 
beneficial 5 
beyond 5 
blockades 5 
broken 5 
brought 5 
calling 5 
calls 5 
calm 5 
carefully 5 
cease 5 
central 5 
cherished 5 
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civilization 5 
commitments 5 
condemnation 5 
confronting 5 
consolidate 5 
consolidated 5 
continuation 5 
cooperative 5 
courageous 5 
course 5 
cradle 5 
crises 5 
cross 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2  
 
Verbatim samples positive and negative word category entries. 
 
Positive Category  
  
Ambassador Mukerji (India): 2013  
“Peace”  
India has consistently supported a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue with 
a view to achieving a sovereign, independent, viable and united State of Palestine, living 
within secure and recognized borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, side by side and 
at peace with Israel, as endorsed in various Security  
Council resolutions and the Quartet road map. 
 
“Coexistence”  
Ambassador Sen (India): 2006  
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It is our firm belief that a negotiated outcome of this longstanding conflict is the only way 
to ensure long-term peace, security and stability in the region, leading to the 
establishment of a viable, united and sovereign State of Palestine, living in peaceful 
coexistence and harmony with the State of Israel. 
 
“Parties”  
Asoke Kumar Mukerji (India) 2014  
His Government continued to support Palestine by contributing directly and indirectly 
through UNRWA and other means in construction and development. “An eye for an eye 
will make one man blind,” he said quoting Mahatma Gandhi, encouraging the parties to 
return to the negotiating table and resume their dialogue towards peace. 
 
“Solution” 
Mr. Mukerji (India) 2013  
Those activities are creating new realities on the ground, threatening the very premise of 
a two State solution. “ 
 
“Negotiations”  
Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri (India) 2011 
Developments in the Middle East since February underline the need to reinvigorate the 
search for that comprehensive peace, while the countries in the region undertake 
inclusive political processes and implement reforms to meet the legitimate aspirations of 
their peoples. It is important that the grievances of the people are addressed through 
dialogue and negotiations, rather than by resorting to arms. 
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“Achievement”  
Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri (India):2012 
For the achievement of that dream, India will continue to support all efforts, including 
those of the Quartet. At the same time, for a comprehensive settlement of Arab-Israeli 
problems, it is also important not to lose sight of other Arab lands under Israeli 
occupation. 
 
Negative Category   
 
 
“Occupied” 
  
India Ambassador Mr. GHAREKHAN (India) 1988 
The Palestinian people and the peoples of the other occupied Arab territories were also 
victims of grave injustice. 
 
 “Rights”  
Ambassador Ansari (India) 1994 
Therefore, finding a genuine solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict must begin and end with 
putting an end to occupation, and by returning to the Arabs their lands and their usurped 
rights. 
 
“Activities” 
Ambassador Mukerji (India): 2013  
The situation in the occupied Palestinian territories has been deteriorating, due to 
settlement activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Those activities are creating 
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new realities on the ground, threatening the very premise of a two State solution. The 
blockade of Gaza has also had serious consequences for the lives of Palestinians. 
 
 “Settlements”  
Mr. Ansari (India Rep), 1994  
Complete, just and comprehensive peace cannot be achieved under continuing occupation 
or while new settlement plans are being carried out regardless of the illegitimate nature of 
such settlements or the fact that they are a major impediment to peace.  
 
“Aggression”  
Ambassador Ansari (India) 1994  
The substance of the conflict never was and never will be cooperation between Israel and 
the Arabs. Rather, it is occupation, aggression, expansion, the acquisition of territory and 
the expulsion of Arab citizens. 
 
“Military”  
HARDEEP SING. PURI (India) 2004  
There could be no military solution to the Middle East problem. States of course had the 
right to defend themselves, but they also had the responsibility to uphold international 
law. The people of Palestine deserved the full support of the international community to 
enable them to realize their national aspirations. 
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APPENDIX 3  
AGGREGATE WORD FREQUENCY COUNTS IN NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE  
CATEGORIES BY INDIAN AMBASSADORS AT UN  
 
INDIA AMBASSADOR NEGATIVE VS. POSITIVE WORD FREQUENCIES  
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APPENDIX 4 
 
WORD FREQUENCY ISRAELI/TECHNOLOGY/COOPERATION 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 5 OFFICIAL (STATE SANCTIONED) EXCHANGES (VISITS AND TREATIES)  
 
Sources: (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs Government of 
India, Embassy of India in Israel, Embassy of the State of Israel in India  
 
2014 Visits 
Modi-Netanyahu phone call 
Indian Defense Minister visits Israel 
Modi-Netanyahu meeting in New York 
Foreign Minister meeting in New York   
Israeli National Security Advisor visits India  
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Indian Home Affairs Minister Visits Israel  
 
6 Visits+0 treaties - total 6 in 2014 
 
 
2013 
Minister of Indian Minister of Communications and Information Technology visits Israel 
Chief Minister of Indian State of Rajasthan visits Israel   
Israeli Minster of Economy visits India 
 
3 Visits +0 treaties – total 3 in 2013 
 
2012 
Indian Minister of Tourism Visits Israel  
Indian Minister of Communications and Information Technology and Human Resource 
Development visits Israel 
Indian Minister of Urban Development visits Israel 
Indian Minister of External Affairs visits Israel  
Israeli Minister of Energy, Water Resources and Infrastructure Visits India  
 
5 Visits + 0 treaties total 5 in 2012   
 
2011 
Chief Minister of Indian State of Haryana visits Israel  
Indian Minister of Communications and Information Technology visits Israel 
Indian Parliamentary Delegation visits Israel 
Reserve Bank of India Governor visits Israel 
Indian Comptroller and Auditor General visits Israel  
Israeli Minister of Finance visits India   
Israeli Minister of Internal Security visits India  
Israeli Minister of Tourism visits India   
Israeli Minister of Agriculture visits India   
 
9 Visits + 1 Treaty (Industrial Research) Total 10 in 2011  
 
2010 
Indian Parliamentary Delegation visits Israel 
Indian Minister of State Science and Technology visits Israel  
Indian Minister Commerce and Industry    
Israeli Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour visits India  
 
4 Total Visits in 2010 + 1 Treaty (Technology and Innovation) Total 5 in 2010  
 
2009 
Chief Minister of Indian State of Punjab visits Israel  
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Chief Minister of Indian State of Himachal Pradesh visits Israel 
 
2 Total Visits + 0 treaties Total 2 in in 2009   
 
 
2008 
Indian Chief Justice of Supreme Court visits Israel 
Former Indian President (Kalam) visits Israel  
Israeli Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development visits India    
 
3 Visits + Treaty (Industrial Development) Total 4 in 2008 
 
2007 
Chief Minister of Indian State of Madhya Pradesh visits Israel 
Indian Minister of State for Railways visits Israel 
Indian Minister of State for Industry visits Israel 
Israeli Interior Minister visits India  
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport and Road Safety visits India    
  
5 Visits + 1 Treaty (agriculture) + 6 Total in 2007 
 
 
2006 
Chief Minister of Indian State of Nagaland visits Israel 
Chief Minister of Indian State of Gujarat visits Israel  
Chief Minister of Indian State of Rajasthan visits Israel  
Indian Minister of Agriculture, Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution  
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour  
Israeli National Security Advisor visits India   
  
6 Visits+ 0 Treaties 6 Total in 2006 
 
2005 
Indian Minister of Agriculture, Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution visits 
Israel 
Indian Minister of Commerce and Industries visits Israel   
Indian Minister of State for Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation  
Indian Minister of State Science and Technology visits Israel 
 
4 Visits and 1 Treaty (Employment) total 5 in 2005 
 
 
 
2004 
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour and 
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Communications visits India 
Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry visits Israel  
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister with Supreme Court Justice visit 
India   
 
3 Visits and 0 Treaties Total 3 in 2004   
 
2003 
Israeli Minister of Science and Technology visits India   
Israeli Prime Minister with Deputy Prime Minster and Minister of Justice along with 
Minister of Agriculture and Israeli Minister of Education visit India   
2 Visits + 5 Treaties (Drugs) + (Environment) + (Health) + (Medicine) + (Exemption of 
visa requirements) Total 7 in 2003 
 
2002 
Indian Minister for Communication and Parliamentary Affairs visits Israel 
Israeli Environment Minister visits India 
Israeli Deputy Prime Minster and Minister of Foreign Affairs visits India   
 
3 Visits + 1 Treaty (Space) Total 4 in 2002 
 
2001 
Knesset (Israeli Parliament) delegation visits India   
Israeli Minister of Regional Cooperation visits India  
    
2 Visits + 0 Treaties 2 Total in 2001 
2000 
Deputy Chairperson of the  Rajya Sabho (Upper House Parliament) visits Israel  
Chief Minister of West Bengal visits Israel 
Indian Minister of External Affairs visits Israel 
Indian Minister of Home Affairs visits Israel  
Israeli Minister of Regional Cooperation visits India      
 
5 Visits + 0 Treaties 5 Total in 2000 
 
1999 
0 Visits + 0 Treaties Total 0 in 1999 
 
1998 
Indian Attorney General visits Israel 
Principle Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister visits India  
   
2 Total + 0 Treaties Total 2 in 1998  
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1997 
Israeli President Ezer Weizman visits India    
1 Total and 0 Treaties Total 1 in 1997    
 
 
1996 
0 Visits + 5 Treaties Customs) + (Research) + (Investments) + (Taxes) + (Technical 
Cooperation) Total 5 in 1996 
 
1995 
0 Visits + 0 Treaties Total 0 in 1995 
 
1994 
0 Visits and 4 Treaties (2 Aviation) + (Trade & Economic)   
+ Telecommunications and Posts Total 4 in 1994 
 
1993 
Israeli Foreign Minister visits India 
  
1 Visit and 3 Treaties (Agriculture) + (Culture) + (Tourism) Total 4 in 1993     
1992 
 
 0 Visits + 0 Treaties Total 0 in 1992 
1991 
 
 0 Visits and) Treaties Total 0 in 1991 
 
 
INDIA – ISRAEL BILATERAL TREATIES (YEAR BY YEAR) 
 
1993 Cultural Agreement 
  
1993 Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture 
 
1994 Air Transport Agreement 
 
1994 Agreement concerning Cooperation in the Field of Telecommunication and Posts 
 
1994 Agreement on Trade and Economics Cooperation 
 
1996 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
 
 
 
 312 
1996 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation/Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Tax  
 
1996 Bilateral Agreement regarding Mutual Assistance and Cooperation in Custom matters 
1996 Memorandum of Intent on a Joint High-tech Agricultural Demonstration 
Cooperation Project 
 
1996 Umbrella Agreement on the Development of Cooperation in the Field of Industrial & 
Technological Research & Development 
1996 Agreement on Technical Cooperation 
1997 Executive Agreement for a Programme of Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture. 
2003 Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Health and Medicine  
2003 Agreement on Cooperation in combating illicit trafficking and abuse of narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances 
2003 Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Protection of the Environment 
2003 Agreement on Exemption of Visa requirement for holders of diplomatic, 
official and service passports 
2005 Indo-Israel Industrial Initiative for R&D  
2005 Agreement on Economic Cooperation 
2006 Three-year Work Plan for Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture 
2007 MOU between MASHAV (Israel's Agency for International Development 
Cooperation) and ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi Arid 
Tropics 
2011 Joint declaration of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of India and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Israel for second phase of Agriculture 
Cooperation  
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2014 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance IN Criminal Matters   
2014 Agreement on cooperation in homeland and public security issue  
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CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION  
 
OVERVIEW  
 
 Ever since its founding, the State of Israel has grappled with forces seeking to 
delegitimize and isolate it in the international arena. To garner more friends and expand 
its political reach, Israel’s leaders introduced a foreign policy strategy, which entailed 
sharing specialized knowledge with other countries. The know-how/technology Israel 
harnessed, was based on experience gained through distinctive challenges faced by the 
country mostly in the fields of farming and security. It was hoped that technology 
transfers, would help advance the Jewish State’s international outreach and thus facilitate 
new relations or expand existing ones with other countries. The dissertation explored the 
interplay of technology/knowledge in the agriculture and military sectors as a source of 
attraction or soft power for Israel in international affairs.  
 China and India both exemplify cases of countries, which for decades ardently 
refused full formal ties with Israel. Yet over time, each of these countries found ample 
cause to set aside longstanding policy constraints which brought about significant change 
in dealings with Israel. In doing so, Indian and Chinese policymakers opened new 
pathways for initial contacts, which eventually gave way to full blown robust bilateral 
relations with Israel. The study assessed whether technology sharing was a viable factor 
in initiating, maintaining and extending diplomatic relationships broadly defined (trade, 
bilateral exchanges and policy approach towards the Middle East). To do this, the 
dissertation considered key mechanics in bilateral ties, like expected/reaped benefits and 
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the convergence of interests between Israel and its partners in Asia. This chapter offers 
overall conclusions about the role of technology as part of Israel’s diplomatic toolkit, in 
relations with China and India. Finally, it will suggest what other countries, in particular 
small states, can learn from Israel’s technical based foreign dealings. 
In recent decades, China and India have developed intricate and much closer ties 
with Israel despite an obscure history laced by murky meetings in the absence of full 
formal relations. The exchange of embassies between Israel and both Asian countries 
only became a reality after a thread of restrained irregular contacts occurring over the 
span of several years. When encounters did happen between Israeli and Chinese or Indian 
officials they were primarily informal, but often times touched on technical issues. 
Leaders in Beijing and New Delhi looked to the outside world for new technologies in 
lieu of rapid economic growth coupled with modernization ambitions. After the death of 
Chairman Mao, the new leadership in the PRC started a series of political and economic 
reforms. In doing so, China turned away from practicing established communist 
doctrines, instead pushing to modernize important sectors like agriculture, military and 
science/technology. Peng (2007) points out that when China’s leadership stopped looking 
outwardly solely in terms of political polarity, it turned instead to an emphasis on broader 
international cooperation. Beijing’s strong thirst to access new problem solving 
technologies annulled traditional dogmatic political practices. Thus, clearing a once 
forbidden pathway to establishing technology ties with Israel. Sobin (1991) sums up the 
transition in Sino-Israeli relations eloquently contending that Israel slowly went from 
being seen by Chinese leaders as inconsequential country to a potential partner and 
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source of benefits, which could be helpful in finding ways to tackle some of the PRC’s 
major national challenges.  
 India also experienced economic and political transformations, which stimulated 
greater global engagement. The Indian economy became more open to foreign 
partnerships. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, New Delhi lost its largest 
military supplier, the Soviet Union. Inbar (2009) asserts India’s move to normalize 
relations with Israel was part of a broader post-Cold War strategy to help India develop 
new ties with major international actors like the United States, and gain access to 
advanced technologies available from Israel to enhance national security. In essence, both 
China and India set aside ingrained ideological sentiments in favor of technical ties with 
the Jewish State. This pragmatic aspect of Chinese and Indian policies was part of what 
would become dual track foreign polices towards the Middle East--one policy pertaining 
to Israel and another policy for the wider Middle East. Meanwhile, on the Israeli side, 
decision makers sought to expand international contacts beyond Israel’s traditional allies 
in the West and turned eastwards to Asia. By mapping out the evolution of Sino-Israeli 
and Indian-Israeli relations, the dissertation has offered a feasible case, which 
underscores tacit and non-tacit benefits attained by Israel as products of technology 
transfers in foreign dealings especially with influential countries like China and India.  
 
DIPLOMACY SUCCESS? 
 
The concept of diplomacy is a key component of the dissertation topic. As an 
overriding concept in the study foreign affairs, diplomacy is widely accepted to be a 
depiction of a country’s efforts to promote its international interests through non-military 
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means. Though, gauging what distinctly constitutes diplomatic success has been, and 
remains, somewhat problematic. This is because a commonly accepted definition of 
success in diplomacy largely remains elusive. Johnson (2006) infers there is no consensus 
about what diplomacy ought to deliver. The absence of a definitive diplomatic success 
metric has made the probe of the dissertation topic a tricky endeavor. Therefore, it is 
difficult to pinpoint the precise weight of technology transfers as tools of persuasion 
(diplomacy) in foreign policy. 
 However, the use of historical narratives, coupled with a review of data trends 
and content analysis used in the study, have helped to identify positive and negative 
tendencies in Israel’s ties with India and China, which in turn implied variant levels of 
diplomatic achievements in the case of Israel’s diplomatic outreach. The study adopted 
various techniques to gather, organize, analyze and interpret data, while mindful of the 
lack a clear “success” definition. It introduced the hypothesis, independent, dependent, 
and intervening variables. To be clear, the study is not suggesting that any correlations 
which may have been observed between the variables necessarily infer causation. 
However, interview data suggest a linkage between Israel’s technology transfer activities 
and the expansion of ties with China and India. The dissertation analyzed a blend of 
quantitative and qualitative content. It also introduced a liberal analysis strategy, which 
doesn’t conform to a specific theory. Given interdisciplinary and unconventional nature 
of the dissertation theme, the broad theoretical approach was determined to be the most 
realistic way to assess interconnections between the study variables: independent 
variables (technology transfers), dependent variables (robust relations comprised of trade, 
bilateral exchanges, and policy statements towards Israel), and intervening variables 
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(Middle East conflict flare-ups, economic, and political factors). The research 
incorporated software assisted and manual reviewing of tens of thousands of press 
reports, and hundreds of NGO documents. The software assisted analysis (NVivo) 
employed a qualitative summative research method, which considered word occurrences, 
significance, positioning of words or concepts, in the context of Indian and Chinese 
statements at the UN with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict specific issues. 
Drawing on a broad range of literature, the study also examined a collection of overall 
concepts inside and outside the field of International Relations. The theme of this 
dissertation examined the implications of technology transfers in international relations 
and how this type of engagement can be associated with central international relations 
and international theory concepts like soft power, interdependence, and functionalism. 
Within the realm of Israeli diplomacy, forms of Nye’s soft power (vehicles of attraction) 
were explored as tacit tools of small state statecraft. The dissertation showed that these 
concepts can be considered tools of statecraft and are very much in play in the confines of 
Israeli diplomacy and Middle East politics. These conceptions were considered while 
watchful of the increasing significance of small state actors in the international system 
after the Cold War.  
Soft power (ability to attract others) in Israel’s case, verified the concept’s utility 
as a plausible way for smaller states to extend their presence internationally, despite the 
limitations of their physical size. Israel also offers a unique scenario of a small country 
with two noteworthy attributes, technical experience but also the lack of financial 
resources. Rightly or wrongly, Israel has been perceived by some countries as a “power” 
larger than it actually (physically) is. This may be attributed in part to Israel’s technical 
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achievements and international technical engagements. This scenario suggests that even 
smaller countries like Israel, which have little in terms of resources except for human 
capital, can still have much to offer larger partner countries. Israel’s soft power in ties 
with China and India was realized through agents of attraction in the form of military and 
agriculture technologies. Technology or know-how transfers offered promises of 
resolving problems, and as such are viable sources of attraction. Cristo (2005) suggests 
utilization of soft power is contingent on how others, namely other states, recognize it. 
China and India recognized Israel’s technical capabilities as helpful in dealing with their 
own national challenges which in turn became bridges in achieving bilateral and multi-
lateral understandings. All this against the background of an emerging global economy 
which as Kutys (2009) asserts promotes interdependence between states, and generates 
international cooperation opportunities to deal with problems. Also considered, was the 
nature of Israel’s China and India partnerships in the framework of interdependence. 
Andrews (2010) and Keohane (2012) assert interdependent relations are driven by mutual 
or shared interests. Keohane and Nye (1977) argued interdependence fosters reciprocity 
and is a chief tool in helping states gain benefits unlikely achieved by any other means. It 
is reasonable to suggest Israel gained economic and strategic benefits as part of bilateral 
exchanges. On the one hand, Israel needed to make more friends. On the other hand, 
China and India needed Israel’s experiences and know-how to overcome challenges in 
military and agricultural matters. However, this is not to say that Israel’s interdependent 
relations with China and India were symmetrical. They were not. The relationship was 
asymmetrical as Israel was more dependent on India and China than the other way 
around. Furthermore, Israel-China and Israel-India relations can be explained along the 
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lines of functionalism as described by Mitrany (1971) as a mechanism set up to tackle 
overall mutual problems. On this point, Mitrany’s notion of functionism further resonates 
the theme of common interests as central drivers behind international collaborations to 
solve problems. Technical cooperation like joint ventures between Israel and her partners 
also permitted the exchange of ideas and opened new opportunities. Joint ventures in one 
sector likely helped to set the stage for discussions on wider contacts and spheres of 
bilateral cooperation. In this way, non-political collaborations could be opened to bring 
about relationships on political levels as well.   
Israeli technology transfers have demonstrated the value of technical ties in 
foreign relations and generating broader contacts. Israel’s, small yet pointed programs, 
have maintained a measure of strategic significance. Past and present programs continue 
to operate as mechanisms for initiating, maintaining, and developing broader 
international opportunities for Israeli policymakers. Israel's success in specialized fields 
offer much in way of talking points for Israeli leaders, diplomats, and pro-Israel advocacy 
groups.  
In agriculture, MASHAV, Israel’s development agency set up and bolstered joint 
farming projects in India and China, which showcased the local benefits of Israeli 
agricultural methods. While technologies and techniques were featured in the specific 
demonstration farms they were designed to be adopted and applied in multiple areas 
across India and China. In the defense sector too, there have been substantial interactions 
among Israel, India and China. However, many of Israel’s military collaborations have 
remained secret. Still, scores of published accounts in the media and other non-
governmental sources have made such secret dealings (worth billions) an open secret.   
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Bozeman (2000) contends that the transport of knowledge produces political, 
economic and social implications, which could impact a country’s behavior. The study 
accentuated the merits of technology sharing in impacting the behaviors of others 
(government or society) which might otherwise not occur. An example of this was the 
introduction of technology from one country partner to another (Israel to China and 
India), which helped to promote increased bilateral exchanges and opportunities for new 
policies towards Israel.  
The dissertation’s examination of UN textual data (ambassador statements) aimed 
to sense how Indian and Chinese policies on the Middle East have altered over the past 
few decades. Some scholars interviewed for the dissertation maintain there has been little 
or no change in Chinese and Indian official political policies towards Israel despite strong 
growing technical ties. However, in terms of diplomatic rhetoric in the case of India and 
China there is some evidence, which questions the vitality of the support toward the 
Palestinian cause. There have been subtle but noticeable changes in tones in speeches by 
Chinese and Indian representatives at the UN. In more recent times there appears to be 
less vocal outright condemnation by China and India of Israel. Over the past two decades 
the rhetoric has veered more in the direction of middle-of-the-road balanced policy 
statements.  This assessment is based on the results of original software assisted content 
analysis which closely examined textual data (speeches and statements) from 1989 to 
2014. This range of time represents two significant periods in Israel’s relations with both 
China and India. The first period being the immediate years leading up to full formal ties. 
The second being the period after diplomatic relations became a reality. The analysis 
entailed isolating key words usually used in debates on Palestinian-Israeli conflict issues. 
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These words were then categorized as either positive or negative. Words like 
“aggression” or “settlements” were coded negative because they were typically used to be 
exclusively critical of Israel. Words like “peace” and “negotiations” were coded positive 
because they are usually used to address both sides of the conflict and promote peace 
building while avoiding singling out Israel for blame. In both, China and India cases 
analysis showed that over time generally positive word usage occurred more frequently 
than negative words. The analysis results implied a decline of critical rhetoric directed at 
Israel in the years after diplomatic relations were established. It also concurs with the 
notion that perhaps China and India are more attuned to Israel’s overall security 
sensitivities. So, generally, China and India support Israel’s right to defend itself but at 
times also expressing reservations about some Israeli military actions and opposition to 
violence.  Softer language suggested that both India and China have departed from past 
more dogmatic driven approaches when it comes to Israel and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Dhume (2014) emphasizes an amplified openness in Indian-Israeli relations introduced 
by the Modi government perhaps suggests a strategic partnership with Israel carries more 
weight for India than solidarity for the Palestinian cause. A seemingly subtle shift in 
policy may be evidenced by India’s abstention on a pivotal vote at the UN aimed at 
denouncing Israel for its 2014 military operation in Gaza. A 2014 address by the Foreign 
Minister of China in Israel also offers a glaring departure from previous Chinese policy 
statements which traditionally used words like “aggression” and “brutal” to characterize 
Israeli territorial claims.  Minister Wang Yi described Israel “as an ancient land of the 
ancient Jewish people”. While symbolic, the statement suggests empathy towards Israel’s 
controversial, yet biblical and core claims to territory.  
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SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS VS INDIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS:  STRIKING SIMILARITIES 
 
 
There are striking similarities on how Israel formed its relationships with China 
and India.  First, technology/knowledge sharing was a vehicle for contacts and exchanges 
even in the absence of full diplomatic relations with both countries. Although, to a lesser 
extent in the case of India. Second, both India and China initially conducted contacts with 
Israel covertly as to not upset Muslim and Arab countries. Third, China and India sought 
technology/knowledge from Israel, which they believed would be useful in addressing 
national (food security and national security) concerns. Fourth, in both cases, the 
usefulness of technology and knowledge acted as a bridge between Israel and its Asian 
partners beyond national levels extending to sub-national levels through paradiplomacy 
mechanisms. Fifth, with the end of the Cold War, Beijing and New Delhi realized that 
they needed a more balanced approach to the Middle East in order to play a more active 
role in the region. Sixth, both India and China were mindful that full formal relations 
with Israel might harm long term relationships with the Arab countries and at first 
hesitantly initiated ties. Seventh, both countries adopted dual track Middle East policies, 
in essence delinking the issue of the conflict with the Palestinians from the workings of 
relations with Israel. Eighth, once full formal ties were established with India and China 
in 1992, technical collaboration accelerated especially in agriculture through joint 
demonstration farms and in the defense sector through the transfer of advanced military 
weaponry. Ninth, also after start of diplomatic relations in 1992 robust relations 
blossomed in terms of trade and bi-lateral exchanges between Israel and both India and 
China. Finally, India and China have demonstrated increased sensitivity to Israel’s 
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security concerns through more moderate stances at the UN on Israeli Palestinian conflict 
issues. All of these factors have helped lessen Israel’s isolation in international forums, 
which is a major objective in the business of Israeli diplomacy.  
 
SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS VS INDIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS:  NOTABLE DIFFERENCES     
 
    
There are some notable differences between the Sino-Israeli and the Indian-Israeli 
narratives. First as a liberal democracy, India was more responsive than the PRC to 
internal constraints. In India there was political opposition and electorate grievances 
about expanding relations with Israel (Muslim community concerns), which tended to 
question and mitigate intentions for greater ties with Israel. China did not seemingly 
contend with domestic apprehensions outside the communist party apparatus. Second, in 
earlier times (pre-1992) India maintained a cold subdued approach towards Israel, but 
New Delhi did allow the presence of an Israeli Consulate. No such equivalent Israeli 
mission was permitted in China. Third, Washington worked to limit the scope of Sino-
Israeli relations but generally did not obstruct Indian-Israeli ties. This was especially 
noticeable when it came to the transfer of defense and/or dual use products. The US 
stopped Israeli military exports to China yet in sharp contrast did not object to Indian-
Israeli joint defense production of weapons systems. Fourth, Israel’s ties with China have 
negatively impacted US-Israeli relations. Israel’s relations with India did not adversely 
impact ties between Washington and Jerusalem. Finally, against the background of 
regional rivalry, China was the first to forge full relations with Israel while New Delhi 
followed so as not be outdone by Beijing.   
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Regardless of political based limitations holding back ties with Israel, a strong 
case can be made to demonstrate that technology offerings functioned as catalysts in 
kindling bilateral engagements once specific areas of cooperation were identified. This 
was true in the absence of diplomatic relations like when a delegation from China 
traveled to Israel in 1985 for discussions on possible joint projects in agriculture and 
cooperation opportunities in other areas like solar energy, robotics, and arms 
manufacturing (Sobin, 1991) and (Sufott, 1997).  Another example was the dispatch of 
Indian agricultural specialists to Israel to observe farming methods before full relations 
between Israel and India were instated in 1992.   
Technology transfers were also a factor in nurturing and expanding ties once open 
formal relationships were established. Israel’s efforts to expand ties have steadily 
produced results. The Jewish State built agricultural and defense relationships, which 
spilled over into broader areas of technology engagements helping to spur political and 
cultural exchanges. The spillover into others areas is notable both in the case of relations 
with India and China.  For example, in China, broader collaboration areas like the 
transfer of Israeli solar power technologies to Henan Province. In India, expanded 
collaboration through a bilateral agreement establishing a research and development 
cooperation pact involving specialized technologies like nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
space, water management and non-conventional energy sources.  
Technological transfers as Larson (1998) suggests are driven by the prospects of 
achieving maximum mutual benefits for the technology receiver and sender. Interactions 
to achieve the most shared objectives offer opportunities for face-to-face talks. This is 
what happened in Israel’s relations with India and China. Irrespective of political 
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rhetoric, Israel largely continues to experience noteworthy achievements in terms of 
increased international trade and recognition. Countries typically look at what experience 
and skills prospective partners can contribute.  
In summing up, overall Israel's technology offerings have helped it widen 
political, military and trade ties. However, Israel’s technical cooperation vis-à-vis China 
and India did not evolve through traditional diplomatic protocol. On this very point, 
Israel’s first ambassador to China, Zev Suffott, offers a helpful agricultural metaphor to 
neatly unpack the pathways taken to reach the normalization of diplomatic relations 
between Israel and China. The metaphor can also be used to describe the making of 
Indian-Israel relations (Goldstein, 1999). There are four stages in the metaphor. First, is 
drought, which is the period of no political/diplomatic progress. Second, is ploughing, 
which is the period of unofficial indirect contacts limited to technical fields like 
agriculture, defense, science, and technology. Third, is sowing, which is a period of 
progress in the larger geopolitical context of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Finally, harvest, 
a period diplomatic relations. 
 
WHAT OTHERS CAN LEARN FROM THE ISRAELI EXPERINCE AND FINAL REMARKS   
 
By traditional standards, Israel is a small country in terms of territory and 
population. It’s a country which contends with unique existential issues and foreign 
policy challenges. Overall though, Israel is no different than other states in the 
international system which vie for self-preservation. Simply, states are seeking security to 
survive (Waltz 1979). To fulfil this endeavor Israel, has devised ways to help overcome 
its adversities. In the process, Israel has succeeded in turning the skills and technologies 
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developed to deal with national challenges into marketable products and services which 
are of critical use to other states. In other words, converting disadvantages (lack of water, 
national defense burdens) into advantages (innovations in arid farming, advanced military 
industry).  
On this very point, Aharoni (2012) an Israeli diplomat asserts Israel’s country 
positioning or branding was accomplished by utilizing the county’s competitive edge in 
selected sectors to marketing itself. Put another way pegging the country’s image to a 
certain proven and desired skillsets. Aharoni points out people who eagerly care about 
specific issues will set aside political disparities to listen to offers in areas they are 
interested in. The Israeli case is an important example because it de-facto shatters the 
belief that small states cannot be operational global players. Small state global payers like 
Israel can harvest noteworthy benefits. Other small states, too can also benefit from the 
foreign policy approach Israel has adopted in a number of ways. 
The perception of being a global player in itself offers small states the following principle 
prospects:  
• Securing wider circles of partnerships with other countries in public or through 
secretive ties.   
• More international engagement ties enhance trade opportunities and even political 
benefits both in non-tacit and tacit forms.  
 
The dissertation also hypothesized that specific intervening variables could 
perhaps foster or impede the strength of connections between the independent 
(technology transfer) and dependent variables (trade, exchanges and policies towards 
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Israeli Palestinian conflict). What follows is a summary of how some intervening 
variables played a role in both Sino-Israeli and Indian-Israeli relations: 
 
• Technology transfer addresses priorities. India and the PRC sought ways to 
boost agricultural/food output while struggling with water scarcity. These issues 
have spurred interest in the Israeli agricultural experience and produced a myriad 
of contacts and collaborations with Israel.   
• Security/military/terror threats. Responding to border conflicts and various 
security threats, India and China found interest in learning about Israel’s military 
hardware and experiences.  
• Access to the US through Israeli Channels. This intervening variable is an 
indirect factor in Indian-Israel relations but not a significant feature in Sino-Israeli 
Relations. There has been collaboration between the predominant pro-Israel 
(AIPAC) and Indian American Groups like US-India Political Action Committee 
(USINPAC) which promotes India-US Relations. However, China’s ties with 
Israel have helped boost access to the influential leaders in the American Jewish 
Community.  
• Geo-Political Shifts. Events such as the end of the Cold War, Middle East 
interests, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Arab Spring. All of these issues have 
either hindered ties or opened opportunities for contacts among Israel, China and 
India. For example, the 1956 Sinai War halted potential progress towards formal 
ties. However, concerns about upheavals in the Middle East in the wake of Arab 
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Spring uprisings gave cause for China and India to look for ways to reduce risk 
and diversify their interests in the region including expanded ties with Israel.  
 
It would be difficult to deny that technical engagement with India and China have 
not produced tangible and worthy gains for Israel. In fact, the dissertation demonstrated 
through a collection of common interests, data trends and software assisted content 
analysis that technology transfer engagement has helped create settings which promote 
bilateral exchanges and openings for expansive collaborations. 
Despite challenges posed by lack of land and resources, Israel has successfully 
branded itself as a world leader in specialized knowledge. The Israeli experience armed 
policymakers and diplomats with an inventory of skills which could be offered to other 
nations. The dissertation showed how national vulnerabilities of both China and India tie 
into the development and growth of ties with Israel. India-Israel and Sino-Israeli ties 
exemplify realpolitik, and underscore self-interest in international relations. Ironically, as 
Israel’s ties with Beijing flourish, China’s growing global role may not necessarily be in 
Israel’s overall interest.  A more powerful global position for the PRC could diminish the 
international influence of Israel’s most important partners like United States and India 
which in the long run may not play well for the Jewish State.  
The study showed reasonable cause suggesting Israel’s technology sharing was a 
viable factor in initiating, maintaining and extending diplomatic relationships broadly 
defined (trade, bilateral exchanges and policy approach towards the Middle East). 
However, in retrospect the study could have also been done differently.   
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HOW THE STUDY COULD HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY: 
 
The dissertation could have studied a single case study instead of two. In this way, 
a more in-depth analysis could have been accomplished. The study could have explored 
wider aspects of a single case study narrative. The content analysis sections (with two 
cases) could have utilized a larger number of positive and negative word indicators. 
Furthermore, the analysis, could have utilized consolidated frequency word counts of 
words with similar meanings and by doing so legitimately generate higher frequency 
words counts.  Higher word frequency counts could help produce more pronounced 
visualizations of data trends. Also, the study could have made more use of NVivo’s 
extensive analytical features.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS:   
 
To further explore the role of technology transfers in diplomacy it would be 
constructive to study the case of countries which have similar diplomatic challenges like 
those of Israel. One example that stands out is Taiwan.  Like Israel, it is known as a 
technically advanced country. At the same time, also like Israel, Taiwan must contend 
with military threats and diplomatic isolation. It would be interesting as a follow-up study 
to investigate how Taiwan’s international technical relations play a part in expanding ties 
with other countries despite challenges posed by doing business with Taipei at the risk of 
upsetting Beijing.  
Another direction for further research can include a more systematic assessment 
of the dependent and independent variables using econometric methodologies. While 
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some of the variables will require coding and identification of the needed data, 
quantitative data is already available for the other variables currently used in the study. 
Such a large-n study could better demonstrate causation. 
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